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RACIAL CODING AND THE FINANCIAL MARKET CRISIS
andr6 douglas pond cummings*
I. INTRODUCTION
The financial market crisis of 2008 has plagued the United States and
countries around the world.' The underlying causes of the 2008 collapse are
numerous, intricate, and complex. Academic scholars, investigative reporters, and
leading economists are now deconstructing the multiplicity of failures that enabled
2
the breathtaking meltdown that nearly collapsed the global economy. As this
* 0 2011 andr6 douglas pond cummings, Visiting Professor of Law, University of
Iowa College of Law; Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law. I am
grateful to Professors Aya Gruber, Steven Ramirez, Peggie Smith, Timothy Canova,
Deirdre Bowen, and Kristin Johnson for excellent comments to early drafts of this Article.
For fantastic research assistance, I am grateful to Sarah Tofflemire, University of Iowa
College of Law, class of 2011. I am further appreciative to Kimberly Murphy, West
Virginia University College of Law, class of 2009; Kyle Schmidt, University of Iowa
College of Law, class of 2011; and Devin Daines, West Virginia University College of
Law, class of 2011, for terrific research assistance. For excellent feedback on this piece in
its nascent stages, I am grateful to the Mid-Atlantic People of Color Conference, held at the
University of Virginia in January 2010, with particular thanks to Deborah Post, Henry
Richardson, William Rhee, Emma Coleman Jordan, and Atiba Ellis. I am also grateful for
the comments that I received during a presentation at the Midwestern People of Color
Conference, held at Loyola University Chicago in April 2010, and at faculty colloquia at
the University of Iowa College of Law and Southern Methodist University Dedman School
of Law. I gratefully acknowledge the West Virginia University College of Law Hodges
Research Grant that provided support necessary to draft this Article. Finally, I am deeply
appreciative to Lavinia, Cole Kaianuanu, Malia Ao'ilagi, and Maxwell Keav6 for constant
sunshine and peace. Of course, as usual, the politics and errata of this Article belong
exclusively to me.
1 See Foreclosure Rate Up 30% From Last February, CBS NEWS (Mar. 12,
6
2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/03/12/national/main48 1033.shtml; STEVEN
RAMIREZ, REIMAGINING CAPITALISM (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at introduction) (on
file with author) (describing the global impact of the U.S. capital markets meltdown); Alan
Zibel, ForeclosureRates Up by Smallest Amount in 4 Years, USA TODAY (Mar. 11, 2010,
12:40 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2010-03-11-foreclosures
N.htm ("Banks repossessed nearly 79,000 homes last month, down 10% from January but
still up 6% from February 2009."); infra notes 4, 5.
2 See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS AND THE SINKING OF
THE WORLD ECONOMY 12-18 (2010); GARY GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND:
THE PANIC OF 2007, at 1-12 (2010); SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE
WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 3-13 (2010); ROGER
LOWENSTEIN, THE END OF WALL STREET, at XXI-XXV (2010); BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE
NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 437 (2010); SCOTT PATTERSON, THE QUANTS 3, 11-12 (2010); RAMIREZ, supra note I
(manuscript at introduction); ROBERT SKIDELSKY, KEYNES: THE RETURN OF THE MASTER
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thoughtful deconstruction crystallizes, a disturbing trend has forcefully surfaced,
wherein dozens of writers, scholars, and thinkers, motivated by politics, limelight,
and self-indulgence, have attempted to fix a singular or foundational cause as "the"
reason for the market crisis of 2008. In a political environment that favors
simplicity And scapegoating, there is a certain toxic danger when singular blame is
fixed to deeply complex failures in order to pander to those in an electorate that
live for sound bites and embrace minimalist explanations. Attempting to find
singular or primary causation by assigning simple blame for the enormous
institutional and personal failures that precipitated the financial market crisis is
reckless and ultimately counterproductive.3
The magnitude of the collapse and its devastating consequences, 4 many of
which continue unabated,5 requires a careful and systematic review of causes,
3-28 (2009); ANDREW Ross SORKIN, Too BIG TO FAIL (2009) (detailing the Lehman
Brothers failure from beginning to end); THOMAS SOWELL, THE HOUSING BOOM AND BUST
1-29 (2009); Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Wages of Failure:Executive Compensation at
Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 258-61 (2010); Timothy
A. Canova, Financial Market Failure as a Crisis in the Rule of Law: From Market
Fundamentalism to a New Keynesian Regulatory Model, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 369,
370 (2009); Joseph Karl Grant, What the FinancialServices Industry Puts Together Let No
Person Put Asunder: How the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Contributed to the 2008-2009
American CapitalMarkets Crisis, 73 ALB. L. REV. 371, 373-77 (2010); Kristin N. Johnson,
Things Fall Apart: Regulating the Credit Default Swap Commons, 82 U. COLO. L. REV.
167, 169-73 (2011); Christopher Peterson, Foreclosure,Subprime MortgageLending, and
the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 78 U. CIN. L. REv. 1359, 1359-63 (2010);
Steven A. Ramirez, Subprime Bailouts and the PredatorState, 35 DAYTON L. REV. 81, 8184 (2009); Steven L. Schwarcz, Markets, Systemic Risk, and the Subprime Mortgage
Crisis, 61 SMU L. REv. 209, 209-14 (2008); Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial
Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 373-75
(2008); William K. Black, Those Who Forget the Regulatory Successes of the Past Are
Condemned to Failure, EcoN. & POL. WKLY., Mar. 28, 2009, at 80, 80-86; William K.
Black, The Disastrous Unexpected Consequences of Private Compensation Reforms 2
(Oct. 28, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/

papers.cfm?abstract id=1536513; Joseph G. Bunn, A Justified "Assault upon the Citadel of
Privity" and the First Amendment: A Theory of Liability for Investors Seeking Recovery
from Credit Rating Agencies 9-13 (Fall 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
3 See The FinancialCrisis and the Role of FederalRegulators: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 110th Cong. 11-14 (2008) (statement of Alan

Greenspan, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve) ("It was the failure to properly price
[subprime securities] that precipitated the crisis."); Peter J. Wallison, Barney Frank,
PredatoryLender, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 2009, at Al9 (blaming Democrats, Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac for the market crisis); Interview by Chris Cuomo, Good Moining
America, ABC News, with Bill Clinton (Sept. 25, 2008), available at
http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalradar/2008/09/bill-clinton-do.html
(video at 2:48)
(blaming the SEC's "uptick rule" for the financial market meltdown).
4

See Edmund L. Andrews, Economic Activity Is Slowing across Many Areas, Fed

ChairmanSays,.N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2008, at C13 ("Mr. Bemanke said Main Street was
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impacts, failures, and economic breakdowns.6 The foundational causes of the
meltdown are numerous. Yet, despite evidence that literally dozens of failures7
already beginning to reel from the crisis on Wall Street. . . . Consumer spending, adjusted
for inflation, declined in both June and July and probably in August as well. The country
lost 100,000 jobs in August and has lost 770,000 since November. . . . 'This is the most
significant financial crisis of the postwar period,' Mr. Bernanke said . . . . 'I see the

financial markets as already quite fragile. The credit markets aren't working. Corporations
aren't able to finance themselves through commercial paper."'); Michael R. Crittenden &
Patrick Yoest, The FinancialCrisis:AIG at Risk: Resolution Trust Plan Is Floated,WALL
ST. J., Sept. 17, 2008, at A12 ("Staring down the worst financial crisis in decades, U.S.
lawmakers are strongly considering whether they need to dust off a 1980s-era plan to help
save the banking industry and stabilize the economy more broadly."); Carl Hulse & David
M. Herszenhorn, Behind ClosedDoors, Warnings of Calamity, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2008,
at C5 ("Gathered in the conference room just off House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's personal
suite on the second floor of the Capitol, the Congressional leadership had just received the
sobering news Thursday night that America's economy remained in peril despite a series of
sudden interventions by the Federal Reserve. . . . In telephone briefings with lawmakers,
Mr. Paulson and the Fed chairman, Ben S. Bernanke, sought to make it clear that the price
of doing nothing could be calamitous. 'If we don't get this, it will be nothing short of a
disaster for our markets,' Mr. Bernanke told House Republicans in a conference call Friday
. . . ."); Sudeep Reddy, The FinancialCrisis; THE OUTLOOK: Fed Could Suffer if New

Role Clashes with Policy-Setting,WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2008, at A8.
5 See Peter S. Goodman, Despite Signs of Recovery, Chronic Joblessness Rises, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 21, 2010 at Al ("Even as the American economy shows tentative signs of a
rebound, the human toll of the recession continues to mount, with millions of Americans
remaining out of work, out of savings and nearing the end of their unemployment
benefits."); The Cost of the Financial Meltdown: Deficits and Spending, BBC NEWS,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8214272.stm (last visited Jan. 21, 2011); Economic
News Release: Employment Situation Summary, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nrO.htm (last modified Jan. 7, 2011) (reporting
unemployment for January 2010 at 9.7% nationally with an estimated 14.8 million people
unemployed); Failed Bank List, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/bank
list.html (last updated Jan. 21, 2011) (listing 157 failed banks in 2010).
6 See Eliot Spitzer, Frank Partnoy & William Black, Op-Ed., Show Us the E-Mail,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2009, at WK9 ("The three of us, as experienced investigators and
prosecutors of financial fraud, cannot answer these questions now. But we know where the
answers are. They are in the trove of e-mail messages still backed up on A.I.G. servers, as
well as in the key internal accounting documents and financial models generated by A.I.G.
during the past decade. Before releasing its regulatory clutches, the government should
insist that the company immediately make these materials public. By putting the evidence
online, the government could establish a new form of 'open source' investigation.");
Sewell Chan, Under Pressure, the White House Ponders How to Remake Fannie and
Freddie, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2010, at B3 ("Despite growing pressure from Congress to
act quickly, the Obama administration is moving tentatively to develop a plan to reshape
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac .

. .

. [T]he Treasury secretary, Timothy F. Geithner, said the

administration would 'take a fresh, cold, hard look at the core problems' in housing finance
. . . ."); Brady Dennis, The AIG E-Mail Trail; Behind the Public Declarationsof Optimism
in 2007, Months ofInternalDiscordandDoubt, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2009, at Al ("While
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precipitated the "Great Recession, many on the right and on the left attempt to
point to individual and singular causes for the economic crisis that seek to establish
a particular political purpose or win for them political points in their specific
positioning.9 Still, thoughtful and honest analysis of the meltdown defies easy
blame categorization or simple causation bottoming. A sincere commentator,
academic, or politician will acknowledge the depth of the failures, the breadth of
the negligence and ignorance, and the audacity of the greed and avarice that nearly
collapsed the global marketplace.10 Many commentators, however, have continued
to "expose" the simple reason that the economy collapsed.
The recklessness of pinning simple blame is manifest. First, it obscures a
genuine interrogation of causation and hampers the ability to remedy mistakes and
past failures. Second, it allows for misdirection and manipulation of events in a
way that confuses and distorts. Third, it camouflages policies and provides cover
for policy makers that promoted positions and legislation that enabled the failure.
Finally, assigning singular, simplistic blame for political purposes undermines
thoughtful and careful introspection that must necessarily be measured when
debating and promoting new policy direction and legislation aimed toward
prevention of future financial crises.
This Article rejects the general, reckless trend toward simple blame causation
which swiftly emerged as interested parties attempted to quantify the financial
market crisis as an avoidable event, but for a particular reason, decision, or
the e-mails offer the most revealing look yet at AIG's inner struggles, they also underscore
the main obstacle to federal prosecutors assessing individual culpability for the financial
crisis. In a Wall Street culture defined by salesmanship and secrecy, divining the difference
between optimism and deceit can be a legal morass-especially when it comes to
convincing a jury that the line has been crossed.... The e-mails, many consumed with
technical details of the firm's deals, reflect an ongoing internal debate about how best to
characterize the company's subprime exposure."); Benjamin M. Friedman, The Failure of
the Economy and the Economists, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, May 28, 2009, at 42, 42-45.
7See infra Parts II.A-C.
8

See PAuL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF

2008, at 181-91 (2009); STIGLITZ, supra note 2, at xi; Niall Ferguson, Op-Ed., When Will
the Recession Be Over?: Our Great Recession, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2009, at WK12; Don
Lee, Unemployment Rate Falls to 9.7%; The Drop Is Tempered by Data Showing the U.S.
Lost 8.4 Million Jobs in the Last Two Years, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2010, at Al; David
Leonhardt, Casualtiesof the Recession, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2009, at B 1.
9 See Wallison, supra note 3; Stephen Gandel, Did Foreigners Cause America's
Financial Crisis?, TIME (Jan. 15, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/business/article/

0,8599,1954240,00.html ('There is no doubt that the pressure on the U.S. financial system
[that led to the financial crisis] came from abroad,' says Caballero, who is the head of
MIT's economics department. 'Foreign investors created a demand for assets that was
difficult for the U.S. financial sector to produce. All they wanted were safe assets, and
[their ensuing purchases] made the U.S. unsafe."' (alteration in original)).
1o See generally Timeline: A Year of Financial Crisis, NPR, http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyld=112538025 (last visited Jan. 24, 2011) (detailing the

depth and breadth of the financial market crisis through a timeline description).
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legislative enactment. Rejecting the simplicity of such an approach to causation,
this Article carefully examines a laundry list of quantifiable failures that enabled
the economy to slip to the very edge of the financial abyss in late 2008.
Challenging the most nefarious of the causation explanations for the meltdown,
this Article will explore postracialism in the United States and will confront a dirty
little myth that emerged immediately upon notice that the economy faced certain
collapse.
In the early rush by commentators to evaluate the financial market crisis,
several startling explanations emerged, primarily from those seeking to assign
simple extrapolations. Perhaps the most startling "cause" put forth for the near
global meltdown is the "minority borrower" extrapolation that emerged in the very
first moments of the September 2008 tumult that accompanied the Troubled Asset
Relief Program (TARP) debates. During the tensest moments surrounding the
mortgage crisis in September and October 2008, as TARP was furiously debated
on Capitol Hill, and as doomsday messages were being delivered daily, many
pundits on the right named racial "minorities" and lending to "poor minorities" as
a root cause for the market collapse." This "dirty little myth" played on loop at
various news channels and on talk radio programs for weeks and months
resonating with those Americans that receive their politics and views from such

sources.12
In an ultimate irony, at precisely the same moment that minority borrowers
were being saddled with the responsibility for crashing a global economy, the
United States citizenry was preparing to send a minority politician to the White
House to take the most powerful seat in the world. During the September 2008
economic firestorm where financial Armageddon was threatened as certain, the
United States was simultaneously engaged deeply in a historic election cycle. As
then-Senator Barack Obama and Senator John McCain battled for the votes of
American citizens, the campaign was blindsided by the economic crisis. In the
weeks leading up to the November 2008 election, the financial market crisis played
a critical role in the campaigns as both Obama and McCain worked hard to
convince the voting public that each was the man best qualified to lead the country
forward.' 3 Most agree that Obama was more convincing in that role.14 Professor
Derrick Bell posits that absent the financial market crisis, according to his interest
convergence theory,' 5 Obama would not have secured the presidency.16

"See infra Part III.A.
12 See infra notes 359-373 and accompanying
text.
13 See JOHN HEILEMANN & MARK HALPERIN, GAME CHANGE: OBAMA AND THE
CLINTONS, MCCAIN AND PALIN, AND THE RACE OF A LIFETIME 377-93 (2010).

See id. at 392-93.
See generally Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARv. L. REV. 518 (1980), reprinted in CRITICAL RACE
THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 20 (Kimberl6 Crenshaw et al.
14

's

eds., 1995) (Bell's interest-convergence theory posits that only when white American's
interests are furthered, will the interests of African Americans be considered or protected).
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With the financial market crisis as backdrop, President Obama
overwhelmingly won the election. Dozens of commentators and millions of
Americans then argued that, with the election of Obama as president, the United
States officially entered a postracial era.17 Postracialism, in averring that the
election of an African American president formally moves the nation past its racial
problems, essentially maintains that honest and open interrogation of racism and
discrimination in the United States is no longer necessary.'" According to
postracialists, America has truly arrived at our colorblind ideal. Racism is a relic of
a checkered past that has been affirmatively overcome. 19
Notwithstanding the attractiveness of the postracial ideology, these arguments
were being made at the very same time that a simmering tale was being floated and
adopted by many of the very same citizens that were hailing a new postracial
America. While markets were roiling in September and October 2008,20 with
See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., On Celebratingan Election as Racial Progress, 36
HUM.
RTS. 4 (2009) ("Barack Obama's election was a dramatic example of Interest Convergence.
... Facing lost jobs and foreclosed homes, [voters] had to ask themselves if they wanted a
really smart young black guy, or a stodgy old white guy from the same crowd who put
them in this hole."); HEILEMANN & HALPERIN, supra note 13, at 392-93, 632 ("[T]he
16

collapse of the economy hurt the GOP.... Obama demonstrated a capacity to withstand
pressure and keep his balance.").
17 See, e.g., Daniel Schorr, A New, 'Post-Racial' Political Era in America (NPR
broadcast Jan. 28, 2008), availableat http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld
=18489466 (arguing that Obama's presidential campaign signaled a "post racial" era in
American politics); John McWhorter, Racism in America Is Over, FORBES.COM (Dec. 30,

2008, 2:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2008/12/30/end-of-racism-oped-cx jm 1230
mcwhorter.html (claiming emphatically that racism has ended in America based on
Obama's election); Race and Ethnicity Poll: ABC News/Washington Post Poll,
POLLINGREPORT.COM (Jan. 12-15, 2010), http://www.pollingreport.com/race.htm (finding
in a race and ethnicity poll that 71% of White Americans believe that with the election of
Obama that African Americans have achieved or will soon achieve racial equality). But see
Shelby Steele, Op-Ed., Obama Seduced Whites with a Vision of Their Racial Innocence
Precisely to Coerce Them into Acting Out of a Racial Motivation, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5,
2008, at A31 (opining that Obama was able to secure the presidency by campaigning as a
"post racial" candidate); Mark Dolliver, How Close Is Post-racialAmerica?, ADWEEK
(Feb. 4, 2010), http://www.adweek.com/aw/content display/news/e3i4b406c00b9c5b2653
al3b5e8fed89d25 (citing a January 2009 ABC News/Washington Post poll indicating that
more than 75% of black Americans believed that the election of Obama would improve
race relations in the United States, but this view was declining among black Americans by
2010).
8

See infra Part IV.

'9 See Schorr, supra note 17; see also andr6 douglas pond cummings, Post
Racialism?, 14 IOWA J. GENDER, RACE, & JUST. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 106)

(on file with author).
20 See Gary Duncan, Lehman Brothers Collapse Sends Shockwave Round World,
TIMES ONLINE (Sept. 16, 2008), http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry
sectors/bankingandfinance/article4761892.ece; Michael J. de la Merced & Andrew Ross
Sorkin, Report Details How Lehman Hid Its Woes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2010, at Al;
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financial Armageddon at the nation's doorstep 2 1 and two presidential candidates
debating the possible effects and solutions,2 2 a simple message emerged from the
right and was peddled to the consuming American public as the primary reason
that the global markets were collapsing: minorities. African American and Latino
borrowers were served up as the scapegoat to explain why the global economy was
failing. 23 The minority-borrower narrative maintains that because of governmental
intrusion into the home lending industry, through the Community Reinvestment
Act of 1977 (CRA), Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac, lenders were forced to provide
loans to extremely risky minority borrowers, who themselves were overreaching
24
by trying to purchase homes that they had no business buying. Because lenders
had no choice but to provide loans to risky minority borrowers, subprime loans
became the avenue of choice for lenders to overreaching minority borrowers and it
was because of the then-current failure of black and brown homeowners to pay
their mortgages that the subprime mortgage industry collapsed. Thus, as the story

Justin Fox, Three Lessons of the Lehman Brothers Collapse, TIME (Sept. 15, 2009),
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1923197,00.html.
21

See Anthony Reuben, What Would FinancialArmageddon Look Like?, BBC NEWS

(Sept. 23, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilbusiness/7631281.stm (discounting sources
that compare the financial crisis to the Great Depression or a financial Armageddon).
22 See HEILEMANN & HALPERIN, supra note 13, at 386-92.
23

See Daniel Gross, Subprime Suspects, SLATE (Oct. 7, 2008, 2:08 PM)

http://www.slate.com/id/2201641; Susan Schmidt & Maurice Tamman, Housing Push for
HispanicsSpawns Wave of Foreclosures,WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2009, at Al; Andy Birkey,
Against All Reason, Bachmann and Others Blame 1977 Fair-LendingLaw for Adding to
Economic Crisis, MINN. INDEPENDENT (Sept. 24, 2008, 12:01 PM), http://minnesota
independent.com/10179/against-all-reason-bachmann-and-others-blame; Thomas B. Edsall,
Conservatives Seek to Shift Blame for Crisis onto Minority Housing Law, HUFFINGTON

PosT (Oct. 1, 2008, 5:34 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/10/01/conservatives
-seek-to-shi n 131020.html; Gary Lapon, Blaming the Victims of the Crisis,
SOCIALISTWORKER.ORG (Oct. 21, 2008), http://socialistworker.org/2008/10/2 1/blamingvictims-of-the-crisis; Zenitha Price, Conservatives Blame People of Color for Wall Street
Meltdown, NEW AM. MEDIA (Oct. 3, 2008), http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view

_article.htm)?article id=1b7402095164d593deaf2cl 115f7ce69; Coulter on Bailout Lies"SocialJustice" Obamination,YouTUBE (Oct. 4, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v
=awNeOKvx5zo (showing Ann Coulter, in a Fox News broadcast, blaming Democrats for

providing loans to minorities and poor people-unqualified borrowers-for causing the
financial market crisis).
24 See SOWELL, supra note 2, at 40-43; Cavuto Suggests Congress Should Have
Warned that "Loaningto Minorities and Risky Folks Is a Disaster," MEDIA MATTERS FOR

AM. (Sept. 19, 2008, 6:28 PM), http://mediamatters.org/mmtv/200809190021 (describing
Fox News reporter Neil Cavuto claiming that minority borrowers are foundationally
responsible for financial crisis); DiscussingFinancialCrisis, Buchanan Baselessly Blamed
Lending in "Minority Communities," MEDIA MATTERS FOR AM. (Feb. 20, 2009, 11:37

AM), http://mediamatters.oig/print/research/200902200006 (detailing former Republican
Presidential Candidate Patrick Buchanan blaming minorities and the Community
Reinvestment Act for the financial market meltdown).
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purports, the financial market crisis is ultimately traceable to minority Americans
and governmental social welfare.25
With precious little evidence to support this scapegoating, many U.S. citizens
have embraced this minority-borrower narrative with vigor.2 6 And, this percolating
resonance continues to survive as proponents of this narrative include some
economists,27 conservative think tank employees, 28 Wall Street insiders, 2 9 mutual
fund presidents,30 pundits,3 1 and average citizens. 3 2 That the minority-borrower
See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
See Jeff Davis, Minority Subprime Mortgages Have Caused the Financial
Crisis,
ALTERMEDIA.INFO (Sept. 23, 2008), http://us.altermedia.info/news-of-interest-to-whitepeople/minority-mortgages-brought-financial-market-to-its-knees_3693.html
("I think
everyone can see the desire to give more mortgages to minorities loosened standards and
caused the subprime crisis. Banks and mortgage companies were giving home loans to
every Tyrone, Jose and Roberto in order to get a commission and generate worthless paper
for the lender to use as collateral on loans from the bigger fish."); Larry Keller, Minority
Meltdown: Immigrants Blamed for Mortgage Crisis, S. POVERTY L. CENTER (2009),
http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2009/spring/
minority-meltdown (describing the massive viral spreading and popularity of the
immigrant/minority trope for causing the mortgage crisis). According to the Southern
Poverty Law Center, "The CRA falsehood easily jumped from the far-right fringe to more
mainstream, presumably more credible conservative media outlets, illustrating how sloppy
fact-checking or no fact-checking at all have become increasingly common in the midst of
fierce competition among speed-obsessed media." Id.
27 See Stan Liebowitz, The Real Scandal: How Feds Invited the Mortgage Mess, N.Y.
POsT (Feb. 5, 2008, 2:39 AM), http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/
item Qjl08vDbysbe6LWDxcqO3J; SOWELL, supra note 2, at 57-67 (blaming regionalized
housing bubbles perpetuated primarily through governmental intrusion in the form of the
Community Reinvestment Act, and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as the primary cause of
the downfall of the economy).
28 See Peter J. Wallison, The True Origins of This FinancialCrisis, AM. ENTERPRISE
INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y RES. (Feb. 19, 2009), http://www.aei.org/issue/100001; John
Derbyshire, PC, Not "Predatory Lenders," NAT'L REv. ONLINE (Feb. 5, 2008),
http://corner.nationalreview.com/post/?q=ZGZjYjM2ZjdiZGE2MWJhNzQ4MjhiOTY1NT
U1M2MOOWU=; Adam Weinstein, Study: Brokers, Minority Borrowers to Blame for
Most Mortgage Delinquencies, DSNEWS.COM (Sept. 2, 2009), http://www.dsnews.com/
articles/study-brokers-minority-borrowers-to-blame-for-most-mortgage-delinquencies2009-09-02.
29 See John Carney, Here's How the Community Reinvestment Act Led to the Housing
Bubble's Lax Lending, Bus.
INSIDER
(June
27,
2009,
9:33
AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/the-cra-debate-a-users-guide-2009-6; Edward Pinto, Acorn
and the Housing Bubble, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2009, at A23; Squawk Box: Interview with
Larry Kudlow (CNBC television broadcast Apr. 4, 2008), available at
http://www.cnbc.com/id/15840232?video=702180420&play-l ("The original sub-prime
loan, with no money down, no FICA scorekeeping-all that came out of the Community
Reinvestment Act and that ought to be repealed or substantially altered.").
30 See andr6 douglas pond cummings, Panel Presentation for University of Iowa
Journal of Gender, Race & Justice: Post Racialism and the Financial Market Crisis: Race,
Gender, and Class at a Crossroad-A Survey of Their Intersection in Employment,
25

26
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narrative would spring up at the onset of this generation's greatest economic ordeal
is disappointing. That this narrative would be embraced by so many with so little
to support it, with scant questioning or thought, is demoralizing. The minorityborrower narrative is nothing more than a "dirty little myth," as this Article will
show, and that it persists is particularly mystifying in an era where many
postracialist Americans are determined to believe that with the election of an
African American President Obama that our nation has crossed over into a
colorblind, postracial era.3 3 Critical race theory, however, provides insight into

Economics, and the Law (Feb. 26, 2010) [hereinafter cummings, Panel: Post Racialism and
the Financial Market Crisis], video available at http://podcast.uiowa.edullaw/
grj/JGRJ%20201 0%20Levitt.mov (describing mutual fund presidents that blame the
Community Reinvestment Act and minority borrowers for the poor performance of their
mutual funds); andr6 douglas pond cummings, Recovery?, CORP. JUST. BLOG (Feb. 27,
/
http://corporatejusticeblog.blogspot.com 2010/02/recovery.html
PM),
2:19
2010,
(describing a board meeting wherein Mutual Fund representatives blamed the Community
Reinvestment Act for the financial market crisis).
31 See Ann Coulter, Dems'Affirmative-Action Time Bomb Has Detonated, ST. J.-REG.
(Sept. 26, 2008, 12:01 AM), http://www.sj-r.com/opinions/x1070363616/Ann-CoulterDems-affirmative-action-time-bomb-has-detonated (arguing that absent affirmative action
for minority borrowers the financial market crisis of 2008 would have been averted);
Davis, supra note 26 ("The crash started with the collapse of the subprime mortgage
market, which is effectively a code word for blacks and Latinos."); Keller, supra note 26
(quoting Rush Limbaugh as blaming illegal immigrants and the Community Reinvestment
Act for the financial meltdown); Limbaugh's "Colorblind" History of Racially Charged
Comments, MEDIAMATTERS FOR AM. (Oct. 13, 2009, 5:18 PM), http://mediamatters.org/
research/200910130049.
32 Examples of average Americans that blame minorities for the financial market
crisis abound on Web 2.0 avenues. See, e.g., Burning Down the House: What Caused
Our Economic Crisis?, YOUTUBE (Sept. 26, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?vTxgSubmiGt8 (video posted by web user claiming that the financial crisis occurred because
of the Community Reinvestment Act); The Democrats and Obama Caused the Financial
Crisis of 08 by Supporting Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, YOUTUBE (Sept. 23; 2008),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UVVVzEKauzY (video posted by web user of
compiled news reports claiming that Democrats pushed programs to help minorities
through government-fuhded mortgage organizations, which triggered the economic crisis);
Obama Responsible for Economic Crisis Black Caucus Fraud,YOUTUBE (Oct. 1, 2008),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bh-wwZwpn8U (video posted by web user claiming
Obama caused the economic crisis by ordering "no documentation" loans to minority
applicants who then defaulted).
See andr6 douglas pond cummings, The Associated Dangers of "Brilliant
3
Disguises," Color-blind Constitutionalism, and PostracialRhetoric, 85 IND. L.J. 1277,
1277-78 (2010) (reciting the positions of many Americans believing that the nation has
entered a post-racial place); Ward Connerly, Message from the President, AM. CIVIL
RIGHTS INST., http://www.acri.org/index.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2011) ("Race has no
place in American life or law."); Shelby Steele, supra note 17. For an example of postracialist thinking articulated before President Obama's election, see generally WARD
CONNERLY, CREATING EQUAL: MY FIGHT AGAINST RACE PREFERENCES (2000) (showing
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how a twenty-first century dirty little myth can still find traction in the United
States.
The powerful continuing dynamism of entrenched traditional American
racism persists in our newly acclaimed "postracial" United States.34 This static
feature, relentless U.S. racial discrimination, simply evolves, and as the laws
change to outlaw various manifestations of overt racism, it merely mutates into
new and sophisticated, complex manifestations of race hatred.35 This mutation
involves racist embrace of any available mechanism or adjacent expression to
subordinate the interests of minorities in the United States, and oftentimes seeks to
attach liability in careless ways to any available minority scapegoat.36
The dynamism and continuing intensity of American racism is clearly evident
in the financial market crisis of 2008. The market collapse was caused by intense
and complex economic forces and failures, not by minority borrowers or
governmental intrusion into the mortgage markets.37
To explore the true underlying causes of the financial market crisis in order to
challenge the simplicity trend and examine the emergence of the minorityborrower narrative in light of a new postracial America, this Article will proceed as
follows: Part II will carefully analyze the genuine underlying causes of the
financial market crisis as identified by economists, scholars, and academics. This
that people believed the nation was entering a post racial era even before Obama's election
to the presidency).
34 See DERRICK A. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF
RACISM 1- 14 (1992); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: CriticalLegal Studies and
Reparations, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 330-31 (1987); Kimberl6 Williams
Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1334 (1988); Adrien Katherine Wing,
Space Tradersfor the Twenty-First Century, 11 BERKLEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y 49, 5152 (2009); Richard Delgado, Explaining the Rise andFall ofAfrican American FortunesInterest Convergence and Civil Rights Gains, 37 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 369, 370-71
(2002) (book review).
3 See sources cited supra note 34; Charles R. Lawrence
III, The Id, the Ego, and
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 335-36
(1987) ("But how is the unconscious involved when racial prejudice is less apparentwhen racial bias is hidden from the prejudiced individual as well as from others?

Increasingly, as our culture has rejected racism as immoral and unproductive, this hidden

prejudice has become the more prevalent form of racism. The individual's Ego must adapt
to a cultural order that views overtly racist attitudes and behavior as unsophisticated,

uninformed, and immoral. It must repress or disguise racist ideas when they seek

expression."). For contemporary examples, see John Meacham, Southern Discomfort,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2010, at WK12; Spencer S. Hsu, Miss. County Schools
Ordered to Comply with Desegregation Order, WASH; POST, Apr. 13, 2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/13/AR2010041302867
.html.
36 See BELL, supra note 34; DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE
QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 5-8 (1989).
3

See infra Part II.
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serves to dissuade pundits and commentators from attempting to hijack the market
crisis debate for political purposes and aims to provide clear and concise guidance
to those that thoughtfully engage in reform efforts targeted toward avoiding future
crises. Part III will explore the dirty little myth which was introduced as the most
central of the primary causes floated by individuals and parties anxious to pin
blame for political purposes rather than interrogate the true failures that
precipitated the meltdown. Part IV will examine postracialism and query whether a
nation that accepts minority scapegoating with little objection, can truly be situated
as postracial. Part V concludes with forward looking thoughts.
II. FINANCIAL MARKET CRISIS REALITY
Despite attempts to pin the market collapse on a simple cause, respected
voices have now found, in light of the breadth and depth of the crisis, that the
underlying foundational economic theories that support American capitalism are
suspect or discredited, if not outright broken.38 The neoclassical law and
economics theories that drive so much of United States economic policy and legal
39
philosophizing are now being critically interrogated both by longtime critics and
38

See JOHNSON & KwAK, supra note 2, at 6-13; RAMIREZ, supra note 1 (manuscript

at introduction) (describing the economic framework that did predict the current crisis, with
powerful explanatory power, is Hyman Minsky's Inherent Instability Hypothesis which
directly contradicts the Efficient Market Hypothesis); SKIDELSKY, supra note 2, at 3-28
(2009); Canova, supra note 2, at 369-70 (2009) ("The economic model underlying today's
failing regulatory regime is a neoclassical equilibrium model that is highly abstract and
mathematical, often based on unrealistic assumptions and ignorant of historical contexts
and the many complex dynamics and interdependencies of human behavior and market
psychology. Largely uncontrolled and uncoordinated, the current regulatory approach does
not serve the interests of the public, but rather the far narrower interests of the regulated
institutions that have captured the agencies of government and the policy-making
process."); Timothy A. Canova, The FailingBubble Economy: American Exceptionalism
and the Crisis in Legitimacy, 102 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 237, 238 (2008) ("Lawyers

and legal scholars have tended not to question the economic assumptions of orthodox
economic models and policies of central banks and international financial institutions. As
the crisis reached a peak and the U.S. Congress passed a bailout plan along the lines of the
original plan proposed by U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson, economic
assumptions began to shift in profound ways. 'Regulation,' which had been a dirty word
for the past three decades, was suddenly the prescription for the failures of
'deregulation."'); Timothy A. Canova, Legacy of the Clinton Bubble, DISSENT, Summer

2008, at 41, 41("The Federal Reserve became increasingly independent of elected branches
and more captive of private financial interests. This was seen as 'sound economics' and

necessary to keep inflation low. Yet the Federal Reserve's autonomy left it a captive of a
financial constituency it could no longer control or regulate.").
39 See sources cited supra note 38; Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance
"Reform" and the New Corporate Social Responsibility, 62 U. PITT. L. REv. 605, 619

(2001) ("Every book and journal article in the corporate law field had to take an economics
of law perspective if they were to succeed in the marketplace of ideas. In its more extreme
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surprising new sources. 4 0 This examination leads many commentators to freshly
conclude that the astonishing rise to prominence of law and economic theory in
forms, law and economics solutions to problems of human behavior were paraded as
'science' (not as social science but as 'science'), the findings of which were unassailable.
Those who questioned were made to appear ignorant or foolish. . . . What prevented

managers from 'ripping off' the owners, by misuse or embezzlement of corporate funds or
property or by other forms of purposeful venality? The answer law and economics gave
was not 'more regulation' or 'public interest directors,' or 'intervention by the federal
government,' but 'market forces."'); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Morals of the
Marketplace: A Cautionary Essay for Our Time, 20 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 171, 173
(2009) [hereinafter Mitchell, Morals] ; Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Board as a Path to
CorporateResponsibility, in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY (Doreen McBarnet et
al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter Mitchell, Corporate Responsibility]. Professor Mitchell
explains:
The law that imposes no corporate obligation on shareholders or creditors
historically was based on the assumption that the financial incentives of
investors would rationally direct them to act in their own self-interest, which
would align with their perceptions of the entity's best interests, and the same
may be said of financing productive activity more broadly. The productive entity
would be well-run, or at least for the purpose of achieving the success of its
business, because it was in the interest of its financiers to ensure that it was. The
more attenuated the security from the productive activity, the less is this true.
... If financing productive activity is a major justification for the existence
of capital markets, that justification is increasingly untenable. Taming the capital
markets to take responsibility, or at least to act as if they were responsible, for
economic production in the real economy is the solution.

The problem, and it is a very real and very substantial one, is that the
growth of risk management has not been accompanied by the growth of what
might be called "responsibility management." Rather, the goal of risk
management, at least in the capital markets, has been to parcel out pieces of risk
normally associated with a given type of investment so that no single investor
holds the entire risk. The substantial achievement of this goal in certain areas
has meant that no single investor takes any responsibility for the acceptability of
the underlying investment, nor for the productive enterprise underlying it, either,
and that the issuer of the securities that parcels out the risk similarly is
untroubled by it.
Mitchell, Morals, supra, at 173, 175, 181-82 (citations omitted).
40 See RICHARD POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE
DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION, at xii (2009) ("We are learning from [the crisis] that we need a
more active and intelligent government to keep our model of a capitalist economy from
running off the rails."). Judge Posner continues in admitting failures in his "law and
economics" modeling: "So the market can be blamed for recessions, which without
government intervention would often turn into depressions, as they often did before the
government learned (we thought!) in the after-math of the Great Depression how to prevent
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this country has now proven folly as neoclassical economics is intellectually and
morally bankrupt. 4 ' This scrutiny leads other critics to claim that capitalism and the
rush to deregulate the U.S. economy in the past two decades have proved a failed
exercise.42
Two surprising commentators are leading this questioning of laissez-faire
capitalism and neoclassical economics and are acknowledging the depths of the
failures and the breadth of the negligence. Famed law and economics champion
Judge Richard Posner penned A Failureof Capitalism: The Crisis of '08 and the
Descent into Depression wherein he admitted, astonishingly to some, that "[t]he
[2008 financial market crisis] is a failure of capitalism, or more precisely of a
certain kind of capitalism ('laissez-faire' in a loose sense .. .), and of capitalism's

that from happening." Id. at 270. "But there might not have been a depression had it not
been for the Bush Administration's mismanagement of the economy." Id. at 271. "There
were three big prevention failures this time: excessive deregulation, neglect of warning
signs, and insouciance about the decline in the rate of personal savings and the safety of
such savings." Id. at 289.
Former Federal Reserve Bank Chairperson Alan Greenspan joins Judge Posner in his
"conversion" away from laissez-faire free markets. The Financial Crisis and the Role of
FederalRegulators, supra note 3, at 6-35 (statement of Alan Greenspan, former chairman
of the Federal Reserve) ("We are in the midst of a once in a century credit tsunami....
[T]hose of us who have looked to the self-interest of lending institutions to protect
shareholders equity, myself, especially, are in a state of shocked disbelief. . . . I made a
mistake in presuming that the self-interest of organizations, specifically banks and others,
were such that they were best capable of protecting their own shareholders and their equity
in firms. . . . I still do not fully understand why it happened and, obviously, to the extent
that I figure out where it happened and why, I will change my views.").
41 See sources cited supra note 38; JOHNSON & KwAK, supra note 2, at 3-13;
RAMIREz, supra note 1 (manuscript at introduction) ("The emergence of yet another bubble
followed by a debt crisis highlights the intellectual bankruptcy of the neoclassical
paradigm, as it lacks any ability to predict such a crisis, explain such a crisis or remedy
such a crisis."); SKIDELSKY, supra note 2, at 3-28 (2009).
42 See sources cited supra notes 38, 40; see also POSNER, supra note 40, at 75
("Digging a little deeper, we find [the underlying causes of the depression] . . . the
withering of the regulation of financial services, which removed checks on risky lending.").
Judge Posner continues: "The housing bubble and the risky lending practices could have
been prevented by more aggressive regulation and the elimination of tax benefits for
homeowners. But the absence of these or other preventative measures was the result not of
too much government but of too little." Id. at 113; andr6 douglas pond cummings, "Ain't
No Glory in Pain": How the 1994 Republican Revolution and the Private Securities
LitigationReform Act Contributedto the Collapse of the United States CapitalMarkets, 83
NEB. L. REv. 979, 984-89 (2005) [hereinafter cummings, Ain't No Glory in Pain]
(describing the "deregulation hysteria" that gripped the "Contract with America" Congress
in 1994); andrd douglas pond cummings, Still "Ain't No Glory in Pain": How the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Other 1990s Deregulation Facilitatedthe Market
Crash of 2002, 12 FoRDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 467, 469-486 (2007) [hereinafter
cummings, Still Ain't No Glory in Pain] (describing the deregulatory enactments of the
1990s and early 2000s that lead to massive market instability).
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biggest boosters."" 3 Throughout his book, Posner surprisingly rejects many law
and economics principles, is extremely critical of his conservative compatriots, and
plainly discusses the failures of capitalism and neoclassical economics that allowed
the financial markets to bubble, balloon, and implode.4
Joining Posner in retrospection and contrition is former Federal Reserve Chair
Alan Greenspan, perhaps the fiercest proponent of deregulated free markets. Under
2008 congressional questioning, Greenspan confessed grave error in aggressively
advocating that the U.S. derivatives markets be freed from governmental oversight,
staking the gravity of his reputation on the fact that large financial institution
leaders would never leverage their companies to the point of collapse in pursuit of
reckless profit. 4 5 In this, Greenspan was confounded, as he later recognized: "those
of us who have looked to the self-interest of lending institutions to protect
shareholders equity, myself especially, are in a state of shocked disbelief." 46In
addition, Greenspan acknowledged that he relied too much on the "self-correcting
power of free markets"4 7 and that careful oversight and regulation could have
prevented the "self-destructive power of wanton mortgage lending."" Greenspan
further admitted that the Federal Reserve System and the government allowed the
growth of highly risky mortgages and out of control derivatives trading without
recognizing the devastating self-destructive potential of those instruments.4 9
Richard Posner and Alan Greenspan conceding significant failure in their
foundational economic theories and beliefs should signal to economists,
43 POSNER, supra note 40, at 260. Judge Posner wrote, "The way was open for a
doctrinaire free-market, pro-business, anti-regulatory ideology to dominate the Bush
Administration's economic thinking and regulatory enforcement (or nonenforcement) until
the depression was upon us, whereupon ideology took a back seat." Id at 274.
44 See generally id.
45 Edmund Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Erroron Regulation, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 23,

2008, at Bl.
46 id
47 Id. Robert Skidelsky, The Remedist, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2008, at MM21.

See Andrews, supra note 45.
supra note 47 ("Among the most astonishing statements to be made
by any policymaker in recent years was Alan Greenspan's admission this autumn that the
regime of deregulation he oversaw as chairman of the Federal Reserve was based on a
'flaw': he had overestimated the ability of a free market to self-correct and had missed the
self-destructive power of deregulated mortgage lending. The 'whole intellectual edifice,' he
said, 'collapsed in the summer of last year."'). That said, Greenspan has retooled his
message and recently amended his outlook suggesting that no person could have foreseen
or prevented the financial market crisis and that his judgments were correct, in retrospect,
70% of the time. See Frank Rich, No One Is to Blame for Anything, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11,
48

49 See Skidelsky,

2010, at WKIO ("[Greenspan] was eager to portray himself as an innocent bystander to

forces beyond his control. In his rewriting of history, his clout in Washington was so slight
that he was ineffectual at 'influencing the Congress."'); Ben Rooney, Greenspan: 'I Was
Right 70% of the Time,' CNNMONEY (Apr. 7, 2010, 2:13 PM ET),
http://money.cnn.com/2010/04/07/news/economy/Greenspanfinancial-crisiscommission/

index.htm?hpt-T1.
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academics, political leaders, and the broader community that there is a striking
need to reevaluate the core underpinnings of our current and continuing economic
policies. Still, when given the opportunity to truly interrogate capitalism, the way
we "do" corporate law, and the pervading neoclassical economic theories in the
United States, we as a nation are largely failing that invitation.
While the 111th Congress tepidly frittered around the fringes of the massive
50
failures that brought the global economy to its knees, the forces that view
Posner's and Greenspan's admissions of error as weak-kneed, those that would
perpetuate status quo economic theories and capitalism's virtues without
examination (including the banking lobby), 5' marshaled their forces and organized
against all formal movement toward new regulation or correction in the aftermath
of TARP. 52 This marshaling of opposition to new and fresh regulation of the
financial institutions most embroiled in the market collapse has been truly
impressive (and reprehensible).
Perhaps paralyzed by reelection fear, Congress significantly diluted
meaningful regulatory reform-so much so that many argue that it failed to
seriously address, in its Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection

5o See generally Housing Preservation and Tenant Protection Act, H.R. 4868,
111th Cong. (2010); Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173,
111th Cong. (2009); Financial Stability Improvement Act, H.R. 3996, 111th Cong. (2009);
Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act, H.R. 3818, 111th Cong. (2009);
Credit Cardholders' Bill of Rights Act, H.R. 627, 111th Cong. (2009); andrd douglas pond
cummings, Consumer Financial Protection Agency, CORP. JUST. BLOG (Mar. 5, 2010,
2:44 PM), http://corporatejusticeblog.blogspot.com/2010/03/consumer-financial-protection
-agency.html (describing the legislatively proposed consumer financial protection agency);
JUST. BLOG (Mar.
andrd douglas pond cummings, Financial Reform Legislation, 2CORP.
0 10/03/financial-reform17, 2010, 2:00 AM), http://corporatejusticeblog.blogspot.com/
legislation.html (describing the Senate version of proposed financial regulatory reform).
51 See Christopher Swann, Time to Stand Up to the Banking Lobby, REUTERS: GREAT
DEBATE (July 15, 2009, 9:25 EDT), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2009/07/15/timeto-stand-up-to-the-banking-lobby/ ("Banks might have less money to throw around. But
they do not appear to be skirnping on lobbying. Political action committees run by the
Independent Community Bankers of America have already raised 40 percent more funds
than last year. Overall the finance, insurance and real estate sectors spent $110.7 billion on
lobbying in the first three months of the year-second only to healthcare providers.").
52 See Andrew Ross Sorkin, So Where's the Consumer Protection?,N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
9, 2010, at Bl; Paul Krugman, FinancialReform Endgame, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2010, at
A27 (describing the causes of lost momentum toward serious financial reform).
5 See Elizabeth Warren: It's Bank Lobbyists vs. American Families in Fight for
FinancialReform, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 20, 2010, 1:30 AM), http://www.huffington

post.com/2010/02/20/elizabeth-warren-its-bank n _469939.html (discussing TARP director
Elizabeth Warren's appearance on the Bill Maher show, where Harvard Law Professor
Warren described the bank lobby as appearing in the offices of sitting congresspersons
"two and three and four times a day," unlike anything she "has ever seen" before).
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Act, 54 passed in 2010 in response to the financial market crisis,s the necessary
reforms that were achingly obvious in the heated aftermath of government bailouts
and Wall Street chaos.56 Indeed, the Dodd-Frank legislation provides an intimate
example of our nation's failure to examine "capitalism" in the United States.57
Early commentators have strongly criticized the Dodd-Frank legislation for not
authentically addressing most of the underlying causes of the global meltdown.58
This has led several prominent economists to predict that a future economic
meltdown is a near certainty because of the failure of Dodd-Frank to affect
meaningful regulation.5 9
Still, much is now being written and debated about the causes of the financial
market crisis of 2008 and the Dodd-Frank Act's response. 6 0 Amidst all of the
reporting and rhetoric, several crisis truths now appear beyond dispute. First, a
deregulatory movement gripped Congress and the Federal Reserve Bank through
the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s, and several federal legislative enactments
during that period created a Wall Street atmosphere that invited the recklessness
that caused nearly every single financial industry titan to face certain collapse in
2008. Second, a housing market bubble inflated in the early part of the past
54 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). A comprehensive
analysis of the Dodd-Frank Act is beyond the scope of this article, although one will be
undertaken in future writings.
ss See andr6 douglas pond cummings, Financial Reform: True Change?, CORP.

BLOG (Aug. 12, 2010, 10:49 AM), http://corporatejusticeblog.blogspot.com/2010/
08/financial-reform-true-change.html (describing the passage of the Dodd-Frank bill and
summarizing its excruciating shortcomings).
56 See Krugman, supra note 52; David M. Herszenhom & Edward Wyatt, G.O.P.
Blocks Debate on FinancialOversight Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2010, at Al.
57 See Steven Ramirez, Dodd-Frank: My Final Take, CORP. JUST. BLOG (Aug. 24,
JUST.

2010, 1:52 AM), http://corporatejusticeblog.blogspot.com/2010/08/dodd-frank-my-finaltake.html (summarizing the Dodd-Frank legislation and finding that it mostly fails to
address the underlying causes of the financial market crisis).
58 See id.; Johnson, supra note 2, at 234-42 (describing the new
Dodd-Frank
requirement for clearinghouses and the clearing of over-the-counter derivatives, including
credit default swaps, but then identifying the enormous exceptions, n6 loopholes, that will
allow the industry to run much the same way as it had before passage of Dodd-Frank). See
generally Matt Taibbi, Wall Street's Big Win, ROLLING STONE, Aug. 9, 2010, at 56
(harshly criticizing Congress' treatment of the financial crisis and the enactment of DoddFrank).
5

See Steven Ramirez, Dodd-Frank VII: Joseph Stiglitz Says It Will Happen Again,

CORP. JUST. BLOG (July 30, 2010, 4:11 PM),. http://corporatejusticeblog.blog
spot.com/2010/07/dodd-frank-vii-joesph-stiglitz-says-it.html (noting that economist Joseph
Stiglitz stated forcefully in an interview that another economic crisis is imminent, in light
of the weakness of the Dodd-Frank act).
6 See sources cited supra note 2.
61 See infra Part II.A; see also Commodity Futures Modernization Act
of 2000, Pub.
L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.);
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial
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decade, enabled by lax lender regulation, predatory lending, predatory borrowing,
and governmental cover. When the housing bubble burst and the market corrected,
the entire housing house of cards collapsed.6 2 Third, mortgage loan securitization
seized the imaginations of institutional investors and securities speculators in
unprecedented fashion, leading to the bundling of home mortgages (most critically
subprime mortgages) into derivative investment vehicles that were bought and sold
with unregulated abandon, all of which was enabled, protected, and hedged by
collateralized debt obligations, credit rating agencies, reckless executive
leadership, credit default swaps, and balance sheet fraud. Greed and avarice
overwhelmed Wall Street. Risk assessment and quant modeling broke down in a
truly unprecedented fashion. An honest exploration of the crisis reveals that each
of the factors outlined above and examined below contributed its significant part to
the global meltdown.. Critically, not one of the causes outlined below implicate
race or social engineering as the dirty little myth posits caused the global
meltdown. First, an examination of the true causes of the crisis, then an exploration
of the dirty little myth and the subsequent racial coding that has emerged.

Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C §§ 6801-27 (2006)); cummings, Ain't No Glory in Pain, supranote 42, at 984-89.
62 See WILLIAM COHAN, HOUSE OF CARDS: A TALE OF HUBRIS AND WRETCHED
EXCESS ON WALL STREET (2009) (describing in riveting detail the minute-by-minute
collapse of the United States financial market); Hershey Friedman & Linda Friedman, The
Global FinancialCrisis of 2008: What Went Wrong?, in

LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE 31, 31 (Robert W. Kolb

ed., 2010); Rick Brooks & Ruth Simon, Subprime Debacle Traps Even Very CreditWorthy: As Housing Boomed, Industry Pushed Loans to a Broader Market, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 3, 2007, at Al; Bill Brown, Uncle Sam as SugarDaddy, WALL ST. J. MARKETWATCH

(Nov. 19, 2008, 10:35 AM EST), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/moral-hazard-unclesam-as-sugar-daddy; Tyler Cowen, So We Thought. But Then Again . . ., N.Y.
TIMES

(Jan. 13, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/13/business/13view.html?_r-

The Downturn in Facts and Figures, BBC

NEWS,

;

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/

business/7073131.stm (last updated Nov. 21, 2007, 8:07 GMT).
63 See Adam Ashcraft & Til Schuermann,
Subprime Mortgage Credit Securitization, FIN.

The Seven Deadly Frictions of
POST (Apr. 1,

PROFESSIONALS'

2010), http://post.nyssa.org/nyssa-news/2010/04/the-seven-deadly-frictions-of-subprimemortgage-credit-securitization.html; Bethany McLean, The Bank Job, VANITY FAIR,
Jan. 2010, at 82; Zach Carter, Rating Agencies, Discredited, AM. PROSPECT
(Mar. 20, 2009), http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article-ratingagenciesjdiscredited;
Jason Cox, What Is Securitization?, U. OF IOWA CENTER FOR INT'L FIN. &
DEV., http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/issues/financial-crisis/posters/Jason%20Final%20
Draft.pdf; Janet Morrissey, CreditDefault Swaps: The Next Crisis?, TIME (Mar. 17, 2008),

http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1723152,00.html.
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A. Deregulation

"We cannot control ourselves. You have to step in and control the Street"
-John J. Mack, CEO, Morgan Stanley"
A clear deregulatory trend has driven Congress and regulators for the past two
to three decades wherein proponents of laissez-faire economics have successfully
persuaded leaders and legislatures to adopt positions that hamper oversight and
restrict thoughtful regulation of capital markets. Four such examples, which are
clearly linked to enabling the market collapse, include deregulatory policies
initiated by the Federal Reserve Bank, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the
Commodities Futures Modernization Act, and the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act, amongst a host of other deregulatory legislative and agency
enactments.
1. The FederalReserve Bank

The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Bank (Federal Reserve or
Fed) played an integral role in the financial market crisis of 2008. Dating back to
the 1970s, the Federal Reserve has been captured by investment banking interests
engaging largely in a strategy of deregulation that has proved disastrous for all
parties concerned aside from the largest bailed out Wall Street financial institutions
and their executives. 6 5 More than twenty-five years ago, the Fed began to relax
lending standards for mortgage providers, loosen interest rates, and slacken capital
requirements for large commercial and investment banks.6 6 According to Professor
Timothy Canova, in the ultimate "capture" the Fed affirmatively adopted the
investment banker's agenda as far back as the 1970s and since then, the Fed has
used that agenda to set policy for commercial and investment banking in the

6

Andrew Ross Sorkin, Extreme Makeover, Wall Street Edition, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 1, 2010, 1:48 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/04/01/extreme-

DEALBOOK

makeover-wall-street-edition/ (quoting the chairman of Morgan Stanley in an unusually
vocal call for needed regulation on Wall Street).
65 See Skidelsky, supra note 47; RAMIREZ, supra note I (manuscript at introduction);
Timothy Canova, The FederalReserve We Need, 21 AM. PROSPECT, A15, Al5-A17(20 10)
(describing the Federal Reserve of the 1940s and how its policies provided for a robust and

stable economic recovery following the Great Depression) [hereinafter Canova, Federal
Reserve]; Timothy Canova, Symposium Presentation at the Southeast/Southwest People of
Color Conference at the University of South Carolina: Equality and Justice in the Obama
Era (Mar. 26, 2010) [hereinafter Canova, Symposium Presentation] (notes on file with
author).
66 See Canova, supra note 2, at 370; Timothy A. Canova, The Transformation of U.S.
Banking and Finance: From Regulated Competition to Free-Market Receivership,
60 BROOK. L. REv. 1295 (1995) [hereinafter Canova, Transformation].
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United States.6 7 By adopting the private banking interest agenda, the Fed has
engaged in a systematic "dereliction of duty"6 8 by promoting standards that
increased the profitability of banks at the expense of protecting consumers from
lending abuse.69
The deregulation trend embraced by the Fed and its wholesale cooptation of
the banking lobby agenda led, in large part, to the financial market crisis. 70 The
relaxation of lending standards, the continuing reduction of interest rates, the
campaign to free over-the-counter derivatives trading from any oversight, the
campaign for repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, and the catering to the interests of
Wall Street investment banks all fell into the deregulatory pattern and agenda that
consumed Washington D.C. and the Fed during the 1990s and early part of
2000s. 71 And, as has been well documented, the Fed's immediate response to the
financial market crisis was to provide an incredible, unprecedented, and unfettered
infusion of bailout capital into the very Wall Street banks whose recklessness
72
brought the economy to its knees.
Reacting to the crisis, the Federal Reserve slashed interest rates on loans and
obligations offered to member banks in order to keep the economy afloat. Staring
into a potential financial abyss, the Fed hastened to open up new lines of credit to
Wall Street investment firms, "creating financial arrangements not unlike deposit
insurance, but chillingly devoid of traditional deposit insurance regulatory
oversight-without any explicit prior approval from Congress." 74 While the Fed's
unprecedented efforts saved Wall Street investment firms and hedge funds from
collapse, smaller subprime mortgage loan originators "folded up their tents like the
Bedouin-over 100 different subprime mortgage origination companies
systematically collapsed."7 The failure of dozens of subprime mortgage
origination companies seems appropriate, in light of the emerging evidence of
predatory lending and discriminatory targeting of minority communities that many
engaged.
67

See Canova, Federal Reserve, supra note 65, at A17; Andrews, supra note 45

("'This modem risk-management paradigm held sway for decades,' [Greenspan] said. 'The
whole intellectual edifice, however, collapsed in the summer of last year."'); Canova, supra
note 2, at 376; Canova, Transformation,supra note 66, at 1309-12.
6 See Canova, Symposium Presentation, supra note 65.
See id.
See Canova, FederalReserve, supra note 65.
See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 2, at 5, 74, 89, 150, 189.
72 See Christian Johnson, Exigent and Unusual Circumstances: The FederalReserve
and the U.S. Financial Crisis (Sept. 7, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
69
70
71

http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfi?abstract-id=1584731; RAMIREZ, supra note 1
(manuscript at introduction); supranote 65 and accompanying text.
73 See Johnson, supra note 72; Peterson, supra note 2, at 1360.
74 Peterson, supra note 2, at 1360-61.
7 Id. at 1361 (citations omitted).
76

See Steven Ramirez, Dodd-Frank X: Finally Doing Something About Race,

CORP. JUST. BLOG, (Aug. 5, 2010, 5:22 PM), http://corporatejusticeblog.blogspot.com/
2010/08/dodd-frank-x-finally-doing-something.html (describing the discriminatory and
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Thus, TARP bailout funds, approved by Congress to save the economy from
catastrophe, were used primarily to prop up Wall Street titans at a cost to U.S.
taxpayers of more than $3 trillion dollars.n Rather than free up lending, which was
a portion of the stated purpose of the infusion of TARP funds, the banks hoarded
the capital bestowed upon them from the Fed to improve their balance sheet
performance. With that massive infusion of taxpayer capital and huge loans made
available to Wall Street firms from the Fed, Wall Street responded almost
immediately by paying near record executive compensation bonuses for 2009
"performance" and simultaneously spending hundreds of millions of dollars
lobbying fiercely against new financial services regulation."
When news organizations and Congress both appealed to the Fed to provide
full disclosure as to the use of TARP bailout funds and massive loans extended to
Wall Street investment banks, including a request to see how the funds were
dispensed, what tracking mechanisms were in place, and who received what, the
Fed stonewalled both news organizations and Congress claiming that the public
had no right to see or know what was being done with taxpayer money.so The
Fed's failure to provide bailout fund disclosure to the public has been challenged
in the courts.81
Taxpayer bailout funds provided by the U.S. government were used by Wall
Street firms to pay hundreds of millions of dollars in executive compensation.
Taxpayer bailout funds derived from government largess were used by Wall Street
firms to pay millions of dollars to lobbying firms employed to aggressively fight
against new financial sector regulation. More than $3 trillion dollars have been
spent by the Fed to prop up a system that has failed taxpayers without any

predatory lending that many mortgage brokers and banks perpetuated during the housing
bubble era).
n See Ramirez, supra note 2, at 91, 100; JOHNSON & KwAK, supra note 2, at 153-56
(describing the meetings where Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson ordered Wall Street
executives to take the government/taxpayer bailout funds at astonishingly low interest rates
in order to prop up the balance sheets of Wall Street investment banks).
78 See Ramirez, supra note 2, at 91, 100 (describing the hoarding of capital by Wall
Street firms using taxpayer bailout funds to improve balance sheets and record profits
rather than lending to a cash-strapped citizenry).
79
See Aaron Lucchetti & Stephen Grocer, Wall Street on Track to Award Record Pay,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 2009, at Al; Taibbi, supra note 58 ("Three hellish years of panic, all
done and gone-the. mass bankruptcies, midnight bailouts, shotgun mergers of dying
megabanks, high-stakes SEC investigations, all capped by a legislative orgy in which
industry lobbyists hurled more than $600 million at Congress."); Elizabeth Williamson &
Brody Mullins, Firms Keep Lobbying as They Get TARP Cash, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2009,
at A4; Canova, Symposium Presentation, supra note 65.
80 See Canova,
Symposium Presentation, supra note 65.
81 Fox News Network, LLC v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 678
F. Supp. 2d 162, 165
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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interrogation of the system that enabled the meltdown and without any functional
oversight or forced responsibility on Wall Street elites. 82
The $3 trillion loaned by the Fed to Wall Street banks in order to prop up
capitalism and free market fundamentalism is an ironic and disturbing oxymoron.
The Federal Reserve gave or loaned taxpayer funds to insulate "capitalism," and
Wall Street excess and privilege, sans examination of any sort. Yet, while a
specific swath of Americans went very nearly crazy in opposition to passage of
Health Care Reform legislation, the vitriol for Wall Street and the complete
subjugation of taxpayer rights to corporate interests is largely ignored by these
same oppositionists. If government intervention is violently opposed in the health
care context, why is government intervention in the form of a Wall
Street bailout not opposed in the same manner? Why would those that spit on
congresspersons, hurl racial epithets at minority members of Congress, scream
homophobic slurs at gay Congressional leaders, and telephone death threats to
individuals with the audacity to vote for insurance company reform stand silent in
the face of massive taxpayer bailout and the unfettered rescue of an entrenched
system of corporate privilege? 84
The Fed chair most responsible for co-opting the Wall Street agenda as
federal policy, Alan Greenspan, has famously admitted the nature of his errors and
the serious miscalculations that were made in the run-up to the financial market
crisis.8 Greenspan declared, "I was right 70% of the time. But I was wrong 30% of
the time, and there were an awful lot of mistakes in 21 years." 86 Adopting Wall
Street's deregulatory agenda and anchoring his philosophy in an unbridled passion
for laissez-faire represent two of Greenspan's most serious "mistakes."

See

andr6

douglas

pond cummings, Symposium Presentation at the
Southeast/Southwest People of Color Conference at the University of South CarolinaEquality and Justice in the Obama Era: Economic Justice (Mar. 26, 2010) (notes on file
with author); HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., ON THE BRINK: INSIDE THE RACE TO STOP THE
COLLAPSE OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 154 (2010) (describing the Treasury
Department's response to the financial crisis as one intended solely to prop up the Wall
Street investment banks without any strings attached or alteration in behavior or activity
that led to the crisis in the first instance).
83 See Bob Herbert, An Absence of Class, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23,
2010, at A29.
84 See id; Megan Carpentier, More than HalfofRepublicansDon't Believe
Banks Are
to Blame for the Financial Crisis, WASH. INDEP. (Mar. 22, 2010, 5:36 PM),
http://washingtonindependent.com/80022/more-than-half-of-republicans-dont-believe82

banks-are-to-blame-for-the-financial-crisis (describing an ABCNews Poll where less than
50% of Republicans polled do not believe that Wall Street banks were the cause of the
financial market crisis).
85 See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying
text.
86 Rooney, supranote
49.
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2. Gramm-Leach-Bliley

The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Amendment of 1999 is among the most significant
injurious deregulatory actions that led to the financial crisis of 2008." While not
alone in deregulatory enactments that precipitated the crisis, Gramm-Leach-Bliley
is often linked to the malfeasance that collapsed the U.S. markets. Gramm-LeachBliley swept away all Glass-Steagall prohibitions against banks entering into the
securities and insurance industries.88 Glass-Steagall was enacted in 1933 to address
the regulatory failures that led to the Great Depression.89 It was designed to stamp
out commercial speculation, and most perceived evils that Congress viewed at the
time as leading to the Great Depression. 90 Following intense lobbying efforts by
the banking industry, the Glass-Steagall firewalls that had been erected between
consumer banks and the insurance and securities industries were eliminated by
Gramm-Leach-Bliley, essentially brushing away six decades of consumer
protection.9
Upon passage of Gramm-Leach-Bliley, a frenzy of consolidation, merging,
and acquiring ensued wherein the primary banking institutions in the United States
became ever larger and more powerful, and simply "too big to fail."92 As was
See James R. Hackney, Jr., On Markets and Regulation: Richard Posner's
Conservative PragmatistEvolution, 3 LAW & FIN. MARKETS REv. 540 (2009) (reviewing
RICHARD POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE DESCENT INTO
DEPRESSION (2009)); JOHNSON & KwAK, supra note 2, at 89, 91-92; POSNER, supra note
40, at 113; Grant, supra note 2, at 373-77.
88 See Hackney, supra note 87,
at 540.
89 See Grant,supra note 2,
at 377.
90 Id. at 374 n.7 ("Passed during the Roosevelt administration, the Glass-Steagall Act
directly responded to the belief that the stock market crash [of 1929] resulted from the lack
of separation between lending and underwriting activities that had allowed banks to engage
-in speculative investments. Under the Glass-Steagall Act, Congress separated commercial
banking from investment banking, thereby prohibiting commercial banks from
underwriting most securities." (citations omitted)); JOHNSON & KwAK, supra note 2, at 89,
134.
87

9' See id. at 380.

See Grant, supra note 2, at 371-72; RAMIREZ, supra note 1 (manuscript at
introduction); David Leonhardt, Washington's Invisible Hand, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2008,
at 32; Louis Uchitelle, Volcker Fails to Sell a Bank Strategy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2009, at
Al; Paul Krugman, Armey of Ignorance, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2009, 10:26 AM)
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/1 1/1 0/armey-of-ignorance/?scp=9&sq=GrammLeach-Bliley&st-cse; Cyrus Sanati, 10 Years Later, Looking at Repeal of Glass-Steagall,
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Nov. 12, 2009, 2:24 PM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/
2009/11/12/10-years-later-looking-at-repeal-of-glass-steagall/?scp=l&sq=Gramm-LeachBliley&st-cse. But see Mark. A. Calabria, Did Deregulation Cause the FinancialCrisis?,
CATO POL'Y REP., July-Aug. 2009, at 1, 6, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/policy
report/v31n4/cpr31n4-1.pdf (arguing that Gramm-Leach-Bliley did not play a primary
role in the financial market crisis); James L. Gattuso, Meltdowns and Myths: Did
92
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feared by the few senators and representatives that opposed passage of GrammLeach-Bliley, the banking industry became an industry of enormous "one-stop"
financial institutions that engaged in not just consumer banking, but also in
insurance activity and speculative investing with consumer deposits.93
Once the firewalls were erased, the consolidation of the banking industry led
in part to the market crisis that, but for a government bailout, nearly collapsed
every single banking institution, including Citigroup and Bank of America, that
had lobbied so aggressively for passage of Gramm-Leach-Bliley.9 4 That Congress
bowed to the intense lobbying of Wall Street and the banking industry in passing
Gramm-Leach-Bliley was not surprising as both Republicans and Democrats fell
under the laissez-faire sway of nearly every financial leader and lobbyist in place.
at the time.9 5 "This monumental deregulatory moment fitted well with Greenspan's
laissez-faire position with regard to markets. It is the same free market belief that
has led the Fed to turn a blind eye in the face of inflated asset prices." 96
Of course, the Fed possesses the power to regulate commercial banks, which
it failed to exercise, particularly following passage of Gramm-Leach-Bliley.

Greenspan, believed and preached, as one of his foundational tenets, that private
industry was much better situated to police and regulate itself primarily because
corporate executives and major financial institution directors would never risk their
very existence in reckless or overleveraged positioning. In this belief, of course,
Deregulation Cause the Financial Crisis?, WEB MEMO (The Heritage Found., Wash.,
D.C.), Oct. 22, 2008, available at http://s3.amazonaws.corm/thf_media/2008/pdf/
wm2109.pdf (claiming that Gramm-Leach-Bliley alleviated the financial market crisis

rather than caused it).
93 Grant, supra note 2, at 384-85.
94 See id.; JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 2, at 134.
9 See Hackney, supra note 88, at 540-41 ("The

repeal of Glass-Steagall was the
product of a Republican Congress, and a Democratic President (Bill Clinton), but had an
'assist' from the Federal Reserve. It was the Fed under the chairmanship of Alan
Greenspan that approved the merger between Citicorp and Travelers Group in 1998. This
forced the hand of Congress and President Clinton to repeal Glass-Steagall."); JOHNSON &
KWAK, supra note 2, at 5-7.
96 See Hackney, supra note 88, at 541.
97 See id.
98 See Jacob M. Schlesinger & Michael Schroeder, Greenspan Defends Longer-Term
Capital Plan, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 1998, at A3 ("Despite acknowledging the potential
dangers from Long-Term Capital's near collapse-and the possibility of more such
disruption-Mr. Greenspan said he didn't think more regulation would work. Attempts to
impose government controls on the unregulated hedge-fund industry, he said, would simply
force those activities offshore."); Allison Bisbey Colter, Hedge Funds Are Back in
Spotlight, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2004, at DI1 ("Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan
last week joined the debate over hedge-fund regulation, saying he objected to a proposal by
Securities and Exchange Commission staff that hedge-fund managers be required to
register as investment advisers. Such regulation would subject many hedge-fund advisors
to oversight for the first time."); Joseph Rebello & Dawn Kopecki, Greenspan Urges
Congress to Move on Derivatives, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2000, at C20 ("Federal Reserve
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Greenspan was badly mistaken. Per Posner, "[t]he successive Federal Reserve
chairmanships of Greenspan and Bernanke must be reckoned prime causes of the
financial crisis and the slide into depression."9 9 For a time, Alan Greenspan's
tremendous prestige allowed him nearly unfettered sway, and with it, he blocked
deregulation of derivative instruments, refused to use the power of the Fed to stave
off the housing bubble by raising interest rates, and failed to rein in reckless
lending by more assertively exercising the control that the Federal Reserve holds
over commercial banks. 00
While Gramm-Leach-Bliley did not necessarily directly impact the actions of
Wall Street investment banks Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns, viewed as the
main progenitors of the early reckless trading in the subprime mortgage-backed
securities market (the Commodity Futures Modernization Act enabled investment
banks to do most of their damage), 0 ' Gramm-Leach-Bliley perpetuated the
environment for commercial banking giants--Citigroup, Bank of America,
Washington Mutual, and Wachovia-to become so large and unwieldy that each
faced certain collapse based on their subprime market exposure.' 02 Following
passage of Gramm-Leach-Bliley, Citigroup and Bank of America both entered an
era of near frantic acquisition, merging with regional banks, investment firms, and
insurance companies in a misguided effort to offer consumers every conceivable
service. 0 3 No longer consumer lenders only,1" both Citigroup and Bank of
America required a massive infusion of TARP bailout funds in order to stave off
certain bankruptcy and collapse because of the investment-related activity that
introduced toxic securitized subprime assets onto their balance sheets. 0 5

Chairman Alan Greenspan urged Congress to act quickly to exempt the $80 trillion overthe-counter derivatives market from government regulation, saying legal uncertainty is
posing 'unacceptable risks to the country's financial system."'); Alan Yonan Jr.,
GreenspanBacks Banking Overhaul Opposed by Rubin, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 1998, at A6
("The Fed chief, however, said passage of the bill would be 'an historic achievement that
would update the increasingly antiquated laws that constrain the development and
competitiveness of our financial system.' Mr. Greenspan said the bill would remove
'obsolete barriers' that prevent banks, securities and insurance companies from merging.").
99 See POSNER, supra note 40, at 281.
100 See id.
101 See Leonhardt,supra note 92.
102 See Grant, supra note 2, at 374-76.

But see Gramm-Leach-Bliley Did Not Cause
the FinancialCrisis, AM. BANKERS Ass'N (Jan. 2010), http://www.aba.com/NR/rdonlyres/

71949FE8-BAO4-40B8-BC6 1-AF9F612C679A/64916/GrammLeachHelpedtoResolvenot
CausetheCreditCrisisJa.pdf.
103 See Grant, supra note 2, at 400-01, 406.

'" See id. at 386-87.
1os See Leonhardt,supra note 92; JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 2, at 10-13.
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3. Commodity Futures ModernizationAct

An additional deregulatory decision that precipitated the market collapse was
06
the 2000 promulgation of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (CFMA).
At a time when financial institutions were combining at a frenzied pace due to the
recent enactment of Gramm-Leach-Bliley and as financial innovation in the
derivatives trading industry was stressing the parameters of known regulation,
Congress, at Greenspan's urging, deregulated the over-the-counter derivatives
trading market.10 7 Passed as a rider to an omnibus appropriations bill, against the
pointed objection of Brooksley Born, then head of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, the CFMA prohibited any type of governmental oversight over the
trading of derivative investment vehicles.108 The CFMA explicitly forbade the
government from conducting regulatory activity in connection with the over-the09
counter trading of many derivative and futures investment vehicles.'
Motivated by the claim that over-the-counter derivatives trading occurring
between large financial institutions simply did not require governmental oversight,
Congress stripped regulators of any realistic ability to oversee trading of these
types of instruments. 10 Therefore, derivatives trading between sophisticated
investors could occur in the "shadows" without any requirement of transparency,
clearing, reserve requirements, or oversight of any kind-the legislation relies
entirely upon the private market and its discipline. This legislation, as predicted,
proved damaging.'
106

See Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114

Stat. 2763 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).

See cummings, StillAin'tNo Glory in Pain,supra note 42, at 536-38.
See id at 529-32; see also JOHNSON & KwAK, supra note 2, at 135-37; Anthony
Faiola, Ellen Nakashima & Jill Drew, What Went Wrong, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2008, at
Al (describing the failed campaign of former U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Commission director Brooksley Born to get the Clinton administration to seriously
107

108

consider regulating over-the-counter derivative trading); Manuel Roig-Fanzia, Credit
Crisis Cassandra,WASH. PosT, May 26, 2009, at Cl. A derivative investment instrument
is a financial instrument whose characteristics and value depend upon an underlying
security, commodity or contract, such as bonds, equities, commodities (like gold, oranges,
or corn) and currency. Typical examples of derivatives include futures and options. Often
derivatives are used to hedge risk against loss on investments in the actual commodity or
currency. See Derivative, INVESTORWORDS.COM, http://www.investorwords.com/1421/
derivative.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2011).
109 See cummings, Still Ain't No Glory in Pain, supra note 42, at 531-34; Frank
Partnoy, ISDA, NASD, CFMA, and SDNY: The Four Horsemen ofDerivativesRegulation?

17-18 (Univ. of San Diego Law Sch., Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 39,
2002), availableat http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=293085.
110 See Partnoy, supra note 109, at 17-19; cummings, Still Ain't No Glory in Pain,

supra note 42, at 529-34.
"

See cummings, Still Ain't No Glory in Pain, supra note 42, at 529-36; Leonhardt,

supra note 92 (stating that the CFMA "clearly did contribute to the current crisis"); Roig-
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As described in detail infra," 2 the creation of Collateralized Debt Obligations
(CDOs) by Wall Street introduced a nascent industry to the exotic derivatives
trading world focused on pooling and packaging home mortgage debt." 3 CDOs
offered investors rights to receive periodic payments from the cash flows
associated with particularized bundles of home mortgages."14 The initiation of
Credit Default Swaps (CDSs)," 5 private insurance-like contracts that act to hedge
against the default risk posed by CDOs, introduced an emerging hedging
mechanism into the exotic derivatives trading world and evolved into a cottage
trading industry." 6 The origination of CDOs and CDSs occurred in the shadows
and back alleys fashioned by the CFMA. Both the bundling of CDOs and the
hedging of CDO default by insuring against failure through CDSs, were
unregulated. "The [CFMA] not only allowed for the unregulated formation of
CDOs, but also the market in CDSs . . . . One of the insurers of choice was

American International Group (AIG).""'7 With an unregulated market in which to
devise innovative new derivatives and contracts, several trading desk leaders at
major financial institutions on Wall Street devised the CDS as an insurance
contract against the failure of the risky securitizations that they were creating and
trading in the mortgage market." 8 In this unregulated environment, investment
banks were both creating and trading CDSs, while at the same time underwriting
CDOs, essentially creating investment vehicles to sell to clients while
simultaneously trading in that same vehicle or selling to other clients often on the
other side of the very vehicle they sold to their clients." 9 Both the securitized
Fanzia, supra note 108 (chronicling Brooksley Born's opposition to, and ultimately
accurate predictions about, the danger of the deregulation of derivatives markets).
112
I13

See infra Part II.C.2.
See infra Part II.C.2; What Does Collateralized
Debt Obligation Mean?,

http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cdo.asp (last visited Jan. 26, 2011)
("[A collateralized debt obligation is] [a]n investment-grade security backed by a pool of
bonds, loans and other assets. CDOs do not specialize in one type of debt but are often nonmortgage loans or bonds.").
114 See Johnson,supra note 2, at 128-29.
INVESTOPEDIA,

"' See What Does Credit Default Swap Mean?, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investo
pedia.com/terms/c/creditdefaultswap.asp (last visited Jan. 26, 2011) ("[A credit default
swap is explained as where] [t]he buyer of a credit swap receives credit protection, whereas
the seller of the swap guarantees the credit worthiness of the product. By doing this, the
risk of default is transferred from the holder of the fixed income security to the seller of the
swap.").
116 See Johnson, supra note
2, at 134-38.
117 See Hackney, supranote
87, at 541.
118 See Johnson, supra note 2, at 134-38; see
generally MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG

(2010) (describing the evolution of the credit
default swap as an insurance hedge against new and innovative securitized subprime loan
SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE

investment instruments); Interview by Steve Kroft, Correspondent, 60 Minutes, with

Michael Lewis, Author, in Cal. (Mar. 14, 2010) [hereinafter 60 Minutes: Michael Lewis
Interview].
" 9 See

JOHNSON

& KwAK, supra note 2, at 3-13.

RACIAL CODING AND THE FINANCIAL MARKET CRISIS

2011]

167

subprime mortgage investment vehicles and the CDSs that insured against the
failure of those securitized subprime vehicles were completely unregulated by any
20
governmental agency or oversight body because the CFMA made it so.1
The CFMA made trading CDS contracts and CDOs in the shadows possible,
thus enabling enormous malfeasance and reckless risk taking by Wall Street banks
and corporate leadership.12 1 Investment banks and large financial institutions
purchased CDOs and securitized subprime mortgage instruments in a frenzied
money grab, as the investments were rated as "safe" (Aaa) by compromised credit
rating agencies,122 and the capital was immediately available based on flawed risk
modelingl 2 3 designed to show the percentages at which the underlying mortgages
would be paid by consumers.12 4 As these unregulated instruments were purchased,
traded, passed, sold, and shorted, these large financial institutions were "hedging"
by purchasing unregulated insurance contracts, CDSs, which would pay out if the
25
subprime mortgage consumers defaulted and homes were foreclosed upon.' In
agreeing to the hedge CDS contract, insurance giants like AIG charged hefty
premiums to "guarantee" against default of the CDOs, which were bundled,
securitized, and sold, all based on an unstable housing bubble and flawed quant
modeling.12 6 CDOs and CDS contracts were then traded and swapped freely in an
unregulated over-the-counter derivatives market wherein a credit default swap
contract could end up in the hands of a small hedge fund that had neither the
resources nor the wherewithal to pay out its insurance obligation if in fact a CDO

121

See Johnson, supra note 2, at 157-63; LEWIS, supra note 118, at 78.
See id; LEWIS, supra note 118, at 78; Michael Lewis Interview, supra note 118.

122

See infra Part II.C.3.

120

See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Risky Business: Credit Crisis and Failure (PartI),
104 Nw. U. L. REv. COLLOQUY 398, 403-04 (2010).
124 See Gretchen Morgenson, Credit Rating Agency Heads Grilled by Lawmakers,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2008, at Bl; Andrew Ross Sorkin, Connecticut Sues Moody's and
S.&P. Over Ratings, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Mar. 10, 2010, 1:15 PM), http://dealbook.
8
blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/10/connecticut-sues-moodys-and-s-p-over-ratings/?scp= &
123

sq=credit%20rating%20agencies&st-cse;

Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Trading Places:

Securities Regulation, Market Crisis and Network Risk (Nw. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law

& Legal Theory Series, Law & Econ. Paper No. 09-01, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1324951 (describing the rising power
of traders on Wall Street and the necessity to better understand and fundamentally regulate
risk and new risk modeling).
See Houman B. Shadab, Counterparty Regulation andIts Limits: The Evolution of
the Credit Default Swaps Market, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 689, 705 (2009/10) (describing
125

credit default swaps, counterparty regulation and concluding that little need exists for
federal regulation of the credit default swap market); Morrissey, supra note 63.
126 See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 943,
988-89 (2009) (describing the role that credit default swaps played in the collapse of AIG
and the "regulatory gap" that existed enabling AIG to take enormous risk positions in the
CDS market); PATTERSON, supra note 2, at 11-12.
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default occurred.127 Further, on these CFMA mandated unregulated markets where
CDSs and CDOs were sold, traded, and swapped, they were also short sold, a bet
that the underlying instrument would fail.128 All of the trading, hedging, shorting,
and swapping occurred in an atmosphere of recklessness and avarice. Truly, the
environment was a recipe for disaster, enabled by Gramm-Leach-Bliley and the
CFMA.
Former President Bill Clinton acknowledged the errors of the deregulation
legislation enacted during his administration, admitting that he should have better
regulated the trading of derivatives while he presided over the country. 2 9 President
Clinton's financial team during the course of his presidency, including Robert
Rubin, Lawrence Summers, and Alan Greenspan, 30 famously battled furiously
against any form of regulation over derivatives and derivatives trading.' 3 '
4. PrivateSecuritiesLitigation Reform Act

A further legislative enactment during the deregulation movement that
gripped Congress in the 1990s was the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(PSLRA).132 The PSLRA made it very difficult for securities fraud plaintiffs to
plead fraud in a complaint to such a degree that the pleading would survive a
motion to dismiss.133 Enacted to combat "strike suits" that were purportedly
stifling corporate growth and shareholder earnings, the PSLRA changed the
See Gretchen Morgenson, It's Time for Swaps to
Lose Their Swagger, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 28, 2010, at BUl; Wolfgang Minchau, Time to Outlaw Naked Credit Default Swaps,
FIN. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2010, at 9; Frank Hardy, What Are Credit Default Swaps:
Unregulated Insurance Policies for Risky, Toxic Investments, SUITE 101 .COM (Oct. 19,
127

2008),

http://americanaffairs.suitel01.com/article.cfm/whatarecreditdefault-swaps;

Yves Smith, So Why Hasn't the Credit Default Swaps Casino Been Shut Down?, NAKED
CAPITALISM

(Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2010/03/so-why-hasnt-the-

credit-default-swaps-casino-been-shut-down.html.
128 See Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, Banks Bundled
Bad Debt, Bet Against It
and Won, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2009, at Al; LEWIS, supra note 118, at 77-79; Michael
Lewis Interview, supranote 118.
129 See Bill Clinton: I Should Have Better
Regulated Derivatives, CNN (Feb. 16,
2009, 3:02 PM EST), http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/02/16/bill.clinton.qanda/.
130 See The Three Marketeers, TIME, Feb. 15, 1999, http://www.time.comi/time/
magazine/article/0,9171,990206,00.html
(describing
spookily-in
retrospect-the
Greenspan, Summers, Rubin financial team as a "Committee to save the world").
131 See Faiola, Nakashima & Drew, supra note 108 (describing
the nearly violent
reaction that Rubin and Greenspan had when former U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Commission chair Brooksley Bom suggested writing a white paper in connection with
regulating derivatives); see also JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 2, at 3-13.
132 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).

'33 See Amy Widman & Joanne Doroshaw, Legal Abandon:
How Limiting Lawsuits
Led to the FinancialCollapse and What to do About It, CENTER FOR JUST. & DEMOCRACY,

6-8 (Feb. 2010), http://www.centerjd.org/archives/studies/LegalAbandonWpaperF.pdf
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securities fraud class action scheme in debilitating ways.134 Because it was much
more difficult for private plaintiffs to get into court following passage of the
PSLRA, corporate executives were freed to engage in behavior that they would
ultimately not be held accountable for in any recognizable way. 35
With pleading standards making it more difficult for securities fraud plaintiffs
to survive a motion to dismiss and discovery stayed until a federal district court
judge had ruled on the motion to dismiss, the deliberate weakening of investors'
private legal rights of action crystallized.13 6
Beginning in the 1990s and into the early part of the next decade, the
legal rights of defrauded shareholders were greatly restricted. Combined
with Congress's failure to fix new litigation obstacles primarily created
by the U.S. Supreme Court, it seems everywhere one turned there were
roadblocks to legal accountability, leaving "private enforcement of the
federal securities laws in near terminal condition."' 37
The impact of the PSLRA has been severe. Abner Mikva, former federal judge,
U.S. representative, and White House counsel wrote "[b]y inhibiting the rights of
individuals to seek damages, we lowered the risks for securities fraud, eliminated
deterrence and fostered a culture of laxity. Arthur Levitt, [former] chairman of the
[Securities and Exchange Commission] . . . has observed that what used to be
unthinkable is now commonplace in the marketplace."13
The PSLRA severely restricted the private enforcement component of
successful capital markets. The "most efficient and productive" capital markets are
those that combine a strong private enforcement function through shareholder
lawsuit and effective governmental regulation.139 A leading study of the forty-nine
largest stock markets in the world, conducted by "a troika of Ivy League
economists - Dartmouth's Rafael La Porta, Yale's Florencio Lopez De Silanes,
and Harvard's Andrei Shleifer," found that "private lawsuits, combined with
common-sense regulation and governmental control, is by far the most effective

134 See Steven Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform in Private Securities Litigation:

Dealing with the Meritorious as Well as the Frivolous, 40 WM. &

MARY

L. REv. 1055,

1055-60 (1999); cummings, Ain't No Glory in Pain,supranote 42, at 1007-28.
13s See cummings, Ain't No Glory in Pain, supra note 42, at 1005-06; James Cotton,

Another Nail in the Coffin of the Small Investor: The Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995, 17 TOURO L. REv. 733, 738 (2001); Steven A. Ramirez, American Corporate
Governanceand Globalization, 18 BERKLEY LA RAZA L.J. 47, 57-59 (2000).
136 See Ramirez, supra note 134 at 1055-60; cummings, Ain't No Glory in Pain,

supra note 42 at 1007-28.
13 See Widman & Doroshaw, supra note 133, at 2 (quoting cummings, Ain't No
Glory in Pain,supranote 42, at 1009 n.135).
138 See id. (alterations in original) (quoting Abner J. Mikva, Share and Shares Alike:
Now Let's Fix the 'Reform' ofSecurities Law, LEGAL TIMES (Apr. 8, 2002)).
13 See cummings, Ain't No Glory in Pain,supra note 42, at 1065-66.
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method to manage a national capital market."1 4 0 Indeed, La Porta, De Silanes, and
Shleifer discovered that markets develop better when civil-not criminal-law is
strong.141 The PSLRA got this capital market truism backward: it restricts the
private enforcement component of stable, healthy capital markets. Instead, it
disincentivizes careful corporate leadership by restricting private shareholders
from bringing legitimate enforcement actions.
The deregulatory strategy that descended on Capitol Hill in the 1990s and
early 2000s actually took the exact opposite tack of that identified in the healthy
capital markets construction outlined above. Successful capital markets require the
threat of strong "private lawsuits, combined with common-sense regulation and
governmental control .... " Nearly every financial market legislation enacted by
Congress in the 1990s and early 2000s either weakened the private lawsuit
component or scaled back common-sense governmental regulation of the financial
services sector-precisely the opposite of what is commonly understood to be the
best approach to maintaining the integrity of strong and sustainable capital
markets.
While Fed policy, Gramm-Leach-Bliley, the CFMA, and the PSLRA
represent destructive deregulatory enactments adopted by Congress in the run up to
the 2008 collapse, many other unfortunate enactments contributed, including the
Telecommunications Act of 2006, the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
of 1998, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and federal courts'
failure to regulate hedge funds,14 3 and numerous SEC rules promulgated under its
rulemaking authority.'" The SEC's sins included exempting large Wall Street
investment firms from minimum capital requirements, repealing a rule designed to
prevent manipulative short selling and limiting shareholders' ability to recover for
securities fraud.14 1

140 See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, What Works
in Securities Laws?, 61 J. Fin. 1, 1 (2006) ("We examine the effect of securities laws on
stock market development in 49 countries. We find little evidence that public enforcement
benefits stock markets, but strong evidence that laws mandating disclosure and facilitating
private enforcement through liability rules benefit stock markets.").
141 See Daniel Gross, So Sue Me, SLATE (Sept. 23, 2003, 4:54 PM), http://www.slate
.com/id/2088790/.
142 Widman & Doroshow, supra note 133, at 5.

143 See Joshua Hess, Note, How Arbitrary Really Was the S.E.C.'s "Hedge Fund
Rule"? The Future of Hedge Fund Regulation in Light of Goldstein, Amaranth Advisors,
and Beyond, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 913 (2008) (describing the SEC's and federal courts
failures to regulate hedge funds).
1" See cummings, Still Ain't No Glory in Pain, supra note 42, at 469-87 (describing

the Telecommunications Act and the Commodities Futures Modernization Act as 1990s
deregulation that had a deleterious effect on the capital markets).

145 See Norman S. Poser, Why the SEC Failed: Regulators against Regulation,

3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 289, 309-310 (2008). Professor Poser notes four SEC
"deregulatory" rules that contributed to the market meltdown of 2008:
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Those that continue to honestly resist deregulation as a primary trigger of the
financial market crisis of 2008 must also ignore the conclusions of an iconic
neoclassical economics voice, Judge Posner, who concludes:
The seeds of failure were sown in the movement to reduce the regulation
of banks and credit, which began in the 1970s. They germinated during
the Clinton Administration, when the housing bubble began and the
deregulation of banking culminated in the repeal of the Glass-Steagall
Act . .. and it was decided not to bring the new financial instruments, in
particular credit-default swaps, under regulation ... .146
Of course, proponents of laissez-faire economics are loathe to embrace any
characterization of the financial market crisis that implicates deregulation as a
primary progenitor. In the face of overwhelming evidence that neoclassical
economic theories of efficiency and private market discipline broke down in newly
deregulated markets,1 4 7 market fundamentalists still cling to the notion of
completely free markets as the answer. In order to support this unfettered market
claim, market fundamentalists must reject deregulation as a cause and instead seek
to refocus public attention on causes other than deregulated markets. Market
fundamentalists have seized upon governmental intrusion into the housing markets
through social steering and the myth of the minority borrower as their base cause
of the market failure. 14 8 Despite this misdirection by market fundamentalists,
deregulation cannot be framed as the sole cause of the financial market crisis. The
housing bubble and mortgage markets that developed in the early part of the
twenty-first century played a major role in the meltdown as well.

During the past decade, the SEC made important regulatory changes that
weakened the regulatory system and turned out to be a disaster for investors,
significantly contributing to the 2008 financial crisis. First, the SEC exempted
the largest investment banking firms from the minimum capital requirements
imposed on broker-dealers. Second, the SEC repealed a rule designed to prevent
manipulative short selling of securities. At the same time, the Commission's
other deregulatory actions included limiting shareholder access to the proxy
voting system and repeatedly urging the Supreme Court to limit investors'
ability to recover their fraud losses by means of private lawsuits.
Id. at 296 (citations omitted); Charles R. Schwab, Restore the Uptick Rule, Restore
Confidence, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 2008, at A17; John C. Coffee, Jr., Analyzing the Credit
Crisis: Was the SEC Missing in Action?, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 5, 2008),
http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202426495544.
146 See POSNER, supra note 40, at 270.
147 See STIGLITZ, supranote 2, at 1317.
148 See infra Part III.
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B. Housing Bubble

"As long as the music is playing, you've got to get up and dance."
-Charles 0. Prince III, CEO Citigroupl49
The second conflation of causes of the financial crisis can be explored by
deconstructing the "housing bubble" that ballooned and collapsed with its
attendant consequences. As Professor Christopher Peterson notes:
[i]n the past two years, subprime mortgage lending has forced the
American economy to the brink of.a depression and fundamentally
undermined world faith in American consumer financial markets. A host
of dubiously underwritten mortgage loans helped inflate a bubble in
residential real estate values. As it has become clear that millions of
Americans are not capable of repaying loans crafted for them by
commission hungry brokers, the liquidity of securities drawn from those
loans froze. Currently about 25% of all subprime home mortgages are
delinquent with millions more likely to follow. One rating agency
predicts that between 40 and 50% of all subprime mortgages originated
since 2006 will eventually end in foreclosure. 50
Estimates indicate that more than 25% of all U.S. households currently show that
they owe more on their home mortgage than their home is worth.' 5 1 In other words,
negative equity indicates that nearly half of all homeowners that entered subprime
mortgages are underwater on their loans, causing many to abandon their homes.152
Thousands of financial 'foreclosure rescue' predators and con artists are
openly stalking desperate families looking for a financial lifeline. County
and municipal governments in the Los Angeles area have begun
campaigns to exterminate a scourge of mosquitoes breeding in the rotten
149

Sorkin, supra note 64 (quoting the chairman of Citigroup).

Iso Peterson, supra note 2, at 1359 (citations omitted); Nick Zieminski,
U.S. Mortgage
Delinquencies Set Record, REUTERS (Sept. 21, 2009, 12:21 PM EDT), http://www
.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE58K29E20090921.
151 See Jody Shenn, 'Underwater' Mortgages to
Hit 48%, Deutsche Bank Says,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 5, 2009, 15:32 EDT), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid

=20601110&sid=ac9ylxr7yNhQ (explaining that 26% or 14 million properties were
mortgaged for more than their value); Gregory Scott Crespi, The Trillion DollarProblem

of Underwater Homeowners: Avoiding a New Surge of Foreclosures by Encouraging
Principal-ReducingLoan Modifications, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 153-55 (2010).
152 Les Christie, Halfof Mortgage Brokers Will Be 'Underwater,'
CNNMONEY (Aug.
6, 2009), http://money.cnn.com/2009/08/06/realestate/underwaterworld/index.htm?post
version=20090806 11 &FORM=ZZNR9; Crespi, supra note 151, at 153-55; Peterson, supra

note 2, at 1359-60.
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water of swimming pools behind thousands of abandoned suburban
homes. 5 3
In Detroit, Michigan, more than forty square miles of abandoned housing sits
vacant within its city limits as foreclosures and unemployment have wreaked
havoc on the city.154 To appreciate a forty square mile vacancy approximation in
Detroit, consider that Manhattan Island in New York City is twenty-three square
miles. An area larger than Manhattan sits vacant and idle in Detroit. Additionally,
with unemployment now, by some estimates, at nearly 50%, Detroit suffers from a
foreclosure disaster that has left a black hole within city limits.'55 Detroit is far
from Wall Street, yet the repercussions- of the actions of an elite few, almost a
thousand miles away, are laying waste to a city once an icon of America's
productivity.156
The reckless overleveraging on Wall Street discussed above and below,
combined with losses in mortgage securities, has devastated "[t]wo of the nation's
formerly most reputable investment houses, Bear Stems and Lehman Brothers,
collaps[ing] when it became clear that billions of dollars of... subprime mortgage
assets were virtually worthless." 5 7 Currently, more than seven hundred banks have
been identified by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as "problem"
banks in danger of failing.' 58 Several contributing factors led to the development of
the housing bubble and its subsequent failure.
Factors contributing to the housing bubble that expanded and then burst,
devastating millions of homeowners and investors, included lax oversight over
important segments of the lender market, the expansion of predatory lending into
minority and poor communities, the growth of predatory borrowing or
irresponsible borrowing engaged in by dishonest or greedy borrowers, and housing
market cover introduced by governmental policies that protected the growing
subprime markets that collapsed under their own weight.
See Peterson,supra note 2, at 1360 (citations omitted).
See Alex P. Kellogg, Detroit'sSmaller Reality, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2010, at A3.
See Mike Wilkinson, Nearly Half of Detroit's Workers Are Unemployed; Analysis
Shows Reported Jobless Rate Understates Extent of Problem, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 16,
2009, at Al; Steven Gray, In Detroit, Nearly 50% Unemployment Rate?, DETROIT BLOG
(Dec. 16, 2009, 11:01 AM), http://detroit.blogs.time.com/2009/12/16/in-detroit-nearly-50unemployment-rate/.
156 See Thomas J. Sugrue, From Motor City to Motor Metropolis: How the
Automobile Industry Reshaped Urban America, AUTOMOBILE IN AM. LIFE & SOC'Y,
http://www.autolife.umd.umich.edulRace/R Overview/R Overviewl.htm (last visited Jan.
26, 2010); Thomas J. Sugrue, Motor City: The Story of Detroit, GILDER LEHRMAN INST.
AM. HIST. (Mar. 2007), http://www.gilderlehrman.org/historynow/03_2007/historian6.php.
1 Peterson, supra note 2, at 1360 (citations omitted) (citing COHAN, supra note 62, at
4).
158 See Eric Dash, At F.D.I.C., BracingFor a Wave of Failures,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24,
153
154
1ss

2010, at B I ("Despite resurgent profits and pay at the giants of American finance, many of
the nation's 8,000 banks remain under stress, according to a quarterly report the F.D.I.C.
released Tuesday.").
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1. Lax Lender Oversight

Before financial deregulation and Gramm-Leach-Bliley, commercial banks
wrote mortgages that were primarily based on an individual's demonstrated ability
to repay the loan, based upon credit worthiness.1 5 9 Typically, the commercial bank
would then hold the mortgage, collecting payments until the mortgage was
ultimately paid off by the credit-worthy borrower. Commercial banks were
generally careful about how, and to whom, they wrote mortgages, because they
held the loan and relied on timely payments to conduct business.16 0
Following the Great Depression, the government became critically involved
in the home mortgage business originating government entities to purchase loans
and guarantee payment of mortgages in many instances via its initiation of Fannie
Mae, Ginnie Mae, and Freddie Mac.161 Soon thereafter, securitization of home
mortgages was initiated by these government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs)
allowing investors to purchase mortgage-backed securities that had both liquidity
and stability "which generated greater spreads over comparable term treasury
obligations than securities of similar risk. Securitization of mortgage loans by
[Fannie, Ginnie, and Freddie] allowed the larger capital markets to directly invest
in American home ownership at a lower cost than the older depository lending

model of business."l 6 2
When the private sector was finally able to burst through and carve itself out a
place in the mortgage loan securitization industry-an evolution that spanned
decades-while providing consumers some benefits. previously unavailable, '63 it
ultimately unleashed a shadow system that eventually spun out of control.
While the GSEs, Fannie, Freddie, and Ginnie, typically invested in mortgages
with particular middle-class focused policy objectives in mind, mostly refusing to
purchase unusually large ("jumbo") mortgages, home equity loans, variable
interest rate mortgages, or most importantly subprime mortgages, purely private
institutions recognized these market gaps as potentially lucrative. '" In the 1970s,
as the baby boomers were reaching home buying target ages, the private sector felt
the potential benefits of pooling jumbo, variable rate, and subprime home
mortgages into mortgage-backed securities and soon began channeling capital into
See Lissa Lamkin Broome, The Influence ofEnhanced Thrift Institution Powers
on
CommercialBank Market Expansion, 67 N.C. L. REv. 795, 813-814 (1989).
160 See id. at n.74.
161 See Christopher Peterson, Predatory Structured
Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV.
159

2185, 2194-99 (2007) (describing the evolution of home mortgage financing following the
Great Depression including the creation of government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae,
Ginnie Mae, and Freddie Mac).
162 Id. at 2199 (citations
omitted).
163 Id. at 2199-2200.
'6
See MEIR KOHN, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND MARKETS 623-24 (1994);
Christopher Peterson, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Home Mortgage Foreclosure
Crisis, 10 Lov. J. PUB. INT. L. 149, 157-58 (2009).
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home mortgage lending similarly to the ways the GSEs did with prime
mortgages.16 5 "Private financiers wanted to mobilize capital to serve this massive
potential demand for [mortgage] credit."l 6 6 Unmet demand in the mortgage market
segments that was too risky for the GSEs-including variable rate, home equity,
and subprime-left enticing and substantial niches for private investors. 67
It is now beyond dispute that Lehman Brothers,168 Bear Steams,16 9
Citigroup, 7 0 Countrywide, 1 AIG,172 and Goldman Sachs,'" amongst so many
others, stepped into this private mortgage securitization business niche and
recklessly pursued these enticing (and enormous) revenue streams by egregiously
originating, purchasing, selling, and trading in the unregulated shadow markets of
securitized mortgage loans.174
A further development in the private sector that led to reckless trading was the
eventuation of the "mortgage broker." For the new, completely unregulated private
mortgage broker industry, the broker foraged for borrowers to whom it could sell a
mortgage, typically on behalf of a bank. Often, the mortgage brokers sold
subprime mortgages to individuals that presented substantial credit risk. In many
instances, these subprime loans were written on a predatory basis.17 Banks that
See Lewis S. Ranieri, The Origins of Securitization,Sources of Its Growth, and Its
Future Potential,in A PRIMER ON SECURITIZATION 31, 31 (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J.
165

Fishman eds., 1996); Peterson, supra note 164, at 157-58.
166 See Peterson, supra note 161, at 2200 (describing the unmet demand in market
segments like "jumbo" mortgages, mortgages with variable interest rates (ARMs), home
equity loans, or subprime mortgages).
167

Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74

WASH.

U.

L.Q. 1061, 1121 (1996); Peterson, supra note 161, at 2200.
168 Peterson, supra note 161, at 2222-25.
169

Susan Chaplinsky, Bear Stearns and the Seeds ofIts Demise (Univ. of Va. Darden

Bus. Sch., Darden Case No. UVA-F-1574, Oct. 22, 2009), available at http://papers
.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=1418914; COHAN, supranote 62, at 208-212..
170 Eric Dash & Julie Creswell, Citigroup Paysfor a Rush to Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
23, 2008, at Al.
171 See JOHNsON & KWAK, supra note 2,
at 96-97.
172 Sjostrom, supranote 126, at 944-45; JOHNSON
& KWAK, supra note 2, at 96, 126,
128.
173 See LEWIS, supra note 118, at 77-78; see also 60 Minutes:
Michael Lewis
Interview, supra note 118.

Factors Affecting Efforts to Limit Payments to AIG Counterparties:Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 111th Cong. (Jan. 27, 2010)
174

(testimony of Thomas C. Baxter Jr., Executive Vice President and General Counsel,
Federal Reserve Bank N.Y.), availableat http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speech
es/2010/bax100127.html; Janice K. McClendon, The Perfect Storm: How MortgageBacked Securities, FederalDeregulation,and Corporate Greed Provide a Wake- Up Call
for Reforming Executive Compensation, 12 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 131, 131-37 (2009); Felix
Salmon, AIG's Speculative CDS Bets, SEEKING ALPHA (Dec. 11, 2008),

http://seekingalpha.com/article/110186-aig-s-speculative-cds-bets;
II.B.2.
171

See infra Part II.B.2.
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closed mortgages through brokers were able to turn around and sell the mortgage
on an unregulated secondary market.17 6 Often, these loans were then packaged as
investment vehicles, CDOs, and again sold in an unregulated market. 7 7
The mortgage lending market, once one of careful weighing and balancing
and where actual concern for the consumer was clear, transformed into a money
grinding market where brokers connected lenders with borrowers, loans were often
packaged at the best fee arrangement for the broker and the bank, rather than the
consumer, and loans were sold in secondary markets and then packaged as
investments, so the risk of return was no longer the concern of one commercial
bank, but was spread out over multiple parties. 178 No longer was any party
concerned with repayment, default or the consumer's interests because much of the
money and fees were paid and collected up front.179 Once the mortgages were
privately securitized and packaged, and once the owner of the securitized mortgage
was an investment bank, then very little care or connectivity existed between the
mortgage payor and the owner. This unregulated mortgage lending industry led to
a confluence of reckless irresponsibility.
First, banks became detached from the credit-worthiness of borrowers as they
could immediately resell mortgages in a secondary market.180 Second, unregulated
mortgage brokers made loans to borrowers that were not qualified and often on a
predatory basis.' 8 ' Third, many borrowers entered into interest-only loans, many
See Brokers, Bankers Play Subprime Blame Game, MSNBC.coM
(May 22, 2007,
3:12 PM ET), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18804054/.
177 See ADAM ASCHCRAFT & TIL SCHUERMANN, STAFF
REP. No. 318,
176

FEDERAL
RESERVE BANK OF N.Y.: UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIZATION OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGE

CREDIT 2-12 (2008), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staffreports/
sr318.pdf.
178 Mitchell, supra note 39, at 171-73.
17 See Mara Der Hovanesian, Nightmare Mortgages, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK,
Sept. 11, 2006, at 70 ("Why are hedge funds willing to buy risky loans directly? Because
they can demand terms that help insulate them from losses. And banks, knowing what the
hedge funds want in advance, simply take it out of the hides of borrowers, many of whom
qualify for lower rates based on their credit histories."); Kimberly Amadeao, Could the
Mortgage Crisis and Bank Bailout Have Been Prevented?, ABOUT.COM, http://useconomy.
about.com/od/criticalssues/a/prevent-crisis.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2011) ("Banks had
hired sophisticated 'quant jocks' who wrote computer programs that could repackage these
[mortgage-backed securities] into high risk and low risk product bundles. The computer
programs were so complicated that no one really understood what exactly was in. each

product bundle or how much of the bundle had subprime mortgages."); Alistair Barr,

Subprime Crisis Shines Light on Mortgage Brokers, WALL ST. J. MARKET WATCH (Apr.
10, 2007, 11:30 AM EDT), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/subprime-crisis-shinesspotlight-on-mortgage-broker-practices ("The main problem is that, counter to common

perception, mortgage brokers do not represent the borrowers who pay them for advice.
Instead, they are more like independent salespeople who are often paid as much by the
lenders offering loans as the borrowers.").
180 See Amadeao, supra
note 179.
181 See id.; see also infra
Part II.B.2.
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adjustable rate, in order to secure lower monthly payments. 182 When the housing
bubble burst and mortgage rates reset at higher levels, many of these homeowners
could not pay their mortgage nor sell their homes for a profit, leading to
defaults.
Fourth, and perhaps most important, mortgages were repackaged as
mortgage-backed securities and sold in an unregulated market to investors.184
"Banks had hired sophisticated 'quant jocks' who wrote'computer programs that
could repackage these MBS [mortgage-backed securities] into high risk and low
risk product bundles. The computer programs were so complicated that no one
really understood what exactly was in each product bundle or how much of the
bundle had subprime mortgages."ss When the housing bubble was inflated, the
repackaged securities were fine as many investors opted for the high risk bundles
of subprime and adjustable rate mortgage-backed securities based on the higher
rate of return. When the housing market collapsed, because the unregulated
subprime mortgage-backed securities had spread throughout the entire economy,
including Wall Street investment banks, national commercial banks, small regional
banks, hedge funds, pension funds, and individual investors, the trajectory of the
downturn was massive. 86 Further, as hedge funds were left unregulated by the
SEC and the buying, selling, and swapping of CDOs and CDSs was conducted in
the shadows, banks and hedge funds could engage in highly speculative,
outrageously risky trading and betting. 87
Mortgage broking, private securitization origination, investment pooling of
mortgage-backed securities, credit rating agency activity, and insuring against
default on the mortgage-backed securities all existed in an unregulated market that
acted to torpedo the world economy.
2. PredatoryLending

Unregulated lenders, including unregulated mortgage brokers that engaged in
88
predatory lending, bear significant responsibility for the financial crisis.
182
183
184
185
186
187

See Amadeao, supra note 179.
See id.
See Arewa, supra note 123, at 403.
See Amadeao, supra note 179; Arewa, supra note 123, at 408.
See Amadeao, supra note 179.
See Felix Salmon, The Magnetar Trade, FELIX SALMON REUTERS BLOG (Apr. 9,

2010, 16:00 EDT), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/04/09/the-magnetar-trade/
(describing the breathtakingly risky and reckless CDO and CDS positions engaged by
Morgan Stanley and the Magnetar Hedge Fund that purportedly lost Morgan Stanley $9
billion); Hess, supra note 143, at 919, 953-54; Jessie Eisinger & Jake Bernstein, The
Magnetar Trade: How One Hedge Fund Helped Keep the Bubble Going, PROPUBLICA

(Apr. 9, 2010, 1:59 PM), http://www.propublica.org/feature/all-the-magnetar-trade-howone-hedge-fund-helped-keep-the-housing-bubble.
188

Martin H. Bosworth, Unregulated Lenders Blamed for Mortgage Meltdown,

2007), http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2007/
08/congress mortgages.html; Peterson, supra note 161, at 2222-25.
CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM (Aug. 12,
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Predatory lending occurs when a lender deceptively convinces borrowers to -agree
to unfair and abusive loan terms, or systematically violates terms in ways that are
difficult for a borrower to defend against.'8 9 Subprime loans are those loans most
likely to be written through predatory lending practices to borrowers who do not
meet prime underwriting borrower guidelines, and are therefore preferred by
lenders because profit margins can be significant if a borrower pays out the loan.' 90
Subprime mortgages are typically written for borrowers who are adjudged to have
very high credit risk, often because they lack a strong credit or work history or
have other characteristics that are associated with strong probabilities of default.'91
Subprime loans typically carry much higher interest rates than conventional
loans. 192
The development of the subprime lending market and its evolution into an
oftentimes predatory market began in the early 1990s when private label
securitization conduits became entrenched as an accepted method of financing
home mortgages.193 During the 1990s, the U.S. witnessed an explosion of a new
and aggressive form of "subprime" mortgage lending.194 Prior to this explosion,
"prime" mortgages were generally considered those qualified to be resold to
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac adhered to strict
automated underwriting standards, using widely embraced financial modeling that
required standardized documentation and pay practices that were similar for all
loans purchased by them.' 9s These standards led to stable and homogenized prime
mortgage loans, thereby permitting secondary markets to treat prime loans like a
commodity instead of a tenuous long-term financial association.196 In contrast to
"prime" mortgages, "subprime" mortgages are typically written for borrowers with
See Predatory Lending, INVESTORDICTIONARY.COM, http://www.investor
dictionary.com/definition/predatory+lending.aspx (last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
190 See Glossary of Mortgage Loan Terms, FIN. WEB, http://www.fmweb.com/
mortgage/glossary-of-mortgage-loan-terms.html (last visited June 14, 2011).
189

1 Ben Bemanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at
the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago's 43rd Annual Conference on Bank Structure and
Competition: The Subprime Mortgage Market (May 17, 2007), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20070517a.htm.
192 Carol Leonnig, How HUD MortgagePolicy Fed the Crisis, WASH. POST, June 10,
2008,*at Al.
193 See Peterson,supra note 161, at 2214.
.194 See Dan Immergluck, Stark Differences: Explosion of the Subprime Industry and

Racial Hypersegmentation in Home Equity Lending, in HOUSING
MILLENNIUM CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

POLICY IN THE NEW

235, 239-40 (Susan M. Wachter & R. Leo Penne

eds., 2001); Cathy Lesser Mansfield, The Road to Subprime "HEL" Was Pavedwith Good
CongressionalIntentions: Usury Deregulation and the Subprime Home Equity Market,

51 S.C. L. REV. 473, 475, 525 (2000).
195

See Peterson, supra note 161, at 2214; see also Anand K. Bhattacharya, Frank J.

Fabozzi & S. Esther Chang, Overview of the Mortgage Market, in THE
MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES 3, 22 (Frank J. Fabozzi ed., 5th ed. 2001).

HANDBOOK OF

196 See Henry T. Greely, Contracts as Commodities: The Influence of Secondary
Purchaserson the Form of Contracts,42 VAND. L. REv. 133, 169-70 (1989).
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poor credit histories that did not historically meet the guidelines established by
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.' 97 Further, unlike prime lenders, those lenders that
specialize in writing subprime loans .typically securitize their own loans and thus
have much more freedom to set rates and establish underwriting standards leading
to a drastically different set of rates, fees, and guidelines for borrowing depending
on which broker or lender a consumer borrows from.19 8 The result is that during
the housing bubble, unregulated lenders were in a rush to originate new subprime
loans in order to securitize and sell them to investors for large profits, often
disregarding their own underwriting guidelines when writing the subprime
mortgages.' 99 "Unlike prime loans, where access to the secondary market is
guarded by the play-it-safe GSEs, the secondary subprime market is filled with
aggressive investors and businesses looking to maximize their profits by any

possible means." 20 0
A steady stream of consumer horror stories and wide-ranging allegations of
predatory lending resulted from this "by any means possible" approach to
originating subprime loans.20' Commentators now point to the powerful connection
between predatory lending and securitization signaling that securitization allows
lenders with limited capital available to "chum" a significant number of loans.202
Churning in this context describes securitization originators quickly assigning their
subprime loans, so that their own capital is invested for just a short period of time
and once a subprime loan is securitized and sold, the originating lender can use the
capital from that sale to find a new consumer to write a new subprime loan
1
198

See Peterson,supra note 161, at 2214.
See Michael D. Larson, It's Buyer Beware When You're Shopping for a Subprime

BANKRATE.COM (Feb. 2, 2001), http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/mtg/2000
WEICHER, THE HOME EQUITY LENDING INDUSTRY: REFINANCING
MORTGAGES FOR BORROWERS WITH IMPAIRED CREDIT 13 (1997) ("In sharp contrast to the

Loan,

0420.asp; JOHN C.

prime mortgage market, there are no generally accepted underwriting guidelines for
subprime home equity lenders. Individual firms set their own guidelines. . . . For this

reason, subprime loans cannot be treated as a standard commodity, again in contrast to
loans in the prime market."); Peterson, supra note 161, at 2214-15.
199 See Jesse Eisinger, Long & Short: Mortgage Market Begins to See Cracks as
Subprime-Loan Problems Emerge, WALL ST. J., Aug. 30, 2006, at Cl (reporting that in

2004 and 2005, Washington Mutual originated more than $30 billion in non-conforming
mortgage loans without adjusting its own underwriting guidelines to account for rising
interest rates during that period); Peterson, supra note 161, at 2214.
200 Peterson, supra note 161, at 2215.

See Creola Johnson, The Magic of Group Identity: How Predatory Lenders Use
Minorities to Target Communities of Color, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 165, 171201

76 (2010) (illustrating the different methods used to market predatory loans in minority
communities); see also Peterson,supra note 161, at 2216-17 ("An impressive and growing
corpus of empirical research buttresses predatory lending horror stories as much more than
mere anecdote. In the legal academy, outrage over the narrative and empirical evidence of
predatory mortgage lending has also led to a large body of legal scholarship on the issue.").
202 See Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: PredatoryLending, Securitization,and
the Holder in Due Course Doctrine,35 CREIGHTON L. REv. 503, 546 (2002).
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continuing this pattern repeatedly. 203 "In effect, securitization uses Wall Street
capital to transform relatively small businesses into multi-million dollar
institutions with a tremendous impact on the lives of entire communities." 204
Scholars believe that the. secondary lending market is fully capable of
recognizing those loans that include predatory terms and markers.205 Media
expos6s have exposed Wall Street executive greed as the basis for the subprime
appetite behind the motivation to purchase subprime loans with the knowledge that
these loans were being written on a predatory basis. 20 6 "And a growing chorus [of]
regulators, consumer advocates, student groups, and faith-based investment
companies have all alleged that secondary
mortgage market participants are
20 7
willfully profiting from predatory lending."
That predatory lending ran amok in the run-up to the financial market crisis is
now well established.208 Mortgage brokers, seeking higher origination fees and
profit spreads, fervently sought out borrowers to whom they could sell subprime
mortgages.2 09 Often, minority communities were targeted for the predatory loans.
In 2006, 55% of loans to African Americans were subprime, despite the fact that
many of those borrowers qualified for prime loans.2 10
While the law has been very slow to react to the trend of securitizing
predatory loans, mortgage lenders, brokers, and servicers moved quickly to
203

See Peterson, supra note 161, at 2220.

2 04

Id. at 2221.

See id.; Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, PredatoryLending: What
Does
Wall Street Have to Do with It?, 15 HOusING POL'Y DEBATE 715, 741-42 (2004).
206 See Peterson, supra note 161, at 2221; Diana B.
Henriques & Lowell Bergman,
Mortgaged Lives: A Special Report.; Profiting From Fine Print with Wall Street's Help,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2000, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/15/business/mortgagedlives-special-report-profiting-fine-print-with-wall-street-s-help.html?pagewanted=1;
Bobbi
Murray, Wall Street's Soiled Hands, NATION, July 15, 2002, at 29 ("This whole business is
205

about providing triple-A bonds to funds that you or I would invest in .

. .

. The poor are

being used to produce this debt-what you have is a glorified money-laundering scheme.").
207

Peterson, supra note 161, at 2221; Michael Gregory, The Predatory Lending

Fracas:Wall Street Comes under Scrutiny in the Subprime Market as Liquidity Suffers and
Regulation Looms,
INVESTMENT
DEALERS'
DIGEST
(June
26,
2000),
http://www.iddmagazine.com/issues/20000625/4126-1.html.
208 See Gretchen Morgenson, Countrywide Suit Settled; Homeowners to Get Aid,
SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 6, 2008, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/
2008231492_mortgages06.html; Tami Luhby, Predatory Lending Lawsuits on the Rise,

CNNMONEY (Oct. 9, 2009, 7:19 AM ET), http://money.cnn.com/2009/10/08/news/
economy/Predatorylending_lawsuits increase/index.htm; States Are Pondering Fraud
Suits Against Banks, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Nov. 3, 2009, 3:45 AM),
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/11/03/states-are-pondering-fraud-suits-against-

banks/?scp=1 1&sq-predatory/o20lending&st=cse.
209 See The Downturn in Facts and Figures, supra note 62; Brokers, Bankers Play
Subprime Blame Game, supra note 176.
210 See Editorial, Mortgages and Minorities, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2008, at A34;
Johnson, supra note 201, at 187.
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actively bargain with a discerning view toward the ultimate end-game destination
of the loans they facilitate. 2 1 1 In this end-game contingency, mortgage loans,
particularly more expensive loans marketed to those with poor credit histories,
were to be purchased by investment trusts, bundled into sizeable geographically
diverse pools with many other mortgage loans, and then sold as securities to
investors.2 12 The mortgage industry has radically changed from one where lenders
"lend" in the sense that they themselves expect repayment, to an industry where
lenders now "manufacture a commercial product-borrowers-that are measured,
sold, and at times discarded by a consuming capital market." 2 13 The mortgage
lending industry has become an industry where "today's. mortgage lenders are
assignment production companies that create income streams for the nation's
capital markets."214
That borrowers are now "discarded" by Wall Street and that mortgage lenders
began viewing mortgage consumers as "income streams for the nation's capital
markets" represents an astonishing perspective change from the original
homeowner/mortgage-lender American dream paradigm imagined by President
Franklin Roosevelt and the originators of the government guaranteed home loan.
Predatory lending has flourished in this new era market and industry. With
promises of ever increasing housing market inclines and with loan instruments that
allowed even the most risky applicant to win loan approval, mortgage brokers sold
subprime mortgages with abandon. Those that recklessly sold and then bundled
predatory subprime loans bear grave responsibility for the financial market crisis.
3. PredatoryBorrowing

Deeply embedded in the web of corporate deceit outlined above are the
borrowers that are currently defaulting in staggering percentages on their loans,
many of them subprime. 21 5 The role of personal borrower culpability for the
See Maura B. O'Connor & James Bryce Clark,. Ten Easy Ways to Make a Loan
Nonsecuritizable, in 2 COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE FINANCING: WHAT BORROWERS AND
LENDERS NEED TO KNOW Now 11, 15-16 (Joshua Stein, Chair 2001); Jess Lederman,
Techniques for Selling Loans to Conduits, in THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET: A
211

HANDBOOK OF STRATEGIES, TECHNIQUES AND CRITICAL ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY
MORTGAGE FINANCE 77, 77-78 (Jess Lederman ed., 1987); Peterson, supra note 161, at

2186.
212

See Peterson, supra note 161, at 2186-87 ("Predatory home loans, like all home

mortgages, are increasingly subject to assignment. Now, more than ever before, a market in

assignment of loans casts a shadow over how those loans are originated and serviced.
While assignment of loans has always been common, relatively new and complex patterns,
alternatively referred to as structured finance or securitization, have rendered the
assumptions of traditional assignment law quaintly over-generalized."); Jeremy Carter,
Highlightsfrom SecuritizationNews, 10 J. STRUCTURED FIN. 97, 98 (2005).

Peterson, supra note 161, at 2186-87.
See id. at 2188.
215 See Carrie Bay, Residential Mortgage Delinquency Rate Surpasses 10%:
LPS,
DSNEWS.COM (Feb. 4, 2010), http://www.dsnews.com/articles/mortgage-delinquency-rate213
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financial crisis is one that must be addressed. Despite clear evidence of predatory
lending as shown above and below, the mortgage crisis can also be attributed in
many respects to "predatory borrowing." In 2006, more than 40% of all subprime
loans were written to borrowers that qualified as "affluent" and identified as
white. 2 16 While some subprime borrowers could be characterized as first-time
home purchasers, a large group of affluent white borrowers attempted to take easy
advantage of lax lending standards by taking out subprime loans in order to
purchase second or third homes to flip them for quick profit, or to purchase
apartment buildings they could not afford. With easy credit available and a
voracious Wall Street appetite for subprime loans for securitization purposes,
together with popular culture programs, such as "Flip This House" 2 17 and "Curb
Appeal," 218 individual borrowers were more than willing to get in over their heads
in order to purchase a home they could not afford or in an attempt to make a swift
profit by purchasing and immediately reselling (flipping) based on the everincreasing housing bubble.219
According to Professor Tyler Cowen: "There has been plenty of talk about
'predatory lending,' but 'predatory borrowing' may have been the bigger problem.
As much as 70 percent of recent early payment defaults had fraudulent
misrepresentations on their original loan applications, according to one recent
,,220
study.
In a survey that evaluated more than three million loans entered into
between 1997 and 2006, many of the loan applications included
misrepresentations, and those that included fraudulent information were more than
five times as likely to default. 2 2 1 The study indicated that much of the fraud
involved simply misstating income levels or employment, and that mortgage
brokers were content to acquiesce or "look the other way" in order to secure the
valuable subprime loan. 22 2 "in other words, many of the people now losing their
homes committed fraud. And when a mortgage goes into default in its first year,

surpasses-10-lps-2010-02-04 ("[T]he total rate of noncurrent mortgages sits at 13.3
percent.").

See Price, supra note 23.
See. Flip This House (A&E Television 2010); Flip This
House, A&E SHOWS,
http://www.aetv.com/flipthishouse/ (last visited June 13, 2011).
218 See Curb Appeal (Home & Garden Television 2010);
Curb Appeal, HGTV,
216
217

http://www.hgtv.com/curb-appeal/show/index.html (last visited June 14, 2011).

219 See Investment Property or Residential Property?,
MONEYINSTRUCTOR.COM,
http://www.moneyinstructor.com/art/investmentproperty.asp (last visited Jan. 26, 2011);
SOWELL, supra note 2, at 24-27; Scott Bernard Nelson, House-Flipping Still Offers
Opportunity, MSNBC.coM (Apr. 9, 2007, 9:48 AM ET), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/
id/17985804/; Barry Ritholtz, Its ALWAYS a Good Time to Buy a House!, BIG PICTURE
(Mar. 14, 2010, 8:47 AM), http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2010/03/its-always-a-good-timeto-buy-a-house/.
220 Cowen, supra
note 62.
221 id
222
d
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the chance is high that there was fraud in the initial application, especially because
unemployment in general has been low during the last two years."2 23
Without doubt, personal borrowers on many levels entered into mortgages
that they should not have and many borrowers lied to get approved. That said, the
depth of the predatory nature of the origination of subprime loans and the fact that
several studies exist that indicate that mortgage brokers, rather than borrowers,
actually committed egregious fraud on many loan applications should at least mute
those that attempt to place singular blame on borrowers.2 24 Still, borrower
irresponsibility and overreaching by consumers played a critical role in the
economic breakdown.
4. Governmental Cover

Some commentators and think tanks present an interesting view of the
underlying cause of the financial market crisis. Many argue that governmental
cover remains the primary reason that the appetite for subprime loans grew so
voracious.2 25
Commentators focus on subprime and Alt-A (nonprime) mortgages,
recognizing that those defaults caused the collapse of the asset-backed finance
market in 2007 and 2008, but then claiming that it was Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac,
and the Community Reinvestment Act that motivated the origination of subprime
and Alt-A loans based on government appetite for junk loans.226
Although the [Obama] administration blames the production of these
deficient loans primarily on unregulated mortgage brokers, many of
whom it calls "predatory lenders," this turns the mortgage market on its
head. Mortgage brokers-even predatory ones-cannot create and sell
deficient mortgages unless they have willing buyers, and it turns out that
their main customers were government agencies or companies and banks
required by government regulations to purchase these junk loans.2 27

223

Id.
See Barbara O'Neill, Predatory and High-Cost Sources of Credit, EXTENSION,
(last
http://www.extension.org/pages/Predatory andHigh-Cost Sources of Credit
updated Dec. 8, 2009); Don't Be a Victim of Loan Fraud,U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN
224

http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfh/buying/loanfraud.cfn

DEV.,

2011).

(last visited Jan. 26,

See Wallison, supra note 3.
See Peter J. Wallison, Deregulation and the Financial Crisis: Another Urban
Myth, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y RES. (Oct. 2009), http://www.aei.org/
225
226

outlook/100089.
227

id.
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A few commentators and economists argue that nearly two-thirds of all subprime
loans in 2008 were held by government enterprises. 2 2 8 That the Federal Housing
Administration, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac held millions of subprime and AltA loans indicates the willingness of the private quasi-governmental enterprises to
engage in the same risky profiteering that Wall Street investment firms and
commercial banks engaged in through the purchase of securitized subprime
mortgage-backed instruments.2 29
Although Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac entered the private securitized

subprime mortgage-backed market late in the game, they entered that market
seeking profit. 23 0 These GSEs are culpable for buttressing the market and creating
additional outlets for purchase of subprime loans and the securitization of those

loans. Due to the massive scope of Fannie and Freddie in the mortgage market,
their presence in the market, though late, created a significant leveraged position.
Further, the GSEs guarantee of many types of subprime loans provided cover for
those private bankers that recklessly wrote loans destined to fail knowing that the
price on some of those junk loans would be guaranteed by the government through
its sponsored entities.23 1
Still, despite attempts favored in some circles to pin singular blame on the
government, particularly Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, for the market crisis, the
truth indicates that while Fannie and Freddie did in fact play a role in the financial
market crisis, it was not a major one.232
Further examples of governmental cover include newspaper reports indicating
that the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) played a role
in encouraging Fannie and Freddie's entr6e into the subprime mortgage market. 2 3 3
HUD, eager to see homeownership more available to low-income families, urged
See id. But see JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 2, at 146 (allowing
that a "grain of
truth" exists in the argument that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bought up large percentages
228

of the junk loans being written by private mortgagers, thereby driving the market, but

debunking the argument that Fannie and Freddie's "guarantee" played a primary role in the
foreclosure fiasco).
229 See Steven Ramirez, Symposium Presentation at West Virginia
University:
Understanding the Financial Market Crisis: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Community
Reinvestment Act (Oct. 29, 2008) (notes on file with author) (referring to securitized
subprime mortgage-backed securities as "mortgage smoothies"); Peterson, supra note 164,
at 149-52.
230 See Peterson, supra note
164, at 163-67.
231 See Wallison, supra
note 226.
232 See JOHNSON & KwAK, supra note 2,
at 144-46; FED. Hous. FIN. AGENCY,
CONSERVATOR'S REPORT ON THE ENTERPRISES' FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE - SECOND
QUARTER 2010 (2010), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/l6591/Conservators
Rpt82610.pdf (providing evidence that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac leaned against the

housing bubble by staying out of the mortgage-backed securities investment game during
most of the build-up, and played a minor role during the raucous subprime days by

guaranteeing fewer of the subprime mortgages in 2007 and 2008); Peterson, supra note
164, at 167-70; Ramirez, supra note 229.
233 Leonnig, supra
note 192.
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Fannie and Freddie to purchase increasingly more subprime loans by categorizing
them as "affordable" through use of an outdated policy allowing the governmentchartered firms to count subprime loans as a "public good that would foster
affordable housing."234 Department policy allowed HUD to neglect examining
borrowers' ability to make payments on loans that Freddie and Fannie
characterized as "affordable."23 5 Reportedly, between 2004 and 2006, Freddie and
Fannie purchased $434 billion in securities backed by subprime loans, thus
fostering a greater market for such subprime lending.23 6 Based on this late game
reckless overleveraging in subprime loans, Fannie and Freddie collapsed under the
weight of millions of loan defaults, and as a result, required governmental seizure
and bailout. 237
A number of important factors precipitated the collapse of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac. First, taking its lead from Clinton and Bush II administrations, which
both heavily promoted homeownership, Fannie and Freddie recklessly entered the
subprime mortgage market, both in guaranteeing and securitizing subprime
mortgages and selling them to investors, and in buying up subprime loans, which
sustained and incentivized a robust market for the freewheeling writing of
subprime loans.238 With HUD policies promoting homeownership and
governmental policies providing cover, Fannie and Freddie, newly privatized,
joined Wall Street in reckless pursuit of profit and exorbitant bestowal of
compensation upon their executives. Fannie and Freddie's reckless pursuit of profit
must be considered against their newfound status as privatized entities. During the
subprime bubble and breakdown, Fannie and Freddie acted as private firmsprivate firms with an implicit governmental guarantee of their mortgage buying
activity. In a deregulated environment and as private actors, Fannie and Freddie
joined their Wall Street brethren in reckless pursuit of profit.
Critics of Fannie and Freddie immediately seized upon their collapse as
validation of previous opposition to the housing GSEs. As indicated above, some
commentators have gone so far as to actually pin the housing crisis and the severe
recession triggered by it on Fannie and Freddie, rather than on foreclosure of
privately originated and securitized subprime mortgages or risky speculation in the
CDOs and CDS derivatives.239 While it is true that Fannie and Freddie became
involved in the subprime mortgage and securitization market and bear
responsibility for contributing to the subprime mortgage crisis, the role of the

234
235

236
237
238

See id.
See id

id.

See Peterson, supra note 164, at 151, 169.
See McLEAN & NOCERA, supra note 2, at 6-8, 32-35; SOWELL, supra note 2, at

36-45.

See Peterson, supra note 164, at 151 ("For example, in 2008, Alaska Governor
Sarah Palin, the Republican Party's nominee for the Vice Presidency, argued that the
239

solution for the nation's economic woes was reform of oversight of quasi-government
agencies like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.").
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government-sponsored enterprises was simply one of many causes of the
meltdown.
The GSEs began to engage widely in unacceptably risky investment
decisions. That said, "allegations that the financial crisis is attributable to the GSEs
are both an oversimplification and a falsehood. Instead .. . while the GSEs became
an important part of the problem, the cause of the financial crisis is a much more
complex amalgam of factors" that include monetary policy established by the Fed,
deregulation of the financial sector and derivatives trading, regulatory dereliction,
judicial passivity, predatory borrowing, and reckless and dishonest "brokering,
appraising, lending, servicing, and securitizing by private financial services
,,240
companies.
Unregulated lending, predatory borrowing, predatory lending, and
governmental cover all played a role in the collapse of the subprime loan market
that led to the financial market crisis. While none were singularly responsible, each
must be acknowledged as an important cause. Acknowledging the role of the
government and its homeownership policy in the financial market crisis serves to
attach an honest appraisal of the financial crisis causes. 2 4 ' The dirty little myth
being analyzed in this Article, however, in its distortion of honest causation
distillation, places minority-borrower culpability as the primary cause of the
financial market crisis as perpetuated by governmental homeownership welfare
through the Community Reinvestment Act and the subprime activity of Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac. As demonstrated above, borrower irresponsibility played a
role in the meltdown. In addition, Fannie and Freddie cannot escape blame or
responsibility for enabling the crisis to occur.242 Still, borrower failure and the role
of Fannie and Freddie are merely minor pieces of the meltdown puzzle.
C. SecuritizationandDerivatives

"[T]he basic responsibility for the [financial crisis] rests with the private
sector-with decisions such as Citigroup's to increase the amount of risk
in its lending."
-Judge Richard Posner 24 3
If deregulation and the housing bubble set the stage for the financial market
crisis, the securitization of subprime mortgage loans and the shadow trading of the
derivative instruments thrown off by the securitized mortgages overturned the table
entirely. The profits available to those institutions that traded in securitized
mortgage-backed securities overwhelmed most involved to the point of

240
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recklessness. 244 The cottage industry that was established to perpetuate the market
served only to protect the trading of subprime derivatives and ignored all warning
signs as it was captured by the industry itself. The mortgage crisis resulted in large
part from the private securitization of subprime mortgages, the shadow banking
industry that allowed the origination and assigning of these instruments sans
regulation, the credit rating agencies that became mere conduits of the investment
banks, the regulators who failed to recognize all of the warning signs, balance
sheet fraud, and manipulation that most of the Wall Street firms engaged in, and
the reckless executive leadership that pursued short term profit at all costs,
collapsing their companies in the process.
Private market discipline failed.
1. PrivateSecuritization ofSubprime Mortgages

Mortgage loan securitization seized the imaginations of private sector
institutional investors and securities speculators in an unprecedented fashion in the
past decade. The profit margins and income streams available from bundling
subprime home mortgages into derivative investment vehicles, which were bought
and sold in unregulated shadow markets, was too potentially profitable to pass up.
Securitization, once a market controlled by GSEs and involving only prime
mortgage loans, became unmoored from these places of relative safety in the
1990s. When the private sector seized subprime loans as a securitization vehicle,
the frenzied profit pursuit began. The role of securitization and derivatives trading
led in large part to the financial collapse of 2008.
Since the government origination of mortgage securitization in the 1940s and
1950s, the ability to profit on pass-through interest based on homeowner payments
that traditionally only default in very small percentages was of keen interest to the
private markets. The securitization of subprime mortgages was extremely attractive
to the private markets because subprime securitization had been historically
avoided by Fannie and Freddie and, despite a higher default rate risk, the interest
rates and potential income available (under appropriate risk modeling) were
particularly lucrative. Securitizing subprime mortgages typically occurred in the
market crisis run-up as follows.
At the outset, a mortgage broker "identifies a potential borrower through a
variety of marketing approaches including direct mail, telemarketing, door-to-door
solicitation, and television or radio advertising."24 5 After contact with a potential
borrower is made, the loan broker and loan originator "together identify a loan
which may or may not suit the borrower's needs."246 Typically, a home mortgage
will fund the purchase price of a home, but it might instead consolidate a
244

See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Wall Street's Obsession with Bonuses 4-9 (Benjamin N.
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borrower's other debts or refinance a pre-existing home mortgage. 247 The borrower
is assigned a credit score that plays a significant role in determining the interest
rate and other pricing contingencies designated by the broker and originator, who
use consumer credit scoring agencies that track outstanding debt, bankruptcies, and
prior civil judgments to assign the credit score and determine the interest rates.24 8
Once interest rates and pricing terms are set, the consumer formally applies for the
mortgage which then typically closes one to two weeks later when the borrower
signs all of the necessary paperwork wherein the borrowers become.bound to the
terms as settled upon. 24 9 At this point, "[s]ome brokers fund the loan directly using
their own funds or a warehouse line of credit, while other brokers act as an agent
and use the originator's capital to fund the loan."250
Quickly thereafter, the loan originator will transfer the mortgage loan to a
subsidiary of an investment bank, typically called a securitization sponsor or seller,
who then transfers the loan forward into a pool with hundreds of other similarly
situated mortgage loans. 251' This pool of mortgage loans will become its own entity,
typically called a special purpose vehicle (SPV) which can be organized as a
corporation, partnership, limited liability company, or most commonly, a trust.252
This SPV trust holds no other assets, employs no individuals, and has no function
other than owning a pool of mortgage loans.253 Under the contract that transfers the
loans into the pool, the SPV agrees to sell equity pieces, or tranches, of itself to
various investors.254 In the typical securitization arrangement, an underwriter
"purchases all of the 'securities'-here meaning derivative income streams drawn
from payments on the underlying mortgages-issued by the pool." 2 55 Thereafter,
the underwriters employ placement agents who work on commission to sell the
tranched securities to various investors based on portfolio needs and risk
tolerance.256
Prior to engaging the placement agents and selling the securitized mortgage
loans, in designing the SPV and its investment tranches, the seller works quite
closely with a credit rating agency that is paid by the seller to rate the credit risk of

See id.
See id.
249 See id. at 2208-09.
250 See id. at 2209; Eggert, supra
note 202, at 538.
251 See id.; Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy
of Asset Securitization, 1
247
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252 See Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution,
CurrentIssues andNew Frontiers,69 TEX. L. REv. 1369, 1377-78 (1991); Hill, supra note
167, at 1067 n.25, 1098 n.162; Peterson, supra note 161, at 2209.
253 See Peterson,supra note
161, at 2209.
254 See Eggert, supra note 202, at 539 n.156; Peterson, supra note 161, at 2209.
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each tranche.257 The credit rating agency is tasked with investigating the credit risk
of the underlying mortgages, along with investigating the risks posed from pooling
the mortgages together, called respectively, "mortgage risk" and "pool risk."2 58
Evaluating mortgage risk requires the credit rating agency to focus on borrower net
equity over time, in other words, "the risk that foreclosure on a defaulting
mortgage will not recoup invested funds." 25 9 Evaluating pool risk requires the
credit rating agency to examine "factors such as the size of the various loan pool
and the geographic diversity of underlying mortgages." 2 60 To say that the credit
rating bestowed by the credit rating agency is crucial in the securitization of
mortgage-backed securities is an understatement. Credit ratings on each tranche of
securities offered for sale were perceived as obviating the need for individual
investors to conduct careful due diligence of the underlying mortgages because this
261
i
has ostensibly become the responsibility of the credit rating agencies. Often, in
order to settle at an agreeable credit rating, the credit rating agency will require the
seller to provide some form of credit enhancement on the riskier tranches in order
to allow assignment of a higher credit rating.262 This credit enhancement typically
entails a "third party guarantee from an insurance company on losses from
mortgage default and prepayments."26 3
Further distancing loan originator from consumer, many sellers of securitized
mortgage loans sell the rights to service the loan pool to a separate company that
will then be responsible for corresponding with the "consumers, receiving monthly
payments, monitoring collateral, and when necessary foreclos[ing] on homes." 26
Occasionally the originator retains the right to service the mortgages, maintaining
some connection with homeowners, but typically servicing is outsourced to a

See infra Part II.C.3; Kenneth P. Morrison, Observations on Effecting Your First
Asset-Backed Securities Offering, in ACCESSING CAPITAL MARKETS THROUGH
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company specializing in loan servicing.265 Often, originators require servicers
under the servicing agreement "to purchase subordinated tranches issued from the
mortgage pool in order to" incentivize the servicer to collect the underlying
mortgage payments aggressively.2 66 Further, "[s]ervicing rights also change hands
often, 'in some cases several times a year for the .same loan,"' for reasons that
include a servicing company "not meeting collection goals or [for] charging ...
too much" in its servicing agreement.267 Additionally, securitization deal sellers
and trustees typically hire a document custodian to track the voluminous
information and paperwork on loans in a pool. 26 8 In recent years, the emergence of
a unique company called the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc.
(MERS) has played a controversial role in representing originators and sellers and
often acting as a foreclosure agent. 2 69 All said, the mortgage loan securitization
process described above, including all of the business involved, have created a
very powerful and lucrative device for marshaling capital into and from home
mortgage loans. 270
This convoluted and complex process is primarily conducted on an
unregulated playing field. Crucially, in this regulation-free zone, nearly every step
of the subprime securitization process above includes junctures or mechanisms that
are fraught with potential for deception, manipulation, and reckless decision
making. At the subprime loan origination stage, unregulated mortgage brokers can
and do act with wanton disregard for the consumer and the system by engaging in
predatory lending and in writing loans that consumers have no business entering.27 1
At the "closing" step of the subprime mortgage process, the financial market crisis
underscores the negligence or complicity of real estate lawyers that engaged in the
signing off on millions of loans whose terms could not possibly be met.27 2 At the
next stage, once the mortgage is closed, the original mortgage lenders have the
ability to immediately dispose of the loan through an unregulated sale and
assignment of the loan into a secondary market for pooling and bundling into an
See Elizabeth Renuart, An Overview of the PredatoryMortgage
Lending Process,
15 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 467, 473 (2004); Peterson, supra note 161, at 2210.
266 Peterson, supra note 161, at 2210; see Richard Levine & Phoebe J. Moreo, An
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172, 180 (Frank J. Fabozzi ed., 1998).
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269 See Arnold, supranote 264, at 34; Peterson, supra note
2, at 1361; Peterson, supra
note 161, at 2211.
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investment vehicle.2 73 This process disaggregates the borrower from the lender and
commodifies the borrower as a capital stream rather than a consumer.274 In the
pooling process where subprime loans are bundled into special purpose vehicles,
this unregulated process allows the haphazard pooling of various types and
qualities of loans, including prime loans, subprime loans, and Alt-A loans, into the
same investment vehicles, making categorization and risk factoring difficult. 27 5
Once the special purpose vehicles have bundled the mortgages into an
investment, then credit rating agencies are employed to assign a risk rating to each
securitized tranche.2 76 That credit rating agencies were misrating the securitized
mortgages is now widely understood based on the intimate, conflicted relationship
between the underwriting industry and the credit rating agencies that are paid by
those the agency is assigned to rate.277 Once investors made unregulated purchases
of the subprime mortgage-backed securities investments, they immediately
negotiated credit default swap contracts with insuring firms in order to hedge
against the potential loss these investments represented. Of course, the credit
default swap contracts were not regulated, so whether or not the insuring firm
could even fulfill the terms of the quasi-insurance contract was never queried.278
Prior to the market collapse, it is now widely accepted that each firm that engaged
every step of the subprime securitization process profited handsomely, some would
say obscenely.2 79
Every step in the unregulated and/or deregulated securitization process just
described was manipulated by nearly every party along the way as each engaged in
the process that precipitated the market collapse. While the government-sponsored
enterprises were initially only engaged in traditional prime loan securitization,
leaving the nontraditional loans to the private sector, all parties involved became
infatuated with the profits available in the past decade as the housing markets in
the United States heated up to unbelievable levels. Additionally, because the
subprime securitization industry had spread so deeply throughout the economy,
almost every single Wall Street investment bank and nearly every large
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commercial bank stared near certain collapse in the face if Washington D.C. did
not provide a lifeline.
2. Shadow Trading

Over-the-counter derivatives trading, including CDOs and CDSs, can fairly be
described as the straws that nearly broke the camel's economic back. Lehman
Brothers and Bear Steams were deeply involved in purchasing bundled subprime
securities, as were dozens of Wall Street titans, such that when the housing market
dropped off its heated pace, each deeply entrenched institution was left desperate
as borrowers began to default on subprime loans. 280 Each institution that had
purchased the securitized subprime mortgage investments had hedged its reckless
subprime money grab by entering into credit default swaps contracts primarily
purchased through insurers like AIG.28 1
As described briefly above,282 CDSs are essentially private bets for insurancelike contracts that are sold as protection against default on loans. They most often
apply to municipal bonds, corporate debt, and mortgage securities, and are sold
over-the-counter by banks, hedge funds, and other parties. The buyer of the CDS
pays significant premiums over a period of time in return for peace of mind,
knowing that losses will ostensibly be covered if a default occurs.283 CDS contracts
are purported to work similarly to homeowners insurance (which protects against
losses from fire, theft, and the like)-but they do not. Banks and insurance
companies are regulated and required to meet capital market reserves while the
CDS market is not. As a result, contracts can be traded-or swapped-from
investor to investor without any party overseeing the trades to ensure the buyer has
the resources to cover the losses if the security defaults.284
See The Last Days of Lehman Brothers, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Oct.
6, 2008,
8:28 AM EST), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/06/the-last-days-of-lehmanbrothers/?scp=1&sq=Lehman%20Brothers,%20depth%20of%2Oexposure&st-cs;
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TIMES, Oct. 6, 2008, at B 1; John Waggoner & David J. Lynch, Red Flags in Bear Stearns'
Collapse; Uncertainty Could Poison FinancialSystem, Economy, USA TODAY, Mar. 18,
2008, at Al; Gretchen Morgenson, A Stock Filing Gone Awry for Bear Stearns, N.Y. TIMES
280
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AIG had engaged so recklessly in the shadow CDS market, writing billions of
dollars worth of quasi-insurance policies to cover CDOs in the event of default,
that it did not have nearly the capital to repay in a situation where any significant
number came due.285 When Bear Steams and Lehman Brothers needed insurance
payouts for defaulted securitized vehicles, AIG had no ability or capital to repay.
Firms wagering on the ability of the CDS payee to default, through an
unregulated short sale, simply added to the economic morass that enabled the
financial meltdown.286 That firms could purchase CDS contracts on CDOs that
they did not own-not for hedging purposes, but for straight up betting purposes,
which is commonly referred to as a naked contract and involves speculating on the
potential failure of a particular pool of securitized subprime loans-contributed to
the wild unregulated atmosphere that prevailed at the time the capital markets
collapsed.287 Subprime mortgage pools were bought up in a frenzy by commercial
banks,. investment banks, insurance companies, hedge funds, GSEs, and others.
These subprime pools were overrated by credit rating agencies and ended up
falling precipitously in value as foreclosures mounted on the underlying mortgages
in the pools. 2 88 Perhaps more devastating, however, was that speculators sold and
bought trillions of dollars of insurance contracts, without owning the underlying
pool or contract, betting on whether these pools would, or would not, default.289
Prior to the meltdown, CDSs exploded into the secondary market, where
speculative investors, hedge funds, and others similarly situated would buy and sell
CDS instruments from the sidelines without having any direct relationship with the
underlying investment.2 90 "'They're betting on whether the investments will
succeed or fail .

. .

. It's like betting on a sports event. The game is being played,

and you're not playing in the game, but people all over the country are betting on
the outcome.', 29 1 When the housing market slowed and the economy soured, the
subprime credit collapse began expanding into other credit areas and CDS
investors and speculators became nervous.
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CDS investors were left wondering if the parties holding the CDS insurance
after multiple trades had the financial wherewithal to meet their contractual
obligations in the event of mass defaults.292 This situation was exacerbated by the
heavy trading volume of the CDS instruments, the secrecy surrounding the trades,
and most importantly, the lack of regulation in this quasi-insurance over-thecounter derivative contract business. Some CDS contracts had been traded or
swapped fifteen to twenty times. Trading of these instruments occurred on shadow
markets, where capital reserve requirements and clearing were unnecessary and in
some instances legislatively prohibited.293 CDSs had been traded and shorted to the
point that the CDO holder often had no clue as to where the CDS currently resided
or what the underlying firm's capitalization or prospects to pay looked like. 2 94 So
when a default occurred, the insured party or hedged party often had no idea who
was responsible for making up the default or whether that end player had the
resources to cure the default. 2 95 The sellers of this CDS insurance were crushed as
defaults rose precipitously and the insurers had no ability to pay the CDS contracts
it had recklessly written.
One of the largest abusers of the shadow markets described above was
Lehman Brothers which had for years behaved recklessly and, in the view of some,
nefariously in the "predatory structured finance" market.296 Lehman was not only
deeply involved with firms that engaged in predatory lending while its balance
sheets were overborne with subprime mortgage-backed securities, but it was
simultaneously defrauding investors by hiding losses on public balance sheets
297
engaging in fraudulent accounting practices.
3. CreditRating Agency Capture

The credit rating agencies that provided bond ratings for the subprime
mortgaged-backed investment market shoulder a significant amount of
responsibility for the financial market crisis of 2008. The primary credit rating
agencies-Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and Fitch's-began rating investment
292
293
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instruments early in the twentieth century, and continue today, by giving letter
grades to debt vehicles in connection with the likelihood of the instrument's
default or failure to pay.298 The ratings typically range in descending order of risk
from triple A (Aaa) to C, with Aaa representing the highest quality debt instrument
with minimal credit risk and C indicating the lowest rated bond class that would
currently be in default with no real prospect for recovery of principal or interest. 29 9
As the private securitization of subprime mortgages market ramped up, credit
rating agencies stepped in to provide ratings on the various tranches of subprime
securitizations that were being structured. The goal of the investment banks and
underwriters was to gain an Aaa rating for as many of the mortgage-backed
securities instruments as they could, and the credit rating agency system of
assigning ratings was primed for manipulation, cover, and capture. The credit
rating agency model failed badly. 300 First, the credit rating agencies adopted the
"issuer pays" model of compensation for delivering ratings, meaning that gross
conflicts occurred when the very parties (investment banks and underwriters)
structuring the vehicle and seeking the rating were also the parties paying the fees
for the ultimate rating that was delivered.301 Second, credit rating agencies were
not adequately staffed to deal with the securitized subprime market explosion
(either staff was not professionally trained or was not provided the time to
understand or deconstruct the vehicles).302 Third, based partially on the breakneck
pace that subprime mortgages were being sold and securitized, the credit rating
agencies did not adequately document the crucial steps along the way of providing
a rating and tracking the substantial participants in the process.303 Fourth, the credit
rating agencies overrelied on outdated risk modeling and dissimilar historical data
which negatively impacted the accuracy of the ratings that they provided.30
Finally, external pressures contributed to flawed rating methodologies, including
the concentrated market of subprime mortgage-backed investment originators
causing the credit rating agencies to concede on important negotiating positions
298
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during the rating process in order to prevent losing an important underwriting
client.305
These failures and pressures set the table for the ratings disaster that
eventuated. Nearly "80 percent of $1.4 trillion in subprime debt issued between
2005-2007 was [wrongly represented as] triple-A rated securities."306 Investors
purchased subprime mortgage-backed bonds that were rated Aaa, indicating an
absolutely safe investment vehicle that would have no trouble paying interest or
principal, and 80% of those securitized instruments had been assigned a misleading
or fraudulent rating. Investors relied upon a rating system that had been captured.
Much of the rating malfeasance was driven by greed, pressure, avarice, and flawed
modeling.307 Credit rating agencies are culpable in large part for igniting the
subprime mortgage bond market.
4. Regulatory Capture

Arthur Levitt, former chair of the SEC, stated, "As an overheated market
needed a strong referee to rein in dangerously risky behavior, the commission too
often remained on the sidelines."30 s Sean Coffey, a former fraud prosecutor,
believes the SEC "neutered the ability of the enforcement staff to be as proactive
as they could be. It's hard to square the motto of investor advocate with the way
they've performed the last eight years." 3 09 Not only was there a relaxation of
enforcement, there was also a reduction in SEC staff.310 Coffey asserts that the
Bush administration used the argument that loosening up regulations was
necessary3 1 in order to make it possible for American companies to compete

globally.

1

Regulators, a favorite target of many in postcrisis America, are often illequipped or undermotivated to use the tools at their disposal to capture fraud and
malfeasance. The case of Bernie Madoff provides the clearest example. The SEC
was presented with evidence on five or six occasions that Madoff was engaged in a
scheme that could not possibly be sustained if the numbers were run carefully. 3 12
See SEC, supra note 301, at 31; see also Bunn, supra note 2, at 10.
See Aaron Unterman, Innovative Destruction: Structured Finance & Credit
Market Reform in the Bubble Era, 5 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 53, 66 n.36 (2009) (citing DAVID
305

306

GREENLAW ET AL., LEVERAGED LOSSES: LESSONS FROM THE MORTGAGE MARKET
MELTDOWN
17 (2008)).
307
See AMERICAN CASINO, supra note 302.
308 Eric Lichtblau, Federal Cases of Stock Fraud
Drop Sharply, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25,

2008, at Al.
See id.
id.
312 See SEC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE OF THE SEC
TO
UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF'S PONZI SCHEME 1 (2009) (Case No. OIG-509) (submitted
310

310 See

by Inspector General H. David Kotz), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/

oig-509-exec-summary.pdf ("The OIG investigation did find ... that the SEC received
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On each occasion these warnings and beseeching invitations to investigate either
fell on deaf ears or a cursory investigation was opened and immediately closed
with a finding of "no cause." 3 13 When the global meltdown exposed Madoff, the
truth revealed that he had in fact been running perhaps one of the grandest ponzi
schemes of all time.3 14 The SEC drew significant fire for its failure to properly
regulate and investigate Bernie Madoff.3 15
In light of such regulatory failures, some argue that regulators are too careful
not to offend Wall Street giants in order to preserve opportunities to enter the much
more lucrative private sector after paying dues on the regulator side for a space.316
Others argue that regulators are not financially savvy enough to combat creative
and bold financial fraud (as many regulators are lawyers, trained in the law, not in
economics or corporate finance) thereby allowing obvious financial fraud to go
undetected. 1 The financial market crisis minefield is littered with failed
regulators, beginning with the SEC and carving a wide swath through the Federal
Reserve Bank, the FDIC, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC),
and the Office of Thrift Supervision.
Further exacerbating the failures are reports that during the most intense
moments of the financial market crisis, senior level SEC attorneys and accountants
more than ample information in the form of detailed and substantive complaints over the
years to warrant a thorough and comprehensive examination and/or investigation of
Bernard Madoff and BMIS for operating a Ponzi scheme, and that despite three
examinations and two investigations being conducted, a thorough and competent
investigation or examination was never performed."); Binyamin Appelbaum & David S.
Hilzenrath, SEC Didn't Act on Madoff Tips: Regulator Was Warned About Possible Fraud
as Early as 1999, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2008, at Dl.
313 See Binyamin Appelbaum & David S. Hilzenrath, SEC Ignored Credible Tips
About Madoff ChiefSays, WASH. PosT, Dec. 17, 2008, at Dl. ('Our initial findings have
been deeply troubling,' [SEC Chairman Christopher] Cox said. 'I am gravely concerned by

the apparent failures over at least a decade to thoroughly investigate these allegations or at
any point to seek formal authority to pursue them."').

314 See supra notes 312-313; Kara Scannell, Madoff Chasers Dug for Years, to No
Avail: Regulators Probed at Least 8 Times over 16 Years; Congress Starts Review of SEC
Today, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2009, at Cl
315 See Stephen Labaton, SEC Knew Him As Foe and Friend,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18,
2008, at Bl; Gregory Zuckerman, The Madoff Fraud Case: Fees, Even Returns and
Auditor All Raised Flags, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2008, at A7; Jesse Westbrook et al.,
Madoff Tipster Markopolos Cites SEC's "Ineptitude," BLOOMBERG (Feb. 4, 2009, 12:03

EST), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=axvJfch6PDjs.
under which
'l6 See Poser, supra note 145, at 309 ("The 'revolving door' practice,
SEC staff members may be tempted to 'go easy' on enforcing securities laws because they
have the prospect of high-paying Wall Street jobs, has been widely commented on ...
particularly in connection with the recent SEC enforcement failures."); see generally
HARRY MARKOPOLOS, No ONE WOULD LISTEN: A TRUE FINANCIAL THRILLER (2010)
(describing his multiple attempts to get the SEC to investigate Bernie Madoff, to no avail);
Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., The MadoffEconomy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2008, at A45.
317 See Westbrook, supra note 315.
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were spending working hours viewing pornography on their government issued
computers. While the SEC works to repair its image and restore its relevance,
particularly by levying fraud charges against Goldman Sachs for allegedly
materially misrepresenting financial information in connection with its Abucus
2007-AC1 investment vehicle structured in consultation with client John
Paulson, 1 it continues to receive withering criticism for its myriad shortcomings.
5. Balance Sheet Fraud

Despite the machinations of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,320 criticized at its
inception as legislation that was mere "window dressing" and did nothing to
meaningfully respond to the Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, Tyco, Global Crossing
accounting scandal era,321 accounting fraud continues to be perpetrated by some of
the nation's most important financial institutions. 32 2 Sarbanes-Oxley increased
accounting oversight, separated accounting and consulting services, increased audit
frequency, and significantly increased internal controls, adding incredible new
costs, and still, was unable to capture deft accounting fraud engaged by some of
Wall Street's most important players.323 As the gravity of the subprime crisis
failures became apparent to Lehman Brothers, company executives engaged in
accounting fraud to secret the losses from the public and present a picture of
vitality to the investing community. 3 24 The very fraud that Sarbanes-Oxley was
318 See Daniel Wagner, SEC Porn Probe: Staffers Watched Porn as Economy
Crashed, HUFFINGTON PosT (Apr. 22, 2010, 11:44 PM EST), http://www.huffington
post.com/2010/04/23/sec-pom-probe-staffers-w_n_548931.html#.
See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Goldman Sachs with Fraud in Structuring
and Marketing of CDO Tied to Subprime Mortgages (Apr. 16, 2010), available at

http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-59.htm; Alistair Barr, Goldman Charged with
Fraud over Paulson CDO Trade, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 16, 2010, 3:00 PM EDT),

http://www.marketwatch.com/story/goldman-charged-with-fraud-over-paulson-cdo-trade2010-04-16.
320 See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745,
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) (legislation that introduced major
changes to the regulation of financial practice and corporate governance).
321 See cummings, Ain't No Glory in Pain, supra note 42, at 1061 ("While
it appears
unlikely that SOX will have any significant effect on improving investor protection, on
ensuring capital market integrity, or even on encouraging appropriate behavior from
corporate executives, the Act certainly busies itself with window dressing .... ).
322 See Jacob Goldstein, Repo 105: Lehman's 'Accounting Gimmick' Explained,
NPR
(Mar. 12. 2010, 11:55 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2010/03/repo 105_lehmans
_accounting gi.html; Ex-Lehman C.F.0. Criticizes Repo 105, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK
(Mar. 12, 2010, 1:02 PM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/12/ex-lehman-c-f-ocriticizes-repo- 105/.
323 See Goldstein, supra note 322; Ex-Lehman C.F.O. Criticizes Repo 105, supra note
322.
324 See Goldstein, supra note 322; Ex-Lehman C.F.O. CriticizesRepo 105, supra note
322.
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supposed to cover-accounting irregularities and financial malfeasance-played a
critical role in the collapse of Lehman Brothers.
Executive dishonesty, apparently, can escape even the most rigid accounting
oversight, particularly if a major accountant is willing to be complicit, as Ernst &
Young was in the Lehman Brothers use of "Repo 105."325 Indeed, reports indicate
that Bank of America may have also used that accounting mechanism to conceal
bad assets in order to prop up its balance sheet during the same crisis period.326
Further, if not outright fraudulent, recent reports indicate that nearly every
investment bank on Wall Street and many national commercial banks engage
routinely in balance sheet manipulation in order to mask risk levels and improve
leverage levels in mandatory periodic reporting.3 27
A group of 18 banks-which includes Goldman Sachs Group Inc.,
Morgan Stanley, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Bank of America Corp., and
Citigroup Inc.-understated the debt levels used to fund securities trades
by lowering them an average of 42% at the end of each of the past five
quarterly periods .

. .

. The banks, which publicly release debt data each

quarter, then boosted the debt level in the middle of successive
quarters. 32 8
Similar to Lehman's use of Repo 105, these financial titans manipulate debt
reporting through repurchase market data by underreporting its risk and debt levels
directly before quarterly reports are due, providing the investing public an
inaccurate picture of its risk levels and leveraged debt.
In February 2002, Greenspan underscored how simple it was for chief
executive officers to "craft" financial statements in a way that was deceptive to the
general public, saying, "[t]here's been too much gaming of the system. Capitalism
is not working! There's been a corrupting of the system of capitalism." 3 29 That
Greenspan recognized balance sheet manipulation was occurring and was likely to
continue should have sounded a warning signal to Wall Street. But clearly, it was
ignored and continues to be by Wall Street executives and its regulators.

325

See Goldstein, supra note 322; Ex-Lehman C.F.O. Criticizes Repo 105, supra note

326

See John Hempton, Repo 105's Antecedents: Ken Lewis, BRONTE CAPITAL (Mar.

322.

20, 2010, 12:03 PM), http://brontecapital.blogspot.com/2010/03/repo-105s-antecedentsken-lewis.html; BofA: Our Accounting Followed the Rules, N.Y. TIMEs DEALBOOK (Mar.
24, 2010, 10:12 AM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/bofa-our-accountingwas-within-the-rules/; Ryan Chittum, Audit Notes: Hapless SEC, Murdoch's Mega-Losses,
BofA Repo 105, COLUM. JOURNALISM REv. (Mar. 23, 2010, 8:05 PM), http://www.cjr.org/

the audit/audit notes hapless sec murdoc.php.
327 See Kate Kelly et al., Big Banks Mask Risk Levels: Quarter-EndLoan Figures Sit
42% Below Peak, Then Rise as New PeriodProgresses,WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 2010, at Cl.

328
329

dY

Ron Suskind, Op-Ed., The Crisis Last Time, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2008, at A29.
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6. CEO Primacy

Commentators now argue that corporate law in the United States has evolved
to a point where the chief executive officer (CEO) reigns supreme as nearly
untouchable in the modem marketplace. 3 30 The model of shareholder democracy
has been ameliorated to the point that the CEO and his pursuit of personal fortune
is the primary driver behind most corporate positioning.33 The CEO dominates
American corporations to the extent that he is held to very few standards of
responsibility and is able to stave off all shareholder dissent through careful
calculation.3 32 According to Professor Steven Ramirez, "CEOs of public
companies have the unique privilege of picking their own nominal supervisorsthe board of directors."333
The CEO in the United States has the power to appoint the board of directors
that "oversees" his performance, 33 4 to maneuver board members off of the board if
they challenge his decisions,335 to establish his compensation through the board
committee that he appoints,336 to make reckless decisions that are protected by the.
business judgment rule,337 to exercise nearly unfettered power (as the duty of care
and duty of loyalty have been judicially emasculated to the point of near
nonexistence), 3 and to escape private shareholder lawsuits (as class action
330 Steven Ramirez, The Special Interest Race to CEO Primacy and the End of
Corporate Governance Law, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 345, 345 (2007) ("Corporate governance

law in the United States is deeply flawed.").
331 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the ShareholderFranchise,93
675, 679 (2007); Ramirez, supra note 330, at 345-46.

VA.

L. REV.

332 See Thomas W. Joo, A Trip Through the Maze of "Corporate Democracy":
Shareholder Voice and Management Compensation, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 735, 758-60
(2003).
333 Ramirez, supra note 135, at 55 (describing the proxy rules that essentially allow
the CEO and management to determine who leads a corporation and to establish significant
obstacles for shareholders who wish to nominate persons for the board of directors); Steven
Ramirez, The End of Corporate Governance Law: Optimizing Regulatory Strticturesfor a
Race to the Top, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 313, 332 (2007) [hereinafter Ramirez, The End of
CorporateGovernanceLaw].
334 Ramirez, supra note 135, at 56 ("This means that the CEO may stack the board

with cultural and social clones in order to maximize compensation. Shareholder democracy
is a myth in the U.S., and management interests have worked to keep it a myth.").

335 See CNBC on Assignment: Rebellion in the Magic Kingdom (CNBC television

broadcast Jan. 24, 2005) (Maria Bartaromo reports on the famed Disney shareholder
lawsuit in the Michael Ovitz executive compensation case where CEO Michael Eisner
deftly maneuvered Roy Disney off of the Disney board of directors when he began
challenging Eisner's authority).
See Ramirez, The End of CorporateGovernance Law, supra note 333, at 333, 340.
See Marc I. Steinberg, The Evisceration of the Duty of Care, 42 Sw. L.J. 919, 923
(1988); Steven Ramirez, The Chaos of Smith, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 343, 344 (2006).
338 See Bebchuk, supra note 331, at 732; Ramirez, The End of Corporate
Governance
Law, supranote 333, at 329, 335.
336
3

RACIAL CODING AND THE FINANCIAL MARKET CRISIS

2011]

201

securities fraud actions have been congressionally neutered to a near terminal
state). 3 CEOs and corporate management have been empowered by U.S.
corporate law to generate personal short-term profit and gain at the expense of
34 0
long-term vitality and shareholder profit maximization in breathtaking ways.
One of the enduring themes of the financial market crisis is that Wall Street
executives overleveraged or allowed such reckless overleveraging of their balance
sheets that nearly every major firm faced imminent collapse and bankruptcy. The
simple reason that these CEOs and other executives allowed their firms to walk to
the very edge of the bankruptcy precipice is because they all pursued the fantastic
profits that were being kicked off in the securitized subprime mortgage industry.34 1
Short-term profit, tied into executive compensation, motivated the audacious
decision making and recklessness that forced a federal taxpayer bailout. The
reckless pursuit of profit in the above described subprime mortgage-backed
securities market is a powerful example of this short-term, personal profit driven
342
vision.
Nearly all the corporate executives that steered their companies into the
subprime mortgage morass walked away with bonuses and compensation, not jail
time.343 In the ultimate irony, some of the compensation paid to these reckless
executives came from the very TARP bailout funds that were needed to keep the
overleveraged firms afloat.344 While corporate executives that recklessly capsized
their firms avoid jail time and any significant consequence for their actions, many
minority borrowers, who are underhandedly blamed by some for causing the crisis,
find themselves saddled with subprime mortgages that were delivered to them
predatorily.34 5
D. Summation

Commenting on the risky derivatives trading and selling, purchasing,
swapping, and insuring of securitized mortgage investments, Professor James Cox
admitted that:
We foolishly believed that the firms had a strong culture of selfpreservation and responsibility and would have the discipline not to be
339 See supra Part II.A.4. (describing the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act);
Ramirez, supra note 134, at 1055-60.
340
341
342

Ramirez, The End of CorporateGovernance Law, supranote 333, at 336-37.
See McClendon, supra note 174, at 134, 138-39.
See generally LEWIS, supra note 118 (describing the near insane pursuit of profits

by Wall Street executives and the role that subprime mortgage securitization played in that
dogged pursuit).
343 See Ramirez, supra note 2, at 91, 100 (describing the hoarding of capital by Wall
Street firms using taxpayer bailout funds to improve balance sheets and post record profits
rather than lending to a cash-strapped citizenry).
34 See Canova, Symposium Presentation, supra note 65.
345

See Johnson, supra note 201, at 176.
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excessively borrowing. Letting the firms police themselves made sense
to me because I didn't think the S.E.C. had the staff and wherewithal to
impose its own standards and I foolishly thought the market would
impose its own self-discipline. We've all learned a terrible lesson.346
The "Group of 20,"347 meeting shortly after the U.S. Government acted in a
desperate attempt to keep its primary financial institutions from collapsing by
passing TARP,348 released its "Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets
and the World Economy" on November 15, 2008, wherein it summarized its
findings as to the causes of the near global meltdown:
During a period of strong global growth, growing capital flows, and
prolonged stability earlier this decade, market participants sought higher
yields without an adequate appreciation of the risks and failed to exercise
proper due diligence. At the same time, weak underwriting standards,
unsound risk management practices, increasingly complex and opaque
financial products, and consequent excessive leverage combined to
create vulnerabilities in the system. Policy-makers, regulators and
supervisors, in some advanced countries, did not adequately appreciate
and address the risks building up in financial markets, keep pace with
financial innovation, or take into account the systemic ramifications of
domestic regulatory actions.349
The material above seeks to present an honest picture as to the reality of the
financial market collapse of 2008. As detailed, the causes for the collapse are
numerous, and intersect in a web of secrecy, negligence, complexity, ignorance,
and greed. While not capturing every single piece of the puzzle, the discussion
above undertakes to describe most of the principle players in the economic
collapse. In light of the many and varied causes carefully described above, the
Obama administration, congressional leaders, and market regulators have a critical
responsibility to thoughtfully consider ways in which to protect investors from the
reckless excess of Wall Street promulgated by its leadership and from its own
short-sighted legislative and policy mistakes.
The U.S. Congress is notorious for adopting lightly considered, knee-jerk
legislation in response to crises that threaten the confidence of American
346

Stephen Labaton, Agency's '04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt and
Risk, N.Y.

TIMES, Oct. 3, 2008, Al (quoting Duke Law Professor James Cox).
347 See About G-20, G20.ORG, http://www.g20.org/about what is_g20.aspx (last

visited June 15, 2011) ("The Group of Twenty (G-20) Finance Ministers and Central Bank
Governors was established in 1999 to bring together systemically important industrialized
and developing economies to discuss key issues in the global economy.")
348 Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) of 2008, Pub. L. 110-343, §§ 101-36, 122
Stat. 3765, 3767-3800.
349 See Declaration Summit on FinancialMarkets and the World Economy, G20.ORG

(Nov. 15, 2008), http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20_summitdeclaration.pdf
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investors. 3 50 As "Main Street" citizens continue today to suffer from rugged
unemployment statistics, continued tightening of credit, continued depression of
housing prices, and destroyed retirement and college savings accounts,
congressional leaders, academics, and economists must seriously examine the true
causes of the meltdown, across the board, and adopt new, fresh, and sensible
regulation, of which the Dodd-Frank Act does not qualify, that protects the
American investor and citizen.3 5 Honest reflection demonstrates that a multiplicity
of failures precipitated the meltdown.
Further, congressional leaders must also discard the market crisis causation
explanations that serve as misdirection or distortion meant to circumscribe honest
and genuine exploration of the crisis causes. Several distortions exist, the most
nefarious of which is the minority-borrower narrative that has been disseminated
and adopted by a curious swath of American citizens and commentators. The dirty
little myth, in the penultimate misdirection, attempts to pin ultimate blame for the
financial market crisis on minority borrowers, through the Community
Reinvestment Act, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac.
III. FINANCIAL MARKET CRISIS MYTH
As described carefully above, the financial market crisis of 2008 has at its
root the failure of dozens of mechanisms, laws, individuals, and decisions. Still,
despite overwhelming evidence that nearly every one of the spectacular failures
were perpetrated by mostly white male Wall Street executives, a mostly white
male Congress, and mostly white male securities speculators, the dynamic and
relentless nature of American racism still emerged in a startling way. As described
by critical race theory, institutional and structural racism has never been
appropriately dealt with or eliminated in the United States, and because it has not,
continuing manifestations of race hatred simply mutate and find expression in
ways that serve to further the interests of the majority.35 2 This mutation was on
clear display in the days, weeks, and months following the financial market
meltdown of 2008, as the minority-borrower narrative spread like a virus
throughout the nation. That minority-borrower myth has not subsided in the
months that have passed. Today, the minority scapegoating has transmogrified into
30 See U.S.A. Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., 49
U.S.C., 50 U.S.C.); Private Securities Litigation Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.); TARP, §§ 101-36.
3
See andr6 douglas pond cummings, Momentum Builds for Reform, CORP. JUST.
BLOG (Apr. 9, 2010, 3:09 AM), http://corporatejusticeblog.blogspot.com/2010/04/
momentum-builds-for-reform.html.

352 See andrd douglas pond cummings, A Furious Kinship, Critical Race Theory and
the Hip Hop Nation, 48 LOUISVILLE L. REV. 499, 500-07 (2010) (describing the evolution

of critical race theory).
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a racial coding blame game where now rather than pointing specifically at minority
borrowers, it is the Community Reinvestment Act, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac
that are blamed by many, in racial code, for causing the meltdown of 2008.
A. The Dirty Little Myth

In the days following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, and as Congress was
intensely debating and posturing in connection with whether to pass TARP, a
stunning message began to seep out from particular news sources, various
commentators, and Web 2.0.35 A dirty little myth began to be peddled that
essentially blamed the failure of the U.S. capital markets on minority borrowers
who were now defaulting on their subprime mortgages, which was the primary
factor leading to the collapse of the global economy. 35 4 Through federal
governmental intervention, in the form of the Community Reinvestment Act of
1977 and the securitized subprime loan purchasing activity of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, lenders were "forced" to provide undeserving minorities with
mortgage loans that never should have been written. Subprime mortgage loans
were required to be written, according to the minority-borrower myth, against the
will of the lenders. 355
In September 2008, when Senator Chris Dodd and Representative Barney
Frank emerged from an emergency closed door meeting With then Treasury
Secretary Henry Paulson and Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke, both Dodd and
Frank appeared ashen faced and visibly shaken.3 s6 Congressional leadership had
just been told that if a $700 billion dollar bailout of the U.S. financial system was
not approved immediately, financial Armageddon would ensue.357 Thereafter a
strange dance materialized where the Bush II presidential administration in lock
step with Democratic congressional leadership rushed through legislation that
eventually committed $850 billion dollars of taxpayer money to "save" and shore

3 See Edsall, supra note 23; Lapon, supra note 23; Fox News Blames Black People
for Financial Meltdown, YOUTUBE (Sept. 22, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v

=q90 1hpeO-qQ&feature=related; Coulter on BailoutLies - "SocialJustice" Obamination,
supra note 23.
354 See sources cited supranote 353.
3 See Birkey, supra note 23; Morning Joe (MSNBC television
broadcast Feb. 20,
2009), available at http://mediamatters.org/research/200902200006 (interview by Joe
Scarborough with Patrick Buchanan).
356 See Jeanne Sahadi, 'Sobering Moment,' CNNMONEY (Sept. 20,
2008, 9:13 AM),

http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/19/news/economy/whatlawmakersheard/index.htm?post

version=2008091922.
357 See id; PAULSON, supra note 82, at 266; Jeannine Aversa, Dire Warnings Fail to
Sway Senators on Big Bailout, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 23, 2008, 10:44 PM),

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/09/23/bush-team-congress-haggle-n_128501.html.
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up the U.S. economy by bailing out Wall Street financial institutions whose
leadership had driven them to the point of utter collapse.35 8
When the dirty little myth began to emerge, it did so with force. Financial
Armageddon as the fault of minority borrowers in urban centers around the country
who took out loans they could not possibly repay3 59 all made possible by the
Community Reinvestment Act, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac seemed absurd to
many, but found unbelievable traction. 3 60 Neal Cavuto on Fox News stated
"loaning to minorities and risky folks is a disaster." 36 1 Ann Coulter, in an article

she authored, stated in the headline, "They Gave Your Mortgage to a Less
Qualified Minority." 36 2 Representative Michelle Bachman (R., MN), on the House
floor and later on Larry King Live said, "Look at the housing crisis. Government
has to take its share of the blame. After all, government was goading these
mortgage lenders [saying] 'if you don't give loans out to marginally credit worthy
people, we're going to come after you."',363 In fact, according to the myth, the
overzealous enforcement by the government of the Community Reinvestment Act
forced quotas on banks to encourage diversity in the housing market by lending
solely "on the basis of race." 6 This is simply false.365
Former presidential candidate Pat Buchanan on MSNBC's Morning Joe stated
flatly, "[T]he Feds leaned on banks and threatened some of these banks [saying]
'[y]ou've

got

to

make

more

loans,'

.

.

.

and

pushed

them

out

See John Gress, Obama Looking at $850 Billion Jolt to the Economy, USA
TODAY, Dec. 17, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2008-12-17-stimulus
N.htm; see generally JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 2 (describing the breathtaking
account of governmental largesse in bailing out Wall Street banks).
3 See Edsall, supra note 23; Gross, supra note 23.
360 The CRA, enacted by Congress in 1977, was intended to encourage depository
institutions "to help meet the credit needs of the communities in which they operate."
Community Reinvestment Act, FED. FIN. INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL,
http://www.ffiec.gov/cral (last modified Apr. 14, 2011, 2:03 PM).
361 See Lapon, supra note 23; Fox News Blames Black People for Financial
Meltdown, supra note 353.
362 Edsall, supra note 23; Coulter on Bailout Lies - "Social Justice" Obamination,
supranote 23.
363 See Birkey, supra note 23; Michelle Bachmann: Poor Minorities Responsiblefor
Economic Crisis, YOuTUBE (Sept. 26, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4DHux
HyafyM.
3 Lapon, supranote 23.
365 See infra notes 400, 402 and accompanying text; Interview with Pam Hennes,
Compliance Dir. and Operations Manager, Deerwood Bank, in Baxter, Minn. (Mar. 27,
2010) (describing the requirements of the Community Reinvestment Act and affirmatively
disavowing that the CRA mandates any quotas or forces any lending to minority
borrowers); Robert Gordon, Did Liberals Cause the Sub-Prime Crisis?, AM. PROSPECT
(Apr. 7, 2008), http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=did liberalscausethesub
prime-crisis; Aaron Pressman, Community Reinvestment Act Had Nothing to Do with
Subprime Crisis, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 29, 2008), http://www.businessweek
.com/investing/insights/blog/archives/2008/09/communityreinv.html.
358
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. . . frankly, in minority communities. And they pushed them out and the guys put

nothing down . . . and then the banks sell the loans off to Fannie and Freddie." 366
To which Joe Scarborough responded, "And that's what happened. Banks made
bad loans. They sold it to Fannie and Freddie."3 67 While many reputable sources
were quick to discredit the claim 36 8 and denounce Buchanan, Scarborough, Cavuto,
and Coulter, 36 9 the myth had been unleashed and it began to creep into households
and mindsets across the country. 37 0 Politicians, pundits, and economists served up
minority borrowers and governmental social steering as the primary cause of a near
global meltdown.
Not surprisingly, driving the myth firmly into the households and minds of a
willing undercurrent of Americans was Rush Limbaugh, who spun out his own
particular mischaracterization for the financial market crisis: illegal Latino
immigrants.37 ' Together with blaming Latino illegal aliens for entering into home
mortgages that they could not afford (and had no legal right to enter), Limbaugh
also placed blame squarely upon Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for their role in
buying up subprime mortgage-backed securities.372 Despite overwhelming
evidence that the private sector's profligation was at the root of the subprime

MorningJoe, supra note 355.
See id.

366See
367
368

See Letter from Ben Bernanke, Chairman, U.S. Fed. Reserve, to Robert Menendez,

U.S. Senator (Nov. 25, 2008) [hereinafter Letter from Ben Bernake], available at
http://menendez.senate.gov/pdf/ll 2508ResponsefromBemankeonCRA.pdf.
369 See Edsall, supranote 23; Lapon, supra
note 23.
370 See Carpentier,supra note 84 (describing an ABC News
Poll where less than 50%

of Republicans polled did not believe that Wall Street banks were the cause of the
recession); see also Three-Quarters Say the Banks Still Need to Make Amends, ABC

(Mar. 22, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/images/PollingUnit/1106a2The
%20Banks.pdf ("There also are partisan gaps in criticism of the banks more broadlynearly two-thirds of Democrats and independents alike assign them significant blame for
the recession, but just under half of Republicans agree. And there's a similar gap in views
of whether banks and related institutions have a responsibility to help Americans who are
still struggling with the economy. Seventy-nine percent of Democrats say they do, and
again nearly as many independents, 72 percent, agree. It's also a majority among
Republicans, but a much smaller one, 54 percent.").
371 See Cheryl Wade, Professor of Law, St. John's Sch. of Law, Panel Address at the
University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law Symposium: The Financial Crisis:
Regulatory & Corporate Governance Critiques & Reforms (Sept. 25, 2009), available at
http://www.ulaw.tv/videos/financial-crisis-symposium---morning-session/791; see also
Keller, supra note 26 ("Rush Limbaugh stated on his radio program that HUD was
'admitting 5 million illegal aliens were given mortgages . . . with fake Social Security
numbers and so forth to go out and purchase homes that they didn't have to pay back."'
(alteration in original)).
WORLD NEWS

372

See Rush Limbaugh Show: There's a Big Idea at Stake in the Democrat-Caused

Financial Crisis

(Premier

Radio

Networks

broadcast

Sept.

22,

2008),

http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/daily/site092208/content/0 1125108.guest.html.
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securitization frenzy, 7 Limbaugh suspended the truth to perpetuate his own
peculiar mythmaking.
The minority-borrower narrative has since evolved into a flowing
characterization that the federal government used its powers to force the expansion
of homeownership to people who had been shut out for economic reasons, or
sometimes, because of racial and ethnic discrimination,37 4 but that these loan
recipients, primarily minorities, and generally poor, must now shoulder the blame
for the failing global financial markets because they were ultimately unqualified
for the loan, were overreaching in seeking homeownership, and were now
defaulting on their subprime mortgages. In addition, the myth contends that the
federal government must accept responsibility for the failure of private market
discipline because it was policy-driven social engineering by government officials
that forced banks to lend to unworthy minority borrowers in the first instance.
While the myth was pervasive in the panic-stricken period that gripped
Congress and the nation in September and October 2008, " it found traction at
America's dinner tables and some boardrooms and now continues to rear its head
in unsettling settings today. 7 The dirty little myth has transmogrified slightly and
now attaches full market crisis fault to minority borrowers, the Community
Reinvestment Act, and the federal government.
No longer is it just
Representative Bachmann, pundits, and talk radio agitators that push the dirty little
myth 37 8-it continues to exist and persist as currently peddled by economists, 379
think tank employees, 380 bloggers and reporters, 38 1 and family reunion attendees.
37

See supra Part II.C.

374 See Gross, supra note 23.
375 See PAULSON, supra note

82, at 250-77 (detailing the initiation of TARP).
See cummings, Panel: Post Racialism and the Financial Market Crisis, supra note
30 (describing mutual fund presidents that blame the Community Reinvestment Act and
minority borrowers for the miserable performance of their mutual funds); Pressman, supra
note 365 (providing more than two hundred reader comments to the online Pressman
article, which reveal the vitriol that hundreds of commentators have toward the Community
Reinvestment Act, and that they blame it-and minorities-for causing the financial
crisis).
37 See, e.g., Peter Schweizer, A Poisonous Cocktail, FORBES.COM (Oct. 5, 2009,
12:01 AM EST), http://www.forbes.com/2009/10/03/community-reinvestment-actmortgages-housing-opinions-contributors-peter-schweizer.htm ("The CRA is not about
376

community development; it is, essentially, affirmative action in lending. . . . This is

precisely what we need to get away from. Drinking this potent cocktail would be dangerous
to our financial health.").
378 See Right- Wing Media Criticize FinancialReform with Regurgitated Myth that
Affordable Housing Caused Financial Crisis, MEDIAMATTERS (Apr. 21, 2010, 3:23 PM

EST), http://mediamatters.org/research/201004210051 (showing Rush Limbaugh's radio
program where he blames the Community Redevelopment Act and Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac for the financial crisis, absolving Wall Street of any responsibility for the
meltdown); see also Quick Fact: Hannity Falsely Suggests Community Reinvestment Act
Caused FinancialCrisis, MEDIAMATTERS (Apr. 20, 2010, 11:14 PM EST), http://media

matters.org/research/201004200058 (showing Sean Hannity's Fox News program where he
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Economist Thomas Sowell argues that the Community Reinvestment Act was
a primary progenitor of the financial market crisis because it required banks to
carefully track the loans it was extending to borrowers, including memorializing
race, gender, and age.382 To Sowell and many others, this act of tracing lending
according to race, gender, and age allowed federal government regulators to exert
enormous pressure on banks that did not appear to lend equally to all potential
borrowers. 8 Accordingly, Sowell argues that this act of pressuring banks to loan
to all community borrowers where the banks did business had the effect of forcing
or mandating that banks lower lending standards in order to increase its lending to
minority and low-income borrowers. 84 Government policy since George H. W.
Bush has strongly promoted home ownership, and the Community Reinvestment
Act tracked lending statistics, making banks develop lax lending standards in order
to meet governmental policy initiatives, thus allowing the banks greater ability to
gain regulatory approval of various activities that were unavailable if the bank was
deemed discriminatory in its lending practices. 38 Thus, according to Sowell, banks
began devising crafty and mischievous lending devices like adjustable-rate
mortgages, interest-only mortgages, and no-down-payment mortgages in order to
lend to minorities and low-income borrowers. Accordingly, the Community
Reinvestment Act and social welfare governmental intrusion represent the true

blames the Community Reinvestment Act and the "notion that everybody in America had a
right to a house" as the primary cause of the financial market crisis).
379 See Thomas J. DiLorenzo, The Government-Created Subprime Mortgage
Meltdown, LEWROCKWELL.COM (Sept. 6, 2007), http://www.lewrockwell.com/dilorenzo/
dilorenzol25.html; SOWELL, supra note 2, at 36-37, 39, 41, 95-109; Stan Liebowitz,
Anatomy of a Train Wreck: Causes of the Mortgage Meltdown, in HOUSING AMERICA:
BUILDING OUT OF A CRISIS 287, 317-19 (2009); Howard Husock, Op-Ed, Housing Goals
We Can't Afford, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2008, at A41; Thomas J. DiLorenzo, The CRA
Scam and Its Defenders, LUDWIG VON MISES INST. (Apr. 30, 2008),
http://mises.org/daily/2963; Liebowitz, supra note 27.
380 See Wallison, supra note
28.
381 See Noel Sheppard, IBD: CarterMore to Blamefor Financial
Crisis than Bush or
McCain, NEWSBUSTERS (Sept. 20, 2008, 3:29 PM), http://www.newsbusters.org/blogs/
noel-sheppard/2008/09/20/ibd-carter-more-blame-financial-crisis-bush-or-mccain;
Jeff
Jacoby, Frank's FingerprintsAre All Over the FinancialFiasco, Bos. GLOBE, Sept. 28,
2008, at D9; Derbyshire, supranote 28; Weinstein, supra note 28.
382 See generally SOWELL, supra note 2, at 36-37, 39-41 (describing the role that

Sowell believes the Community Reinvestment Act and governmental intrusion played in
the financial market crisis and mortgage market collapse); see also Thomas Sowell on the
Housing Boom and Bust, YOuTUBE (Jan. 26, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-5
GoAGuTIbVY (showing Sowell's conviction that lax lending standards pushed by various
government programs and entities led to a regionalized housing bubble and a mortgage
industry collapse).
383 See SOWELL, supra note 2, at 36-45.
See id.
385
See id. at 41-42.
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roots of the financial market fiasco.3 86 Based primarily on Sowell's interpretation
of the meltdown and the role played by government, in particular the Community
Reinvestment Act, most of the media and pundits that gravitate toward such
messaging have seized upon this narrow line of reasoning and have distilled it
down to a single explosive message: minority borrowers caused the financial
market crisis because the government through the Community Reinvestment Act
forced banks to adopt quotas by requiring them to loan to poor borrowers of
color-i.e., affirmative action in lending.38 7
Extending the myth of governmental social engineering as a primary cause of
the financial market crisis, in 2009, Congress established a commission, styled the
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) that was charged with drilling down
into the root causes of the financial market crisis. 38 8 The FCIC was ordered to
conduct an exhaustive investigation, and upon completion, submit a report to
Congress that would identify all of the causes and failures that precipitated the
meltdown. 38 9 This bipartisan commission, after conducting hundreds of hours of
interviews, began fracturing. In December 2010, the four Republican members of
the ten-member FCIC forced a vote in advance of the official report due date
where they demanded that the following terms be banned from the final version of
the official report: "Wall Street," "shadow banking," and "deregulation." 390 When
the Republican committee members' proposal to ban these terms was rejected by
the five Democratic members and the one Independent member, the Republican
commissioners defected from the FCIC and became determined to issue their own
report, called the "Financial Crisis Primer." 39 1
The nine-page Republican Financial Crisis Primer, with precious little factual
support, bewilderingly ignores Wall Street's role in the financial market crisis,
refuses to mention deregulation, credit default swaps, and reckless decision making
by Wall Street executives, and instead, focuses fundamentally on the role of Fannie
Mae, Freddie Mac, and the goal of homeownership in poor communities as the

See id. at 146-47.
E.g., Schweizer, supra note 377.
388 See Fraud Enforcement & Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-21,
Stat. 1617, 1625-31 (2009).
386
387

389

§ 5, 123

id

See Brady Dennis & Zachary A. Goldfarb, Financial Crisis Probe Ends with
Partisan Vote on Report, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2011, at A07; Kathleen Parker, Editorial,
Washington's Weasel Words, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2010, at A21; Shahien Nasiripour,
FinancialCrisis Panel in Turmoil as Republicans Defect; Plan to Blame Government for
Crisis, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 15, 2010, 12:17 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2010/12/14/financial-crisis-panel-wall-street_n_796839.html.
391 See Republican Commissioners on the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
FinancialCrisis Primer Questions and Answers on the Causes of the FinancialCrisis, BIG
PICTURE (Dec. 16, 2010, 7:06 AM), available at http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2010/12/
republican-commissioners-on-the-fmancial-crisis-inquiry-commission-financial-crisisprimer-questions-and-a-nswers-on-the-causes-of-the-financial-crisis/.
390
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primary causes of the financial market crisis. 39 2 No longer is the mythmaking
reserved for pundits and an occasional economist-now the Republican
commissioners have issued a report that whitewashes Wall Street's role in the
crisis, effectively rewriting history.3 93
From this massive mutation, the minority-borrower narrative has grown,
appeared on headline news programs, and dominated dinner table discussions. 394
That news agencies, financial institutions, and corporate America, had the audacity
to point a singular market failure finger at minority "subprime" mortgage
recipients and governmental intrusion, rather than to accept responsibility for a
failure that could have been avoided with private market discipline, responsibility,
and regulation, in place of voracity and greed, demonstrates the depth of the
mutation and the distortion of those who should accept responsibility (the list is
lengthy), but still unfailingly refuse.395
B. Nevermind the Truth

The dynamism of American racism has never allowed the truth to impede the
desired scapegoating result. As described above, the mutation of reality in
connection with the financial market crisis borders on the absurd. Yet and still,
gathering forces attempt to pin the blame for the financial market crisis on
minority borrowers and governmental intrusion.
Is it true that minority borrowers were provided subprime loans through
forced lender activity based on the Community Reinvestment Act? Did minority
borrowers defaulting on these subprime. loans cause the collapse of the financial
markets?
Responding to the immediate minority borrower and governmental social
engineering mythmakers in the days following the near collapse of the financial
markets blaming the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) as perpetuating the
collapse, Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke, in a November 25, 2008 letter to
Senator Robert Menendez, stated:
Our own experience with CRA over more than 30 years and recent
analysis of available data, including data on subprime loan performance,
392

See Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Wall Street Whitewash, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2010, at

A39.
393 See id.; Michael Powell, Obama the Centrist Irks a LiberalLion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
8, 2011, at B1 ("If you widen the lens, the public is being sold a lie-that our [economic]

problems owe to unions and the size of government and not to fraud and deregulation and
the vast concentration of wealth. Obama's failure is that he won't challenge this
Republican narrative, and give people a story that helps them connect the dots and
understand where we're going.").
394 See supra notes 352-386 and accompanying text.
3 See Rich, supra note 49 ("[Greenspan] was eager to portray himself as an innocent
bystander to forces beyond his control. In his rewriting of history, his clout in Washington
was so slight that he was ineffectual at 'influencing the Congress."').
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runs counter to the charge that CRA was at the root of, or otherwise
contributed in any substantive way to, the current mortgage difficulties
. . . . The available evidence to date . . . does not lend support to the

argument that CRA is to blame for causing the subprime loan crisis.396
Further, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Janet Yellen,
stated in a March 2008 speech that "studies have shown that the CRA has
increased the volume of responsible lending to low- and moderate-income
households."3 97 In truth, with the guidelines imposed by the Community
Reinvestment Act, efforts to open the mortgage pipeline to minority groups have
398th10'
proved successful. Prior to the 1977 Community Reinvestment Act, minority
borrowers that applied for mortgage loans were often stopped cold by a persistent
practice called "red-lining," wherein lenders would refuse to write mortgages
within particular geographical areas, often on the basis of race.39 9 Studies show
that the CRA inspired responsible lending and opened homeownership to
American citizens previously shut out, and that loans written to borrowers through
the CRA default significantly less often than peer loan vehicles and those written
400
by independent mortgage companies.
Despite the hue and cry that the Community Reinvestment Act forced lenders
to extend subprime mortgages to unqualified minority borrowers,40 1 the truth is
that the CRA was enacted more than thirty years ago, so its evil impact must have
396

See Letter from.Ben Bernanke, supra note 368.

397 See Janet Yellen, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F., Opening Remarks at the
2008 National Interagency Community Reinvestment Conference (Mar. 31, 2008),
available at http://www.frbsf.org/news/speeches/2008/0331.pdf.
398 See Schmidt & Tamman, supra note 23.

See id.
See Roberto Quercia et al., The Community Reinvestment Act: Outstanding, and
Needs to Improve, in REVISITING THE CRA: PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUTURE OF THE
COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT (Fed. Reserves of S.F. and Bos. 2009), available at
3

400

http://www.frbsf.org/publications/community/cra/cra outstanding_ needsjimprove.pdf;
Elizabeth Laderman & Carolina Reid, CRA Lending During the Subprime Meltdown, in
REVISITING THE CRA: PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUTURE OF THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT
ACT, supra, available at http://www.frbsf.org/publications/community/cra/cra lending

duringsubprime meltdown.pdf (concluding from their empirical study that Community
Reinvestment Act loans were significantly less likely to be in foreclosure than loans
originated by independent mortgage companies, and finding that CRA standards and
localized lending led to lower cost loans and significantly fewer defaults); Lei Ding et al.,
Risky Borrowers or Risky Mortgages: Disaggregating Effects Using Propensity Score
Models 20-21 (Nov. 30, 2009) (Univ. N.C. Ctr. for Cmty. Capital, Working Paper)
available
at
http://www.ccc.unc.edu/documents/Risky.Disaggreg. 1.1.09.Final.pdf;
Memorandum from the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Div. of Research and
Statistics, to Sandra Braunstein, Dir., Consumer & Consumer Affairs Div. 5-6 (Nov.
21, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/20081203
analysis.pdf.
401 See supra Part III.A.
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laid dormant for more than twenty-five of those years. The CRA requires no quotas
or mandatory lending and instead specifies that lenders extend loans in a fair,
sound, reasonable, and principled fashion.402 Additionally, more than 50% of the
lenders extending subprime loans during the run-up to the crisis were finance
companies that were not required to comply with the CRA.403 In reality, less than
20% of lenders extending subprime loans were subject to the provisions of the
CRA, 40 with some estimates indicating that lenders beholden to the CRA extended
just 6% to 7% of the subprime loans subject to default risk during the crisis. 4 05
While Thomas Sowell is careful to cabin his criticism of the Community
Reinvestment Act by claiming that it only allowed the government to "pressure"
banks to loan to poor minorities, many that subscribe to his economic theorizing
use his language to argue that the CRA "forced" or "required" banks to write
subprime loans to minorities.406 This is simply untrue. That said, Sowell cherrypicks historical facts to support his own ends in describing the CRA's role in the
financial market crisis. When Sowell blames the government for forcing lax
lending standards, he does not mention the persistent and gnawing discrimination
that led to the adoption of the CRA in 1977. Forcing banks to track lending
statistics by race, gender, and age allowed bank regulators to determine which
banks were continuing to discriminate against minority borrowers in their lending
practices. Further, Sowell ignores the private market entry into the subprime
mortgage market together with independent and unregulated mortgage brokers
who had nothing to do with the CRA, but were insistent on writing subprime loans
for profiteering purposes. While banks unquestionably have CRA loans on their
books that have defaulted during the market crisis, suggesting that some of those
loans were extended that likely should not have been, the truth is that the default
rates and percentages are significantly lower than the subprime loans written by
independent mortgage companies and are in line with typical default percentages
expected with CRA subprime loans.40 7
See Interview with Pam Hennes, supra note 365 (describing the requirements of
the Community Investment Act and affirmatively disavowing that the CRA mandates any
quotas or forces any lending to minority borrowers).
403 Edsall, supra note 23; Gordon, supra note 365; Pressman, supra note 365.
404 Edsall, supra note 23 (citing University of Oregon economist Marc Thoma who
noted in addition that "subprime loans grew twice as fast in institutions that did not have to
meet the conditions of the CRA").
402

See Neil Bhutta & Glenn B. Canner, Did the CRA Cause the Mortgage Market
Meltdown?, FED. RES. BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS (Mar. 2009), http://www.minneapolis
405

fed.org/publications_papers/pubdisplay.cfn?id=4136.
406 See supra notes 359-383 and accompanying
text.

See David Goldstein & Kevin G. Hall, Private Sector Loans, Not Fannie
or
Freddie, Triggered Crisis, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS (Oct. 12, 2008) http://www.
407

mcclatchydc.com/2008/10/12/v-print/53802/private-sector-loans-not-fannie.html;

The

Community Reinvestment Act: A Welcome Anomaly in the ForeclosureCrisis, TRAIGER &
HINCKLEY

LLP

(Jan.

7, 2008),

http://www.traigerlaw.com/publications/traiger

hinckley llpcraforeclosure study_1-7-08.pdf; The Community Reinvestment Act of
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Thus, not only did the CRA play little to no role in the subprime loan abuse,
often minority communities were targeted for predatory lending.4 08 In 2006, 55%
of loans to African Americans were subprime, despite the fact that many of those
borrowers qualified for prime loans. 4 09 Additionally, statistics indicate that 40% of
loans to Latinos were subprime; 35% of loans to American Indians were subprime,
while just 23% of loans to whites were subprime.4 10 Women also received less
favorable loan terms across equal presentations of credit worthiness.4 11
Studies indicate that minority borrowers were purposely steered into risky and
expensive subprime loans, even when they qualified for better terms. 4 12 Those
lenders that steered minority borrowers into subprime loans were often mortgage
brokers that were eager to make a significantly larger profit. 4 13 For instance, "[i]n
two audit studies wherein creditworthy testers approached subprime lenders,
whites were more likely to be referred to the lenders' prime borrowing division
than were similar black applicants. Further, subprime lenders quoted the black
applicants very high rates, fees, and closing costs not correlated with risk." 4 14 In
addition, a classic discrimination study by the Reinvestment Coalition found that
black and Latino individuals that posed as borrowers received significantly poorer
treatment and were offered costlier, less-attractive loans more often than whitesdespite the fact that minority testers had been given more attractive financial
4 15
profiles, including stronger credit standings and lengthier employment tenures.
This study rebuts mortgage companies' claims that lending patterns are determined
solely by risk characteristics. "John Taylor, the coalition's president, told a
Congressional hearing last year, that minority borrowers were paying a 'race tax.'
While lenders are required to report to the federal government such things as race,
gender, census tract, amount of loan and income, they omit credit score data."416
Therefore, in guarding the most important statistic used in making loans, mortgage
lenders provide for themselves a ready shield against charges of discrimination and
predatory lending.4 17

http://www.traiger
law.com/publications/Thecommunityreinvestment-act of 1977-not guilty 1-26-09.pdf.
408 See Johnson,supra note 201, at 176-82.
409 See Editorial,supra note 210.
1977: Not Guilty, TRAIGER & HINCKLEY LLP (Jan. 26, 2009),

See id
See id
412 See Johnson, supra note 201, at 176-82; see also supra Part II.B.2 (describing
410
411

predatory lending as a major cause of the market meltdown).
413 See Editorial,supranote 210; Johnson, supra note 201, at 176-82.
Devah Pager & Hana Shepherd, The Sociology of Discrimination: Racial
Discrimination in Employment, Housing, Credit, and Consumer Markets, 34 ANN. REV.
Soc. 181, 190 (2008), available at http://www.princeton.edu/-pager/annualreview
_discrimination.pdf.
415 See Editorial,supra note 210.
414

416

id.

417

id.
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In further debunking the myth that minority borrowers caused the market
crisis and that the CRA was at the root of this failure, nearly 60% of all subprime
loans in the 2005 to 2007 period were extended to white borrowers and more than
40% of all subprime loans were extended to white borrowers that qualified as
" affluent."4'8
While the mortgage crisis has been recharacterized by some as the fault of
minority borrowers and governmental intervention through the Community
Reinvestment Act, Fannie, and Freddie,4 19 the reality is primarily just the
opposite. 42 0 The financial market crisis has landed heaviest on communities of
color.42' Predatory lending and subprime mortgage abuse is far more responsible
for minority involvement in the subprime markets than the CRA. Because minority
communities and borrowers were targeted predatorily for subprime loans,
foreclosures have devastated urban communities.4 22 There are few, if any, facts
that support the minority-borrower narrative and governmental social engineering
myth. It is just that-a myth. Minority borrowers are no more responsible for the
financial market crisis than are Brazilian surfers, Tongan princesses, or Japanese
lawyers.
As one journalist stated, "[w]hat we're witnessing is the disastrous collision
of greed, fear and ignorance at the intersection of Wall Street and Main Street.
Some banking kingpins got rich peddling junk."423 The once staid mortgagelending business became the playground for high-flying investment bankers, who
were not ready to settle for modest profits.42 4 Instead, they turned mortgage
lending into a gambling scheme, introducing high risk and huge profits. 4 25 "The

418

Price, supra note 23.

See Phil Gramm, Deregulation and the Financial Panic: Loose
Money and
PoliticizedMortgagesAre the Real Villains, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2009, at A17.
420 See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 2, at
144-46 (describing the very limited
419

exposure to subprime loans Fannie and Freddie had on their books during the securitization
bonanza years, based primarily on charter limitations and requirements that they purchase
only loans that met strict underwriting standards and size limits); see also STIGLITZ, supra
note 2, at 10-12 (describing conservative blaming of Fannie, Freddie and the Community
Reinvestment Act as "sheer nonsense").
421 See Devona Walker, How Ruthless Banks Gutted the Black Middle Class and Got
Away with It, ALTERNET (Sept. 4, 2010), http://www.altemet.org/story/148068/; Michelle
Chen, No End in Sight for Foreclosures in Communities of Color, HUFFINGTON PosT

(Oct. 25, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michelle-chen/no-end-in-sight-for-forec_b
626421.htm.
422 See Chen, supra note 421; Walker,
supra note 421.
423

See Caitriona Palmer, Greed that Led to FinancialMeltdown, INDEPENDENT.IE

(Mar. 22, 2008), http://www.independent.ie/business/world/greed-that-led-to-fmancialmeltdown- 132481 0.html.
424
425

See id.
See id.; Andy Serwer & Allan Sloan, How Financial Madness
Overtook Wall

Street, TIME (Sept. 18, 2008), http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1842123
,00.html.
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system became corrupted by high salaries and the need to sustain those high
26
salaries, by shoddy lending practices, by self-dealing with the bond regulators.A
The truth of the financial market collapse lies above in Part II. The causation
42 8
and failures were divers and complex.427 The dirty little myth is unsupportable.
So, why was the myth floated in the face of little evidentiary support? What
motivates this blatant misrepresentation that continues to percolate?
IV. RACIAL CODING
When the United States capital markets nearly collapsed in 2008 and came
close to causing a global financial meltdown, it is incredibly revealing that a
stunning portion of the nation's citizenry pointed the finger of blame at minority
Americans. 429 While at first astonished by this audacious misdirection, the blaming
has now settled into a familiar trope that must necessarily be recognized and
challenged.
As if existing in parallel universes at the darkest moments of the near global
meltdown, the United States was preparing to elect its first nonwhite male
president of the United States. In near lockstep, the country was paralyzed by fear
of potential economic failure yet amazed that an African American stood poised to
become the most powerful individual in the world. In a truly schizophrenic
moment, millions of Americans denigrated minority borrowers as the cause of the
financial market crisis while millions of Americans flocked to their election
'precincts to vote for a candidate that held promise to ring in a postracial
America. 430 The irony of this dual, simultaneous construction cannot be ignored.
To many, the election of Barack Obama as president signaled a new era for
American politics and symbolically represented a coming of age for a country with
See Palmer,supra note 423.
See Serwer & Sloan, supra note 425.
See Eric Alterman & George Zomick, Think Again: Meltdown: The Blame Game,
CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 16, 2008), http://www.americanprogress.org/
426
427
428

issues/2008/10/thinkagain fannie.html (describing the "deeply misleading" arguments
seeking to blame Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Community Reinvestment Act, and
minority borrowers as the primary cause of the financial market crisis); Goldstein & Hall,
supra note 407;

Ellen Seidman, Don't Blame the Community Reinvestment Act, AM.

PROSPECT (Aug. 7, 2009), http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=dont blame the
community reinvestment act; The Community Reinvestment Act: A Welcome Anomaly in
the Foreclosure Crisis, supra note 407; The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977: Not
Guilty, supra note 407.
429 See supra Part III.

See Senator Barack Obama, Address at Phila., Pa.: A More Perfect Union (Mar.
18, 2008), available at http://my.barackobama.com/page/content/hisownwords; Steele,
430

supra note 17; Courtney E. Martin, The Power of the "Post-Racial" Narrative, AM.

PROSPECT (Feb. 2, 2010), http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article-the-power of the
postracialnarrative; Schorr, supra note 17. Obama himself campaigned in a post-racial
fashion, positioning himself as a product of a different era, apart from the civil rights
battles of old. See McWhorter, supra note 17.

216

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[No. I

a tortured racial history.431 At the very moment that our nation was touted as
"coming of age" we regressed into our familiar historical hostility toward our
minority citizenry.432 For a nation that has purportedly progressed to a postracial
place, the dirty little myth smacks of the racial hatred and propaganda that marks
so many chapters of our nation's history.433 Can we as a country make a legitimate
claim of true racial progress, racial healing, and postracial understanding if we
continue to condemn the least powerful and those least responsible for the ills that
beset our nation?
A. Code Talk

As described above, many now argue that the financial market crisis owes its
entire genesis to the Community Reinvestment Act and the quasi-governmentsponsored entities, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Perhaps recognizing the political
inexpediency of pointedly blaming "minorities," the dirty little myth has now
morphed into a more insidious characterization of minority blaming in code. News
pundits and politicians Coulter, Beck, Cavuto, Bachmann, Limbaugh, and
Buchanan, while maintaining powerful sway over a certain segment of the U.S.
population, are easily dismissed by thoughtful observers. This group was explicit
in its condemnation of minority Americans and illegal aliens as the cause of our
nation's subprime sickness.4 34 The absurdity of this dirty little myth can be easily
swept aside as mere talk radio or Fox News spin and only housed in the far right
reaches of the tea-party political spectrum.
But what has dangerously evolved from the early Buchanan, Coulter,
Limbaugh, and Bachmann screeds against "minority" borrowers and "affirmative
action" for homeowners, is now a fairly consistent drumbeat from some
economists, think tanks, bloggers, market insiders, and citizen commentators that
articulate as the true downfall of the economy the Community Reinvestment Act
and the pre-meltdown activities of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 435 This blaming
of governmental welfare, while not expressly racial, is simply traditional coding
for race. Portraying the CRA, Fannie, and Freddie as the primary agents of the
See Ian F. Haney L6pez, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification
and Mass
Incarcerationin the Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REv. 1023, 1023 (2010); Peter J. Boyer,
The PoliticalScene: The Color ofPolitics, NEW YORKER, Feb. 4, 2008, at 38; Tim Rutten,
The Good Generation Gap, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2008, at 31; Hua Hsu, The End of White
America? ATLANTIC ONLINE (Jan.-Feb. 2009), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/
archive/2009/0 1/the-end-of-white-america/7208/.
432 See supra Part III.A.
433 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
431

U.S. 537 (1896); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).

434 See supra notes 359-365 and accompanying text.
435 As described above, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac played a minor role in the

subprime mortgage fiasco by stoking the market with its own private profiteering efforts
and in guaranteeing many of the subprime loans that were recklessly written by mortgage
brokers and banks. See supra Part II.B.4.
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economic collapse simply names in code minority Americans and "welfare"
affirmative action as the prime progenitor of the global meltdown. And this coding
persists with remarkable intensity amongst a wide swath of Americans.4 36
Racial coding has a long tradition in the United States. That it persists in the
purportedly postracial Obama era belies the very positioning of postracialism and
postracialists. Racial coding entails engaging issues "such as crime and welfare are
now widely viewed as 'coded' issues" that play upon race-or more centrally,
upon white Americans' negative views of black Americans-without explicitly
raising the race card.437 By embracing coded issues, politicians and pundits are
able to exploit white American's racial animosity and resentment toward minority
Americans while diminishing the appearance of race hatred or race baiting.438
Classic examples of code talk or racial coding in fairly recent U.S. history
include the political invocations of the "welfare queen," the Willie Horton
advertisements in the 1988 Bush/Dukakis presidential campaign, and the "Harold,
call me" advertisements in the 2006 Harold Ford, Jr., Tennessee Senate campaign,
amongst so many others examples.
The "welfare queen" entered American tradition during the Reagan years,
wherein poor African American women in urban centers were coded as welfare
recipients reliant on government largesse and as gaming the system by bearing
scads of unruly babies in order to receive greater governmental assistance. 43 9 The
racial coding of "welfare queen" has become so imprinted on America's
consciousness that mere mention of the term immediately brings to mind inner-city
black women who lazily wait for first of the month welfare checks to arrive by
mail.440 Of course, as described above,441 racial coding requires a suspension of the

436

See supra Part III.A; see also Pressman, supra note 365 (providing more than two

hundred comments to the online Business Week article, which discloses the venom that
dozens of commentators hold against the Community Reinvestment Act, and that they
blame it-and minorities-for causing the financial crisis).
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See Martin Gilens, Race Coding and White Opposition to Welfare, 90 AM. POL.

BYRNE EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN
REACTION: THE IMPACT OF RACE, RIGHTS AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS 198-214

SCI. REV. 593, 593 (1996); see also THOMAS

(1992) (describing the emergence of coded language during the Reagan Administration).
438 See Tim Wise, Imagine if the Tea Party Was Black, OPEN SALON (Apr. 26, 2010,
6:56 AM), http://open.salon.com/blog/theone69/2010/04/26/imagineifthetea_party was
_black bytim wise (describing the American racial double standard in connection with
racial animosity and racial exploitations); EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 437, at 198;
Gilens, supra note 437, at 593, 602.
439 See Nathan Tobin, Disrobing the Welfare Queen, WIRETAP (July 10, 2000),
http://www.wiretapmag.org/stories/9435/; Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Republicans and
Race, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2007, at A23; Franklin D. Gilliam, The "Welfare
Queen" Experiment: How Viewers React to Images of African American Mothers on
Welfare, NIEMANN REP. (Summer 1999), http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reportsitem

.aspx?id=102223.
See sources cited supra note 439.
"' See supra Part III.B.
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truth. The "welfare queen" largely does not exist, particularly in urban centers. 442
Most Americans on welfare in the United States are poor whites. Nevertheless, this
racial coding allows white Americans to disdainfully condemn poor African
American mothers as a blight and unworthy of assistance or compassion.
Willie Horton entered American tradition during the 1988 George H. W. Bush
presidential campaign against Michael Dukakis, wherein a political commercial
aired by the Bush campaign used a black rapist and murderer (Horton) who had
been granted a weekend prison release from a Massachusetts penitentiary to
symbolize Dukakis's purported softness on crime.443 While the advertisement was
ostensibly about crime and Dukakis's support of prison release programs, it
ultimately was racially coded to present the black male criminal stereotype and
was meant to induce fear in white Americans. 4 The commercial is roundly
considered the primary reason that President Bush was able to overcome doubledigit deficits in the polls and played expertly into America's fear of the black male
criminal."5 Of course, as described above, racial coding requires a fabrication and
distortion of the truth. Michael Dukakis had no connection to Willie Horton," 6 and
violent crimes in the United States are carried out far more often by white
perpetrators than black.44 7 Nevertheless, racial coding allows race baiting to be
perpetrated without explicit reference to race based on white Americans'
resentments toward minority citizens.
"Harold, call me" entered American politics during the 2006 Tennessee
Senate campaign between African American candidate Harold Ford, Jr. and white
candidate Bob Corker, where the Republican National Committee released an antiHarold Ford commercial featuring a scantily clad white woman who winks into the
camera and implores Harold Ford to "call me."4 8 While the advertisement was
ostensibly about Ford being unprepared or wrong on the politics, it was ultimately
See sources cited supranote 439.
4See Gilens, supra note 437, at 593; Jon Hurwitz & Mark Peffley, Playing the Race
Card in the Post-Willie Horton Era: The Impact of Racialized Code Words on Supportfor
Punitive Crime Policy, 69 PUB. OPINION Q. 99, 100-01 (Spring 2005), available at
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4See Gilens, supra note 437, at 593.
44 See Jake Tapper, The Willie Horton Alumni Association, SALON (Aug 25, 2000,
13:31 ET), http://www.salon.com/news/politics/feature/2000/08/25/horton.
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See id.
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("In 2009, 69.1
44

percent of all individuals arrested were white, 28.3 percent were black, and 2.6 percent
were of other races.").
48 Harold FordJr. Not for Tennessee, YouTUBE (Oct. 22, 2006), http://www.you
tube.com/watch?v-kkizldlGsA; see Peter Wallsten, GOP Attack Ad Draws Heat for
Racial Overtones: The Tennessee Spot Is Denounced as More of the "Southern Strategy,"
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2006, at A14; Anti-Harold Ford Ad Draws Racism Charges,
TRUTHDIG (Oct. 24, 2006), http://www.truthdig.com/avbooth/item/200601024_harold
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racially coded to present the black-male/white-female interracial relationship taboo
that continues in many corners of the United States and was meant to induce fear
in white Tennesseans." 9 The commercial was aired in the last weeks of an
exceptionally close Senate campaign and is roundly considered as "a very serious
appeal to a racist sentiment."450 Again, as described above, racial coding requires a
fabrication and distortion of the truth. Racial coding allows race baiting to be
perpetrated without explicit reference to race based on white American's
continuing resentments toward minority citizens.
This racial coding, blaming the minority poor, continues unabated in
"postracial" America. 4 51 Following the tradition of the "welfare queen," Willie
Horton, and "Harold, call me," politicians and pundits seized upon the Community
Reinvestment Act and governmental housing policy "affirmative action" through
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to code race and disseminate racial hostility in a
wide-ranging misdirection from the true underlying causes of the financial market
crisis. The countless politicians, commentators, economists, and citizens who
blame the Community Reinvestment Act for the financial market crisis literally
suspend reality in order to code minority citizens as responsible for the economic
collapse. The Fannie and Freddie finger-pointers are engaging in classic race
baiting. The code talk creates subterfuge and massive misdirection in connection
with the reality of the meltdown, as painstakingly described above.452 While
capitalism and neoclassical economics should be critically interrogated in light of
the colossal failures in the private financial sector that precipitated the crisis, we
are instead fervently engaged in propping up these two systems that failed us so
spectacularly.45 3
B. Coming ofAge?

Postracialism is a deeply loaded term. Taken lightly, postracialism can mean
simply that our nation has transcended the "color line" and that truly all people are
created equal and treated fairly in this country. Surely, if an African American can
become president, race is no longer an issue worthy of discussion. On a much
44
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(Oct. 25, 2006), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15403071/ (quoting a former Republican
senator from Maine who acknowledged the race-baiting nature of the ad).
451 See Kevin R. Johnson & George A. Martinez, Discriminationby Proxy: The Case
of Proposition 227 and the Ban on Bilingual Education, 33 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 1227,

1269-71 (2000) (identifying the use of "proxy" language as racial coding to enable
discriminatory policies against "aliens" and "immigrants" particularly in the context of
Mexican Americans).
452
See supra Part II.
453 See generally JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 2 (describing the intimate
relationship between Washington D.C. and Wall Street, and identifying how the Wall
Street economy has recently become synonymous with the American economy).
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deeper level, postracialism can be used as a tool to perpetuate white privilege and
lend additional power to entrenched elites. On a more subtle, contemptible level,
racial coding is often used as a mechanism for claiming "colorblindness" as a
valued principle but engaging in race baiting and racial fearmongering by playing
on the fears of white American's without explicitly mentioning race.454 When
those claiming postracialism are the same parties perpetrating instances of racial
coding, a particularly reprehensible plane of racism is on display.
Professor Sumi Cho describes one outcome or effect of postracialism as a
result of adopting a postracial construct-"whether intended or not, [it] is the
ultimate redemption of whiteness: a sociocultural process by which whiteness is
restored to its full pre-civil-rights value."455 In embracing a postracial
conceptualization, Professor Cho argues that the full value of white privilege is
captured for whites as unjust enrichment is disaggregated from racist complicity
based on the occurrence of the "big event" of racial transcendence.45 6 The election
of Barack Obama as president fully realizes the equality dream for minority
citizens and returns whiteness to its comfortable place of dominance and privilege.
Racial remedies and racial discourse are off the table in a postracial world and
those that engage in continuing racial discussion are agitators seeking to place race
where it no longer belongs.4 57 The nation has rebooted. Equal opportunity is freely
available and as a consequence white privilege reigns supreme.
The irony of the survival of the dirty little myth in a purported postracial
nation is that the myth of minority fault for economic collapse serves as subterfuge
for the deeply cynical purpose of maintaining "capitalism" and American
corporatocracy as a wealthy white tradition. Surely scapegoating minority
borrowers as guilty for bringing the global financial markets down is disgraceful,
but when done to prop up the very systems that actually failed the nation, simply
because those systems are the playground of the white privileged and powerful, is
truly diabolical.
The financial market crisis can teach us many lessons. One of the most
poignant is that postracialism is a dream-a worthy dream, but still a distant one.
Predatory lenders targeted African American and Latino borrowers at alarming
rates. Minority borrowers were steered into riskier and costlier loans despite credit
scores that situated them comfortably within prime loan territory and were eligible
for far less costly and risky mortgages. Once the subprime mortgage market
collapsed, dozens of commentators and now millions of Americans, including
economists, legislators, think tank employees, citizens, and neighbors place the
blame for the financial market crisis squarely at the feet of African American and
Latino homeowners. In a dreadful distortion, millions of Americans now blame
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minority borrowers and through racial coding the Community Reinvestment Act,
Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac as the literal crisis scapegoats. If we as a nation had
truly arrived at a postracial, colorblind place, then this dirty little myth could not
exist and proliferate like a racist disease.
The financial market crisis has laid bare our true place, and it is not postracial.
The dirty little myth and its accompanying racial coding indicate that we are not
close to becoming a truly postracial America.
V. CONCLUSION

The financial market crisis of 2008 literally invites interrogation of sacred
economic traditions in the United States. A near total collapse of the global capital
markets signals genuine problems with American capitalism and the neoclassical
economics modeling so prevalent today. Yet, we are largely failing the invitation
to critically examine the underlying economic principles our markets are currently
based upon. One reason that we are failing the invitation to challenge our classic
capitalist underpinnings is because many of the entrenched elite in the United
States have misdirected our attention. When a massive failure in the private
markets nearly collapses the economy, one simmering reason offered up for the
underlying cause is minority borrowers in most of our city's urban centers. Many
in this country have fully embraced this classic racist misdirection.
The genuine underlying causes of the financial market crisis of 2008 have
been carefully outlined above. The reasons and causes are complex, difficult, and
wide-ranging. Very few market players are innocent when it comes to the
subprime mortgage industry collapse. Individuals and corporations must be held
responsible for their roles, including Wall Street, commercial banks, investment
banks, corporate executives, CEOs, regulators, legislators, individual borrowers,
lenders, mortgage brokers, credit rating agencies, and governmental entities. All
must recognize its role in the meltdown and honestly explore how it needs to
change to better protect U.S. shareholders and investors. The parties least culpable
for the near global meltdown and least in need of absolution are minority
borrowers, particularly minority borrowers that took out loans through the
Community Reinvestment Act.
This classic racial coding must be summarily rejected if we ever hope to reach
our twin goals of genuinely safeguarding our nation's capital markets and arriving
at a truly postracial positioning in America.

